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ABSTRACT 
 
BENJAMIN SAMMONS: Reforming Readers: Agency and Activism 
In the Long Progressive Era 
(Under the direction of Linda Wagner-Martin) 
 
 
This dissertation argues that between 1860 and 1945, a period that I call the Long 
Progressive Era, American fiction about poverty dramatizes a crisis of agency besetting 
the middle and upper classes. A pervasive unease about human volition arose among the 
affluent as the growing anonymity of urban life, the rationalization of many forms of 
labor, and the articulation of a thoroughly Darwinian worldview challenged liberal 
doctrines of autonomous selfhood. The activity of reading poverty fiction focused these 
bourgeois doubts because, first, it confronted the affluent with the disturbing spectacle of 
a stereotypically disempowered underclass and, second, it registered the increasing 
professionalization of both poverty relief and literary reading, two fields of labor to 
which the affluent citizen’s access was newly mediated by a class of proprietary 
specialists. Thus, the reading of poverty fiction became an exemplary negotiation of 
broadly philosophical and historically specific challenges to bourgeois agency. 
Unlike the post-World War II period, when similar anxieties about impersonal 
political and social institutions habitually devolved into paranoia, the interwar period I 
study retained a measure of balance in its agency crisis. Contrary to narratives of decline 
that characterize the Long Progressive Era in terms of a linear diminution of the 
individual’s capacities, I argue that this period produced staunch defenders (and 
 iii 
practitioners) of agency as well as thinkers who, in the face of advancing modernity, 
abdicated once-assumed powers of human volition. In studies of poverty fiction by 
Rebecca Harding Davis, William Dean Howells, Edith Wharton, and John Steinbeck, I 
examine the figure of the reader as one whose activist or quietist responses to fictional 
and real-life poverty model the diverse responses of bourgeois Americans to the 
philosophical specter of determinism. I conclude by reflecting on the continuing legacy, 
in the similar but more paranoid contemporary American landscape, of reading imagined 
as a site of agency’s erasure or assertion. 
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Agency, Reform, and Reading in Late Modern America 
In the title of this study, Reforming Readers, the subject is indeterminate. 
“Readers” may be the subjects or objects of “reforming” activity, either enacting reform 
on, say, a set of social conditions or a particular demographic, or undergoing reform by, 
perhaps, a moralizing discourse or an activist literature. The title presents a problem of 
agency and subjectivity: who or what is acting? And, further, who or what can act? Can 
literature, for example, properly be considered an agent? How much agency can be 
ascribed to a reader of fiction? Such questions motivate this entire study—just as, I argue, 
they motivated Americans who lived between the Civil War and World War II, a period 
that, for reasons I explain below, I call the Long Progressive Era. In this period, fiction 
about the poor dramatized a crisis of agency among the affluent, not only in the stories it 
told but especially in the relations it constructed with readers. The problematic role of the 
reader in this fiction paralleled the problematic role of the well-to-do citizen troubled by 
poverty. A few examples illustrate the point. 
In Rebecca Harding Davis’s Life in the Iron-Mills (1861) the narrator charges the 
reader to “come right down with [her]” into the squalid urban underworld she depicts. In 
Edith Wharton’s introduction to The Book of the Homeless (1916), a multi-author 
collection she edited to raise funds for her World War I charities, she imagines the text as 
a building in which she plays the hostess: “So I efface myself from the threshold and ask 
you to walk in.” In John Steinbeck’s Tortilla Flat (1935), however, the narrator bars the 
2 
reader (and himself) from a room where his impoverished characters are grieving the loss 
of a friend: “The door was, and is, closed,” he says. In each of these texts, an image of a 
threshold signals the author’s concern for the reader’s role in the text; and, as these are 
texts about poverty, that literary concern is also a social concern about the reader’s 
relation to the poor. In what ways, these authors are all keen to determine, does entrance 
into a fictional world influence readers’ lives in the real world? More specifically, when a 
fictional world is rife with social problems, like poverty, how does readers’ engagement 
with that world mediate their relationship to the historical, embodied work of social 
reform? These questions are common to poverty fiction across this era, but these three 
authors’ distinctive constructions of the threshold between fiction and social reality, and 
their different manners of policing that border, reflect competing ideas about poverty and 
social reform, textuality and reading, and human subjectivity and agency.1 
 In the past, however, literary critics have not pursued extended inquiries on 
human agency through this period’s fiction about poverty. I do for multiple reasons. First, 
the Long Progressive Era itself has often been studied in terms of agency—more 
                                                
1  I use the term “poverty fiction” to refer to a subset of the genre that Amanda Claybaugh 
calls “the novel of purpose,” the offspring of a marriage of social reform writing and literary 
realism that she deems “the predominant nineteenth-century genre in both Great Britain and the 
United States” (9). Novelists of purpose considered their fictions “performative” in the same way 
that the nonfictional writings of social reform were; they “thought of novels not as self-contained 
aesthetic objects but rather as active interventions into social and political life” (36). However, 
while Claybaugh’s term encompasses “nonreformist novels” that nonetheless “took [their] 
conception of purposefulness from reform,” my term designates only fiction that thematizes 
reform. It also embraces a wider historical period than the “novel of purpose,” whose lifespan 
Claybaugh limits to the second half of the nineteenth century. 
I take poverty relief as a representative field of social reform. While choosing this single 
expression of reform limits the scope of my argument somewhat, and while choosing another 
project (e.g., temperance, women’s sufferage, civil rights, crime, sanitation, mental illness) would 
not yield an identical narrative, poverty relief was an extraordinarily inclusive work, 
encompassing or overlapping every one of the reform projects listed above. Therefore, to study 
poverty relief is, in some important respects, to study them all. 
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specifically, in terms of a tension between, on the one hand, the reformist zeal that 
deployed new organizational methods and bureaucratic structures to renovate social and 
political relations and, on the other hand, the feeling of personal diminution, of spiritual 
impoverishment, that such rationalizing campaigns bequeathed even to the reformers.2 
This tension between feelings of empowerment and disempowerment is a broad cultural 
phenomenon that I examine at greater length and that forms a backdrop for this entire 
study. 
 Second, and more specifically, fiction reading per se changed dramatically in the 
Long Progressive Era. Like so many forms of labor, it underwent professionalization; 
                                                
2  Reforming Readers dubs the period between the Civil War and World War II the Long 
Progressive Era. I prefer this nomenclature to a term like “late modernity,” which is nearly as 
serviceable, because it emphasizes the reformist spirit that is often associated with the 
traditionally defined Progressive Era but that, I argue, suffuses the entire inter-war period. Even 
Richard Hofstadter’s classic study, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (1955), which 
makes distinctions between the Populist movement, the Progressive movement, and the New Deal, 
finds unity in the “age” that encompasses all three movements. Admittedly, my inclusion of 
Rebecca Harding Davis’s work from the 1860s gives Reforming Readers an earlier starting point 
than most comparable studies; but in Life in the Iron-Mills (1861), Davis anticipates techtonic 
shifts in both poverty relief and literary culture that would shape the landscape in which William 
Dean Howells found himself in the 1880s. 
Seminal historical studies of the (traditionally defined) Progressive Era include 
Hofstadter’s Age of Reform and Robert Wiebe’s The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (1967). While 
these writers’ claims have been disputed and revised ad infinitum, they set a precedent of 
analyzing Progressivism as a movement largely about middle-class power—for Hofstadter, a 
recovery of social and political power that an established middle class lost to industrial titans after 
the Civil War and, for Wiebe, a pursuit of social and political power that a new middle class saw 
available to them in modern bureaucratic structures. For recent historical studies of poverty relief 
in the period, see Alan Dawley’s Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State 
(1991); James Patterson’s America’s Struggle Against Poverty in the Twentieth Century (2000), 
esp. “The Gospel of Prevention, Progressive Style,” pp. 19-37; and Alice O’Connor’s Poverty 
Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History 
(2001), esp. “Origins: Poverty and Social Science in the Era of Progressive Reform,” pp. 25-54. 
Like many recent scholars of this period, I highlight the ambivalence of late-modern 
reform, which often carried the seeds of its own defeat and constrained human freedom even as it 
liberated. Paul Boyer located this ambivalence, for example, in the “familiar urban moral-control 
cycle, from initial enthusiasm to baffled discouragement” (155). While I steer clear of “social 
control” theses, which seem to me reductive and somewhat unfertile, I do read Progressives’ 
reform efforts in constant dialogue with their anxieties about agency, anxieties that fed on 
reform’s capacity to impoverish spiritually even while it enriched materially. 
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book-of-the-month clubs and a new class of literary scholars made aesthetic taste a matter 
of technical expertise, undermining the genteel generalist’s claim to untrained aesthetic 
authority. What to read and how to do so became questions for specialists to answer. 
Third, and perhaps more fundamentally, affluent Americans in this period found their 
own agency challenged by the conspicuous weakness (real or perceived) of the poor. This 
challenge was multivalent: it depended partially on imagining the poor as the affluent 
classes’ abject Other, disturbing embodiments of economic, social, and moral 
impotence.3 The challenge also proceeded from a close association of the poor with a 
broad culture of reform. Overwhelmingly, writers in this period understood cultures of 
poverty as degraded imitations of bourgeois culture; only in the mid-twentieth century 
would Americans begin to see the former as independent systems of positive value and 
practice. Therefore, to write or read about the poor between the wars was to assume the 
need for reform, and, for reasons I discuss below, the contemporary culture of reform was 
a primary—perhaps, the primary—locus of bourgeois anxieties about agency. Thus, 
when affluent authors represented the poor, and when affluent readers read about them, 
they inevitably confronted a culture of reform that evoked troubling questions about their 
own moral efficacy. 
 Finally, this study excludes the post-war period because writers in that era, more 
often than those in the Long Progressive Era, embraced historiographies that define 
modernity in terms of a continuous diminution of individual agency—stories that Jennifer 
Fleissner calls “narrative[s] of decline” (15). In these accounts, an emerging culture of 
                                                
3 In this respect Reforming Readers is a distant relation of Karen Sánchez-Eppler’s project in 
Dependent States: The Child’s Part in Nineteenth-Century American Culture (2005), where 
rather than the poor, children provide the figure of dependency and minimal agency through 
which a more obviously empowered population conceptualizes its own capacities for action. 
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professionalism, to borrow Burton Bledstein’s term, and an expanding governmental 
bureaucracy transform American life according to a rationalizing ethos that, if it renders 
many forms of labor more efficient, also diminishes individuals’ sense of creativity, 
originality, and uniqueness. Extending Frederick Winslow Taylor’s principles of 
scientific management to every sphere of life results, unexpectedly, in a loss of individual 
freedom and agency. Far from apotheosizing the human being, then, modernity lays 
unprecedented constraints on the individual will. Scientific management turns selves into 
automata, making human relations more efficient at the cost of spiritual vitality, moral 
force, and psychological coherence. This pessimistic narrative culminates in what literary 
critics have alternately called the “culture of paranoia” and the “culture of conspiracy,” 
which, in post-World War II America, pits the beleaguered individual against sinister, 
impersonal institutions that govern his movements without his consent.4 
 Scholarship on the Long Progressive Era has often deployed such narratives of 
decline, interpreting the period’s diverse reform movements as a fundamentally unified 
expression of Taylorist impulses. Alongside the work of poverty relief, movements 
concerning temperance, woman suffrage, sanitation, low-income housing, care of the 
mentally ill, education, domestic management, and industrial engineering comprised a 
culture of reform aiming to root out vice and waste from every sphere of human activity. 
                                                
4 See Timothy Melley’s diagnosis of a postwar “agency panic” in The Empire of Conspiracy: The 
Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America (2000) (10). The postwar generation’s “all-or-nothing 
conception of agency” renders it prone to panic and, crucially, distinguishes that generation from 
Americans of the Long Progressive Era, who responded not only to romantic conceptions of 
agency in the work of William Dean Howells and John Steinbeck but also to the nuanced 
accounts of freedom and constraint promulgated by Rebecca Harding Davis and Edith Wharton. 
For more on postwar paranoia, see Peter Knight’s edited volume, Conspiracy Nation: The 
Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America (2002) and his earlier monograph, Conspiracy Culture: 
From the Kennedy Assassination to the X-Files (2000). 
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Thus, one might expect the Long Progressive Era’s poverty fiction, so bound up with that 
culture of reform, to appropriate and enact the narrative of decline. In fact, some of this 
fiction does. However, the poverty fiction I study maintains a critical relationship with 
that pessimistic narrative lamenting a modern loss of agency. If some of the authors I 
study succumb to modernity’s more enervating influences, as I argue William Dean 
Howells and John Steinbeck do, their loss of faith in the will comes as a surprise because 
they so convincingly tell stories of human dignity untrammeled by adverse 
circumstances. On the other hand, despite painting one of the bleakest images of 
industrial working conditions in the American canon, Rebecca Harding Davis staunchly 
defends the individual power of choice; and Edith Wharton, sensibly labeled a naturalist 
by many literary critics, imagines human beings’ compromises with fate or circumstance 
as genuine, even invigorating, acts of will. Imagined as a coherent literary tradition, 
shaped by a set of shared social conditions and moral concerns, the poverty fiction of this 
period displays a tension between confidence and doubt in human agency—a conflict 
that, sometimes productive and sometimes paralyzing, need not have resolved itself into 
the next generation’s pervasive fear.  
 Post-World War II fiction about agency, tending toward paranoia about 
depersonalizing institutions, does not flow inevitably from American poverty fiction 
between 1860 and 1945. In that earlier period, William Dean Howells and John Steinbeck 
found themselves trapped in a modern (i.e., Cartesian) binary that suggested, to simplify 
only slightly, human beings were either autonomous and volitional, or they were radically 
contingent—shaped and moved by environmental, biological, and/or metaphysical 
forces—and thus incapable of choice. Such a construction of human being indeed lends 
7 
itself to the pessimism and fear of post-World War II fiction. Challenging Howells’s and 
Steinbeck’s vision, though, was Rebecca Harding Davis’s and Edith Wharton’s, which 
understood the contingency of the self as a necessary condition of agency. These women 
drew on a premodern concept that Charles Taylor calls the “‘porous’ self,” which lived in 
an enchanted cosmos and was subject to penetration and possession by spirits—and was 
no less a willful subject for all that (A Secular Age 38). I do not mean to cast Davis or 
Wharton as believers in sprites and fairies (although both wrote stories of the 
preternatural), but I do claim that the idea of a self permeated by external forces did not 
threaten Davis and Wharton in the way it did Howells and Steinbeck. Indeed, as I show in 
Chapters 2 and 4, Davis’s and Wharton’s characters often appear most decisive and 
empowered in moments when they are least isolated and most conspicuously related to an 
Other or to the environment. 
 These two authors produce a sense of agency that does not presume the self’s 
independence or sovereignty but assumes the self’s relationality and boundedness—
boundedness not in the sense of discreteness but of limitation. The self is formed by its 
environment and its own biology, and it expresses its powers only under those limiting 
conditions. Contrary to modern suggestions that the individual exerts his will in acts of 
conquest, triumphing over environment and biology, Davis and Wharton imply that the 
individual is most powerful when she creatively and strategically inhabits the limitations 
of environment, body, and relationship. 
Scholarly Contexts 
Any study of agency so defined must be attentive to its own contexts and 
conditions of plausibility. Therefore, I want briefly to suspend the main argument to 
8 
describe the literary critical situation of Reforming Readers and to draw the historical 
setting of the fiction I study in some greater detail. The last decade has produced a wealth 
of literary criticism and theory engaging the topic of agency.5 Some of the attention to 
this topic has been implicit, as in the manifold expressions of the “cognitive turn” in 
literary studies, which, in pursuing materialist accounts of consciousness, calls for a 
dramatic rethinking of the category of agency. Alternately, the strain of literary 
scholarship concerned with the ethics of reading generally assumes the existence of 
human agents, without whom ethics would have to be radically reconceived or 
abandoned. Other scholarship has more explicitly addressed matters of agency, including 
literary applications of systems theory and posthumanist theory, which redefine agency in 
extending it to nonhuman entities or networks.6 Still other studies, like Paisley 
Livingston’s Literature and Rationality: Ideas of Agency in Theory and Fiction (1991) 
and Meili Steele’s Theorizing Textual Subjects (1997), aim directly at a theory of human 
agency that can steer between deconstructionist and liberal accounts of subjectivity, the 
one positing a self entirely formed by discourse and the other asserting an autonomous, 
rational self. 7 
                                                
5 In May 2012, searching the MLA Bibliography for books with “agency” as a keyword yields 
179 results since 2000, with 140 of those titles appearing in 2005 or later. 
 
6 Indispensable texts in systems theory include Bruno Latour’s Reassembling the Social: An 
Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (2005) and Niklas Luhmann’s Social Systems (1995). In 
posthumanist theory, Donna Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of 
Nature (1991) and Cary Wolfe’s What Is Posthumanism? (2010) are helpful introductions to the 
field. 
 
7 For approaches to literary agency akin to Livingston’s and Steele’s, see Allen Speight’s Hegel, 
Literature, and the Problem of Agency (2001) and Marshall Gregory’s Shaped by Stories: The 
Ethical Power of Narratives (2009). 
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Within this field of scholarship concerned with agency, two types of work have 
proved most influential for my own study. The first of these investigates the ethics of 
reading, in most cases assuming or asserting that literary reading can avert the hazards of 
voyeurism and moral evasion by fashioning what Adam Zachary Newton calls 
“intersubjective ties,” or “relations of provocation, call, and response that bind narrator 
and listener, author and character, or reader and text” (13).8 I have found the work of 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Georges Poulet, and Wayne Booth especially useful in conceiving of a 
literary language that fosters dialogical, even friendly, relations—rather than exploitative 
ones—among readers, characters, and authors.9 Finally, my project, invested as it is in the 
potential of activist reading, draws inspiration from Paul Ricoeur’s claim that, because of 
the work of the reader, “the text is not closed in upon itself but open onto the world, 
which it redescribes and remakes” (132).10 
                                                
8 Such critiques find classic expression in Walter Benjamin’s “The Storyteller”: “What draws the 
reader to the novel is the hope of warming his shivering body with a death he reads about” (88). 
Similarly, Emmanuel Levinas argues that all art, “essentially disengaged, constitutes, in a world 
of initiative and responsibility, a dimension of evasion”; to him, enjoying literature is like 
“feasting during a plague” (12). 
 
9 See Bakhtin’s theory of the novel’s dialogical language in “Discourse in the Novel,” Poulet’s 
account of the intimate relation between reader and author in “The Phenomenology of Reading,” 
and Booth’s notion of companionate reading in The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction 
(1988). Important deconstructionist accounts of quasi-/personal, ethical relations formed in 
literary reading are J. Hillis Miller’s The Ethics of Reading: Kant, DeMan, Eliot, Trollope, James, 
and Benjamin (1987) and much of Derek Attridge’s work, beginning with The Singularity of 
Literature (2004). Finally, Andrew Miller’s The Burdens of Perfection: On Ethics and Reading in 
Nineteenth-Century British Literature (2008) is a model of theoretically sophisticated, historically 
grounded, and formally acute scholarship that imagines ways in which fiction can urge readers 
out of solipsism and into saving relationships with others. 
 
10  In his book, From Text to Action (1991), Ricoeur describes a two-step reading process by 
which readers translate literature into praxis. The first step, called explanation, “bring[s] out the 
structure” of the text; this step is purely analytical. However, the second step, called interpretation, 
involves “follow[ing] the path of thought opened up by the text” and “plac[ing] oneself en route 
toward the orient of the text” (121-22). In interpretation, a reader reconfigures both herself and 
her world in harmony with the configuration of the text. 
10 
More generally, studying the ethics of reading corrects a blind spot in the growing 
field of agency studies. While authors, characters, social institutions, and disembodied 
forces all appear in the existing scholarship as agents, readers have been surprisingly 
overlooked, even though they represent the interface between fiction and history. In the 
period I study this elision is all the more problematic because the era witnessed dramatic 
changes in bourgeois conceptions and practices of reading. These changes in reading 
usually carried implications for the question of readers’ agency, and as such they 
conditioned the writing and reading of fiction at the time, they offer a window on 
contemporary notions of agency beyond the literary realm, and they should inform our 
ongoing interpretations of the fiction and culture of that period. My project posits the 
reader of reform fiction as an exemplary figure in the Long Progressive Era’s struggle 
with agency. Both formed by and forming the discourses that swirled around this 
problem, both acted upon and acting, such readers embodied the agency of late-modern, 
middle-class Americans. 
The other type of agency scholarship that has most influenced Reforming Readers 
is the richly historicized investigation of agency from within the disciplines of history, 
cultural studies, and literary studies. First, James Block’s A Nation of Agents (2002), a 
sweeping reinterpretation of United States history as a collective pursuit of agency, has 
sharpened my conception of that term, making it not a negative liberty but a particular 
form of freedom under constraint, a potent force generated in balancing the claims of the 
                                                                                                                                            
While From Text to Action does not focus explicitly on the ethical implications of reading, 
some related theoretical projects imagine salutary social outcomes from reading, including Elaine 
Scarry’s On Beauty and Being Just (1999) and Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge: Essays in 
Philosophy and Literature (1990) and Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life 
(1995). 
 
11 
individual with those of the community.11 In cultural studies, Jackson Lears’s No Place of 
Grace (1981), Martha Banta’s Taylored Lives (1993), and Jennifer Fleissner’s Women, 
Compulsion, Modernity (2004) have served me by situating a late-modern crisis of 
agency in various discrete communities and by narrating several modes of self-assertion 
and self-preservation through which historical actors engaged that crisis. Finally, Robert 
Chodat’s Worldly Objects and Sentient Things (2008), which argues that twentieth-
century literature did not announce the death of agency but its relocation in entities and 
energies previously considered non-volitional, has helped me to recognize not only 
bourgeois Americans’ suspicion of their diminished agency but also their attribution of 
increased agency to the poor and to literary texts.12 
Beyond studies of agency per se, an emerging literary-critical conversation about 
poverty fiction has helped me to frame this project. Addressing one of the first problems 
confronting scholars of this fiction, Amanda Claybaugh points to a “longstanding debate 
                                                
11 Block narrates United States history as the evolving application of a philosophical development 
he traces to seventeenth-century England: the emergence of a “new human character type,” the 
agent, meant that “individuals shifted from being servants of God and society carrying out rigidly 
defined duties on behalf of distantly formulated but fully designated ends. They became agents, 
that is, individuals participating actively in shaping the worldly means to be employed for 
realizing divine and collective purposes” (22). Agents did not choose the ends that their actions 
would serve; these were defined by God and/or society at large. But agents were the creative 
masters of means, of the mechanisms by which those ends were achieved. Placing the figure of 
the agent at the center of United States history, Block argues that the American experiment 
framed “modernity as the continuing project of reconciling individual prerogatives and normative 
order” (16). The agency civilization’s “vision was of individuals freed from lifelong 
submissiveness within authoritarian hierarchies in every domain of societal life in order to be 
resubordinated to the emerging institutions of liberal society, and placed qua individuals as equal 
agents capable of undertaking the realization of collective ends” (29). 
 
12 Other exemplary studies of this historicized sort include Alan Trachtenberg’s The 
Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (1982), James Livingston’s 
Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850-1940 (1994), and, in a 
British context, Andrew H. Miller’s excellent The Burdens of Perfection: On Ethics and Reading 
in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (2008) and Anne Frey’s British State Romanticism: 
Authorship, Agency, and Bureaucratic Nationalism (2010). 
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among historians about whether reform helped to create a more humane and enlightened 
world or whether it served as a form of discipline and social control” (43-44). Literary 
critics differ on the same point in reference to poverty fiction: does it participate in the 
empowerment of the poor or the consolidation of bourgeois power? Scholars have argued 
that poverty fiction contributes to several ends other than, or contrary to, care for the 
poor. Claybaugh contends that writers frequently deployed the “novel of purpose” for 
primarily artistic or professional aims—to enable formal experimentation, to imbue their 
fiction with a sense of purposefulness, or to tap a wider audience. Amy Schrager Lang 
and Gavin Jones each describe the ways in which fiction ostensibly about class or 
poverty, lacking a rich vocabulary for this subject matter, often borrows the language of 
race or gender and ends up saying as much or more about these topics as they do about 
class or poverty. In Feeling for the Poor (2010) Carolyn Betensky claims that Victorian 
“social-problem novels” did not call their bourgeois readers to ameliorative action; they 
taught such audiences that their feelings, and the reading that prompted them, were 
important by themselves (1). Such novels were manuals in “bourgeois selving” (4). 
Finally, Eric Schocket argues not that fiction about class serves purposes other than 
economic justice but that it tends to undermine justice. The trope of “unveiling” poverty 
for the previously ignorant reader does not move audiences to restructure society more 
equitably but rather to feel sympathy for the poor, which in turn promotes a false sense of 
cross-class identification rather than a more realistic recognition of difference. 
Gavin Jones and Carolyn Betensky, however, both of whom turn a keen eye on 
reform fiction’s ambivalences and hypocrisies, find potential for progressive social action 
in this literature. In his effort to theorize poverty as a category for literary critical 
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discourse, Jones challenges scholars to “recognize the aesthetic dimension of poverty, the 
complex ways that it has catalyzed the forms and content of literary expression, without 
merely dismissing this aesthetic as an act of internal ‘colonization’ or as a repressive, 
bourgeois appropriation of the poor” (19). Betensky claims that reform fiction generally 
expresses both altruism and selfishness and neither disqualifies the other for critical 
attention: “Social problem novels [. . .] are complex, unsteady attempts to do both of 
these things at once—to look after the other and to look after the self. Reading them as 
doing purely one or the other, it seems to me, is to take only the lessons we most want 
from them, and not necessarily the ones we can most use” (21). I follow Jones and 
Betensky in acknowledging the operations of “colonization,” “appropriation,” and 
“look[ing] after the self” in poverty fiction but also in affirming the aesthetic possibilities 
in this literature and the likelihood that it carries “lessons” we can use.13 Poverty fiction’s 
negotiation of the late modern crisis of agency through the figure of the reader, a matter 
impinging directly on care for the poor in the Long Progressive Era, strikes me as an 
eminently “usable” aesthetic engagement with poverty. 
 Reforming Readers analyzes the work of reading poverty fiction as a negotiation 
of the agency crisis I have described. To describe that negotiation more deeply, I provide 
                                                
13 This contemporary critical turn to the aesthetic as a potential site of social transformation 
mirrors a strategy of many Progressive Era intellectuals, artists, urban planners, and 
philanthropists. In Beautiful Democracy: Aesthetics and Anarchy in a Global Era (2007), Russ 
Castronovo traces the Progressive Era’s multifarious deployments of “the beautiful” as a means 
of forming a more democratic public sphere. Offering a sense of this cultural project’s 
methodological diversity, he writes, “While university researchers hypothesized beauty’s effects 
on subjects, urban reformers and social activists asked if flowers, slideshows of art’s masterpieces, 
and ‘high-class moving pictures’ could encourage people to act as agents in command of their 
own ethical destinies” (9). Like Gavin Jones and Carolyn Betensky on poverty fiction, 
Castronovo calls aesthetics “[b]oth a tool for crafting hegemony and an instrument of change” (8). 
For a related study focused primarily on the cultural work of poetry, see Lisa Szefel’s The Gospel 
of Beauty in the Progressive Era: Reforming American Verse and Values (2011). 
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historical accounts of both poverty relief and fiction reading in this period. Thus, the 
analysis of reading I provide in each single-author chapter corresponds to patterns of 
reading and reform specific to the author’s historical moment. However, three 
developments span the entire period, conditioning readings of all of these authors. Two of 
these developments are an increasing attribution of agency to fictional texts and to the 
poor. Novels and poor people “came to life” simultaneously in the bourgeois imagination, 
ceasing to be passive objects amenable to others’ intentions and becoming actors in their 
own right. One might imagine a zero-sum game in which these trends corresponded to a 
decrease in agency for readers of poverty fiction: as texts and poor people grow more 
powerful, reformist readers must grow weaker. Such an exchange might seem even more 
likely in light of the third development spanning this period, namely, the middle and 
upper classes’ gradual replacement of an integrated, autonomous self with a dis-
integrated self enmeshed in and constituted by social relations. This new prototype of 
personhood would justify a feeling of diminished agency among the affluent, but the 
fiction of this period reveals no consistent surrender of volition by cultural elites. As 
authors observe the growing force of fiction and the poor, and the reconstitution of 
selfhood, they reevaluate bourgeois agency differently from one another and, 
accordingly, construct a variety of roles for readers to inhabit. 
 William Dean Howells and John Steinbeck come to understand the affluent self as 
radically constrained, and their fiction positions readers as minor participants in the text 
and as spectators of poverty. Rebecca Harding Davis and Edith Wharton also recognize 
constraints on bourgeois agency, but they understand acceptance of those limitations as a 
choice and, moreover, an essential condition of meaningful action. Therefore, their 
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fiction imagines readers intervening significantly in the text and in the lives of the poor. 
Historical Contexts 
 Reforming Readers resists a popular narrative of decline by which intellectuals 
have described modernity’s relation to the individual. That narrative of decline itself 
protests a triumphalist telling of modernity’s salutary advance, more popular among 
utopian writers like Edward Bellamy, Social Darwinists, and industrial engineers like 
Frederick Winslow Taylor and Henry Ford. Still more intriguing, though, are the 
ideological and ethical differences between analysts of modernity who are neither 
triumphalist nor censorious and, despite sharing a more balanced perspective on 
modernity, adopt very different social practices in relation to cultural change. Henry 
Adams and Jane Addams, two of the United States’ keenest thinkers of modernity, 
demonstrate that even ambivalence can tend in one direction, and their lives illustrate 
alternate responses to even a nuanced perspective on modern “progress.” Before 
addressing these two figures directly, I want to reference William James’s writing on the 
human will as a conceptual framework in which their responses to modernity can appear 
as expressions of their thinking on agency. 
 Working in the increasingly scientific field of psychology, James confronted the 
specter of determinism in a “mechanical” or “materialistic” account of human 
consciousness, under the influence of which “nothing is easier than to indulge in a picture 
of the fatalistic character of human life” (Talks to Teachers 105). In a chapter on “The 
Will” in Talks to Teachers on Psychology (1899), James expresses the tug of fatalism this 
way: 
Man's conduct appears as the mere resultant of all his various impulsions 
and inhibitions. One object, by its presence, makes us act: another object 
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checks our action. Feelings aroused and ideas suggested by objects sway 
us one way and another [. . .]. The life in all this becomes prudential and 
moral; but the psychologic agents in the drama may be described, you see, 
as nothing but the 'ideas' themselves,—ideas for the whole system of 
which what we call the 'soul' or 'character' or 'will' of the person is nothing 
but a collective name. (Talks 105) 
 
In this same text, James ultimately affirms the freedom of the will.14 However, James 
takes care to say that voluntary action emerges not from a psychological terrain devoid of 
obstacles to action but from within “a complex field of consciousness,” full of inhibitions 
and “conflicting systems of ideas” (Talks 104). Indeed, the strongest acts of will emerge 
from conflicted minds: 
[T]he mind of him whose fields of consciousness are complex, and who, 
with the reasons for the action, sees the reasons against it, and yet, instead 
of being palsied, acts in the way that takes the whole field into 
consideration,—so, I say, is such a mind the ideal sort of mind [. . .]. 
Purely impulsive action, or action that proceeds to extremities regardless 
of consequences, on the other hand, is the easiest action in the world, and 
the lowest in type. Any one can show energy, when made quite reckless. 
An Oriental despot requires but little ability: as long as he lives, he 
succeeds, for he has absolutely his own way [. . .]. But not to proceed 
immediately to extremities, to be still able to act energetically under an 
array of inhibitions.—that indeed is rare and difficult. Cavour, when urged 
to proclaim martial law in 1859, refused to do so, saying: "Any one can 
govern in that way. I will be constitutional." (Talks 106)15 
 
James himself exercises his freedom rather like a constitutional monarch in that, while 
philosophical fatalism exerts a strong pull on his intellect, he chooses to believe in free 
will.16 His dynamic engagement with determinism offers a framework in which to read 
                                                
14 To his mind, this freedom inheres most fundamentally in the individual’s capacity to fix and 
sustain her attention on a single idea, over against the natural, ungoverned progress of ideas 
through the mind (i.e., the “stream of consciousness”). 
 
15 I am indebted to Jane Thrailkill for directing me to this highly illustrative passage. 
 
16 James asserts that “the very first act of a will endowed with freedom should be to sustain the 
belief in the freedom itself” (Talks 112). For earlier discussions of the will, see James’s “The 
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Henry Adams and Jane Addams as representative modern thinkers troubled by the 
problem of human agency. 
 Henry Adams, who simultaneously venerated and dreaded the dynamo, symbol of 
modern technological advance, adopted an aloof, observational posture toward life 
generally and confessed that he “never got to the point of playing the game at all; he lost 
himself in the study of it, watching the errors of the players” (10). A brilliant and intense 
dilettante, he characterized himself by the following qualities: “The habit of doubt; of 
distrusting his own judgment and of totally rejecting the judgment of the world; the 
tendency to regard every question as open; the hesitation to act except as a choice of 
evils; the shirking of responsibility [. . .]” (11). This “habit of doubt” and “hesitation to 
act” correspond to what James calls the “obstructed will,” characteristic of 
“melancholiacs,” for example, whose “minds are cramped in a fixed emotion of fear or 
helplessness, their ideas confined to the one thought that for them life is impossible. So 
they show a condition of perfect 'abulia,' or inability to will or act” (Talks 106). 
 A contemporary of Henry Adams, Jane Addams shared his ambivalence toward 
modernization, reflecting in Democracy and Social Ethics (1902) that “[a]ll about us are 
men and women who have become unhappy in regard to their attitude toward the social 
order itself; toward the dreary round of uninteresting work, the pleasures narrowed down 
to those of appetite, the declining consciousness of brain power, and the lack of mental 
food which characterizes the lot of the large proportion of their fellow-citizens” (6). She 
sounds a bit like a prophet of decline when she sums up her observations, “all are 
increasingly anxious concerning their actual relations to the basic organization of 
                                                                                                                                            
Dilemma of Determinism” (1884), the chapters on “Habit” and “Will” in The Principles of 
Psychology (1890), and “The Will to Believe” (1896). 
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society” (6). Unlike Henry Adams, however, Jane Addams eschewed the mere 
indulgence of anxiety and the luxury of detachment in favor of social and political 
activism. She was quite conscious of the more passive, reflective alternative, commenting 
that in the face of uniquely modern social problems, “while the strain and perplexity of 
the situation is felt most keenly by the educated and self-conscious members of the 
community, the tentative and actual attempts at adjustment are largely coming through 
those who are simpler and less analytical” (9). Quite the analyst herself, possessing the 
“complex field of consciousness” of which James writes, Addams nonetheless practiced 
an ethics of intervention that transcended the “strain and perplexity” that she and Henry 
Adams both felt. 
 A similar tension plays itself out in contemporary scholarly discussions of the 
period. One party draws on critiques by David Riesman, Jackson Lears, and Christopher 
Lasch, emphasizing the enervating, constraining, and demoralizing effects of modernity 
on individuals and communities.17 Another party, perhaps labeling its opponents dour and 
nostalgic, cites thinkers like Anthony Giddens, James Livingston, and even Charles 
Taylor to highlight the unique opportunities for self-making and social reform that 
modernity presents.18 What this historical and contemporary controversy reveals, of 
course, is an historical moment deeply riven by ideological conflict and a set of cultural 
                                                
17 See especially Riesman et al.’s The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American 
Character (1950); Lears’s No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of 
American Culture, 1880-1920 (1981); and Lasch’s The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in 
an Age of Diminishing Expectations (1979). 
 
18 See especially Anthony Giddens’ Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age (1991); James Livingston’s Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural 
Revolution, 1850-1940 (1997); and Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity (1989) and A Secular Age (2007). 
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phenomena that have posed serious interpretive challenges for the nation. The rifts that 
have divided skeptics of modernity from its boosters, and that have often internally 
divided modernity’s most insightful analysts, define this historical period more tellingly 
than one-sided narratives of either advance or decline. 
 I want to highlight two impulses that drove much of the cultural change this era 
witnessed, namely the impulse to doubt and the impulse to reform. Superficially, these 
tendencies appear to move in opposite directions, the one wedded to pessimism and the 
other to optimism. One could imagine the doubters squaring off against the reformers to 
decide the shape and tone of the modern world. In fact, however, a deep affinity underlay 
the penchant for questioning tradition, which infiltrated every sphere of life from religion 
to politics and from economics to art, and the urge to reconstruct each of those spheres on 
new foundations. Doubt occasioned reform, and reform occasioned doubt. In America’s 
Long Progressive Era these two impulses are not rivals but rather two sides of the one 
coin on which modernity traded. 
In A Secular Age (2007), Charles Taylor objects to “subtraction stories” of 
modernity, which suggest that modernity is simply what is left after scraping the Western 
tradition clean of religious, philosophical, and political accretions from the medieval 
period. Taylor claims instead that modernity is a building project—creative, strategic, and 
additive. This is visible, for example, in the Enlightenment. A desire to ground 
philosophy exclusively in indubitable knowledge drove René Descartes and Francis 
Bacon to deconstruct contemporary epistemological orthodoxies. While these demolition 
projects were followed by new philosophical construction (their respective empiricisms), 
Taylor argues that, with the so-called disenchantment of the world to which Descartes 
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and Bacon contributed, a new “buffered” self emerged that, no longer subject to hovering 
spiritual forces, eagerly took up reformist causes in the flush of its new independence. 
Thus, the leveling of old epistemological foundations was itself constructive: it laid the 
groundwork for a modern self, who in turn built the liberal political systems of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Likewise, Steven Mintz argues that in the early United States the doctrine of 
American exceptionalism nourished a reform impulse. American exceptionalism rested 
on a belief that the United States, having broken with Old World stagnancy and 
decadence, symbolized a new and better way of ordering humankind; traditions were not 
assumed here but subjected to the same pragmatic evaluation as all other proposed forms 
for common life. While these beliefs gave rise to the same sense of contingency that 
philosophical skepticism did, religious liberalism and evangelical revivalism contributed 
a different sort of energy to the reform impulse. These two expressions of Christianity 
shared a belief in human perfectibility, and their adherents believed in a divinely ordered 
cosmos in which, nonetheless, humans possessed free will to determine their courses and 
improve themselves in the here and now. To their minds the primary change occurring in 
the world was not disenchantment but the coming of the Kingdom of God (Mintz 16-17, 
21-23). 
In the nineteenth century, Darwin’s evolutionary theory and the “higher criticism” 
in biblical scholarship fed a belief in the “death of God”; and while these critiques drove 
some Americans to despair of a meaningful and amenable universe, they also helped 
create a national landscape in which new philosophical, social, and cultural opportunities 
seemed to appear everywhere. The social order was up for grabs as never before—not, 
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indeed, for the poor and disfranchised but for the middle and upper classes who had a 
voice in shaping their neighborhoods, cities, states, and nation. When everything could be 
doubted, from metaphysics to political systems, everything could also be remade. Many 
Americans began to perceive a radical contingency in the ways in which they ordered 
their lives. Why could it not be otherwise? The great reform movements of the Long 
Progressive Era—women’s suffrage, temperance, sanitation, mental illness, civil rights, 
poverty—were made possible in part by the philosophical skepticism introduced by 
classic Enlightenment thinkers and, more immediately, Charles Darwin, from whose 
work Social Darwinists like Herbert Spencer and Francis Galton harvested a secular 
perfectionist teleology. 
Whether motivated by philosophical skepticism or religious belief, the reform 
efforts of the Long Progressive Era gave rise to doubt whenever they failed—and they 
failed often. Fiction of the period thematizes the disillusionment of reformers whose 
idealism has shattered on the sharp, inert edges of real social problems. As this motif 
emerged, of intelligent and well-intentioned men and women finding their best efforts 
ineffectual, the human will came in for questioning. Descartes’s cogito ergo sum 
inaugurated a modern movement that posited an autonomous, self-determining individual 
as the cornerstone of philosophy. Liberalism assumed that figure in politics, and the 
applied sciences advanced on his shoulders. But if nineteenth-century social reformers 
repeatedly found the world unamenable to their good intentions, then perhaps the myth of 
the independent and potent human subject was just that—merely a myth. Perhaps forces 
of environment and biology loomed larger than any American Progressive wanted to 
believe. 
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What is more, the reformist impulse that energized the Long Progressive Era 
expressed itself in the professionalization of the public sphere and in the ascendance of 
the specialist over the generalist. The analytic impulse that gave birth to Frederick 
Winslow Taylor’s “scientific management” and Henry Ford’s assembly line dramatically 
reduced the range of laborers’ competency, fitting them to do only one, minute task at an 
accelerated pace for an extended interval. And this impulse was not limited to industry. 
Increasingly, traditional spheres of civic engagement like the arts, charity, philosophy, 
and science—domains historically inhabited by all sorts of educated people—became the 
exclusive territory of professionals who, by defining a body of knowledge, a set of 
methods, and a system of apprenticeship for their respective fields, established their 
unique authority to work in, pronounce on, and patrol the borders of those fields. By 
establishing specialized training as a necessary grounds of effective social action, 
professionalization contributed to a broad rethinking of human agency that encroached on 
the prerogatives of the democratic, liberal self and relegated power and freedom to a new 
class of “experts” in every field of human endeavor.19 Among the forms of labor most 
affected by these seismic shifts were poverty relief and literary reading. 
 
 
                                                
19 Classic studies of professionalism include David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the 
Changing American Character (1950); C. Wright Mills’s White Collar: The American Middle 
Classes (1951); Burton Bledstein’s The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the 
Development of Higher Education in America (1976); and Thomas Haskell’s The Emergence of 
Professional Social Science (1977). More recently, Thomas Strychacz’s Modernism, Mass 
Culture, and Professionalism (1993) and Stephen Schryer’s Fantasies of the New Class: 
Ideologies of Professionalism in Post-World War II American Fiction (2011) provide 
illuminating literary histories of professionalism either situated in or (in Schryer’s case) 
beginning in the Progressive Era. I will return to these contemporary scholars’ work in a history 
of literary reading below. 
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History of Poverty Relief 
Between 1860 and 1945 American poverty relief evolved in three roughly 
successive phases, which I call the traditional, Progressive, and statist. This evolution 
incrementally excluded ordinary citizens from the work of relieving poverty and 
attributed increased agency to the poor. Two types of development primarily account for 
the differences between these phases: the first, an epistemological change, involved the 
replacement of a theological understanding of poverty with a “scientific” one, and then 
the splintering of that “scientific” perspective into various, more specific forms of what 
Alice O’Connor calls “poverty knowledge.” The second, an administrative change, 
involved the eclipse of private, communal poverty relief by public, bureaucratic forms of 
the same.20 As the emerging social sciences crowded out theology and bureaucratic 
institutions appropriated the charitable work of communities, poverty relief became an 
increasingly rarefied project to which individuals who were qualified only by their good 
intentions could hardly gain access. 
Until the middle of the 1800s Americans, by and large, understood poverty 
theologically. The basic doctrinal schema that formed their views finds expression in the 
opening dictum of John Winthrop’s sermon, “A Model of Christian Charity” (1630): 
“God Almighty in His most holy and wise providence, hath so disposed of the condition 
of mankind, as in all times some must be rich, some poor, some high and eminent in 
power and dignity; others mean and in subjection” (206). By this account, social 
                                                
20 In this period Americans also differed on the relative influence of moral and environmental 
factors in producing and prolonging poverty, but because opinion on this point does not follow a 
linear path from one position to the other, the controversy does not seem to me as useful 
heuristically as the epistemological and administrative differences. I will, however, reference the 
moralist-environmentalist debate because of its implications for reformers’ understanding of 
agency—both their own and that of the poor. 
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hierarchy is not an oppressive order but a social form that guides individuals into separate 
vocations necessary for sustaining a common life; in this frame the poor no less than the 
rich claim a divine calling, a unique manner of manifesting God’s glory—the wealthy, 
for example, in their “love, mercy, gentleness, [and] temperance” and the poor in their 
“faith, patience, [and] obedience” (Winthrop 206). The complementarity in this structure 
is plain. That “some must be rich, some poor” does not imply a social antagonism; 
instead this order underscores human interdependence, ensuring that “every man might 
have need of other, and from hence they might be all knit more nearly together in the 
bonds of brotherly affection” (Winthrop 206). The duty of the wealthy to those in need is 
unequivocal: in catechetical form Winthrop’s sermon prescribes liberal giving, 
dismantles self-preserving objections to this principle, and then concludes bluntly, “if thy 
brother be in want and thou canst help him, thou needst not make doubt, what thou 
shouldst do, if thou lovest God thou must help him” (209).21 
Through the early-nineteenth century this theology governed not only individuals’ 
private exercise of charity but also local communities’ systems of public assistance for 
the poor. For this multi-tiered task of charity, early American communities depended 
primarily on family and communal networks, even when aid was superintended by the 
local government or financed by a poor tax. But because early Americans generally did 
not understand poverty as a flaw in the social fabric or a phenomenon to be eradicated, 
local governments readily shared the burden of caring for the poor, and they administered 
aid “straightforwardly, without long investigations or elaborate procedures, without 
                                                
21 Almost two hundred fifty years later, Rebecca Harding Davis’s essay “At Our Gates” would 
put an even finer point on the matter. There Davis argued that the affluent were not absolved of a 
charitable duty when they deemed a poor person “undeserving”; rather, “[t]he more of a fraud or 
a criminal he is the more he needs [a helping hand].” 
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severe discomfort or dislocation” (Rothman 31).22 A standard component in their systems 
of aid was outdoor relief—monetary assistance that did not require recipients to move 
into someone else’s home or an almshouse and did not call on them to perform any labor. 
However, this traditional method of poverty relief and the philosophy underlying it came 
in for strong criticism in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
As a new generation of Americans drifted from the Calvinist orthodoxy of their 
predecessors, new interpretations of poverty encroached on the one exemplified by 
Winthrop’s sermon. “Scientific philanthropy” emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century declaring that empirical investigation, not theological reflection, offered the best 
knowledge of poverty. The theological framework did not simply vanish, of course. 
Steven Mintz argues that nineteenth-century religious liberalism and evangelical 
revivalism, which shared a belief in human perfectibility, played a prominent role in 
reframing poverty as a social ill to be cured rather than an inevitable condition to be 
accommodated (Mintz 16-29). No longer a necessity but an aberration, poverty became 
an object of investigation as never before, and the inchoate social sciences emerged as the 
preeminent epistemological tools for the job. Scientific philanthropists conceived the case 
study and the “friendly visitor,” a volunteer or paid individual who visited and 
interviewed the clients of philanthropic agencies in their homes, as the primary means of 
gathering and systematizing information about the poor. 
                                                
22 In The Discovery of the Asylum, David Rothman explains early American communities’ 
tolerant approach to poverty relief this way: “It was as unthinkable to allow the destitute to shift 
for themselves as to let commerce flounder or children grow up untrained. Thus, without second 
thought, the colonists relieved the needy, the widows and orphans, the aged and sick, the insane 
and disabled. This customary and legitimate function did not require finely drawn or detailed 
legislation, great fuss or trepidation” (14). 
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As such agencies proliferated in urban centers, some means were required to 
coordinate their efforts. The Charity Organization Societies (COS) filled this need; 
founded in London in 1869 and quickly imported by Americans, the COS operated 
through local branches, each of which aimed to synchronize the work of the various 
charitable agencies in a particular city. The establishment of the COS represents not only 
a formalizing of the scientific approach to poverty knowledge but also a beginning in the 
bureaucratization of poverty relief. In this way it stands as the exemplary institution of 
Progressive Era poverty relief. However, it also marks an ideological cleavage in that 
field that was never fully bridged even under the New Deal, namely the split between 
moralism and environmentalism. 
Moralists contended that vicious behavior caused poverty: the poor were poor 
because they lacked the virtues of thrift, temperance, and diligence. Environmentalists 
argued conversely that external forces, even systemic ones, foisted poverty on the poor. 
This disagreement, which was relatively unimportant to traditional reformers, reached a 
fever pitch among Progressive and statist reformers. Moralists advocated the abolition of 
outdoor relief, arguing that such aid, by placing no requirements on recipients, fostered 
the vices that surely impoverished recipients in the first place. According to Walter 
Trattner, the logic ran thus: “By encouraging the poor to rely upon the public dole rather 
than upon their own energies, and by removing the dread of want, considered by many to 
be the prime mover of the needy, the poor laws [especially outdoor relief] destroyed the 
incentive to work, causing the poor to become even more idle and improvident” (56). 
Thus, it was with an eye to moral accountability that a new class of philanthropists 
limited their work to indoor relief—“care offered in homes other than one’s own and [. . 
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.] in institutions” (Axinn and Stern 21). Administered by moralists, systems of indoor 
relief subjected applicants for aid to personal investigation in hopes of serving only the 
“deserving” poor and encouraging moral reform among the vicious. Environmentalists, 
however, resisted policy innovations involving this sort of interrogation. They targeted 
not the poor for reform but the housing, sanitation, and labor conditions thought to be 
responsible for poverty. 
At the core of the moralist-environmentalist debate lay questions of agency and 
responsibility. Who, or what, was to blame for poverty—the poor, the affluent, the built 
environment, an economic system? And who was responsible for alleviating or 
eliminating it? In its early days the COS harbored both perspectives, before finally 
veering sharply toward the environmentalist position.23 Public opinion remained divided 
on this issue even in the 1930s, after the stock market crash devastated communities that 
knew nothing about Wall Street. However, Franklin Roosevelt’s epoch-making New Deal 
was from its inception oriented toward environmental and systemic causes of poverty. Its 
“alphabet soup” of social programs, which aimed above all to provide citizens with a 
safety net (a “social security”), addressed Americans’ newfound sense that much of life 
was beyond their control. The New Deal reflected a popular sense of impotence, but it 
obliquely contributed to that feeling as well. As the creation of Roosevelt’s renowned 
“brain trust,” a cadre of Columbia and Harvard professors, the New Deal expressed the 
                                                
23 My account of the traditional and Progressive phases of poverty relief aims at a broad synthesis 
of six major historiographical works: Robert Bremner’s From the Depths: The Discovery of 
Poverty in the United States (1956); David Rothman’s The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order 
and Disorder in the New Republic (1971); Paul Boyer’s Urban Masses and Moral Order in 
America, 1820-1920 (1978); Alan Dawley’s Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the 
Liberal State (1991); Steven Mintz’s Moralists and Modernizers: America’s Pre-Civil War 
Reformers (1995); and James Patterson’s America’s Struggle Against Poverty in the Twentieth 
Century (2000). 
 
28 
culture of professionalism that had been reshaping poverty relief since reformers first 
appropriated social scientific methods; that professional culture enthroned the university-
trained specialist as its highest authority—not the community activist or the benevolent 
neighbor. The New Deal redrew the spheres of influence in which Americans understood 
themselves to operate, as it shifted responsibility for care of the poor away from local and 
state institutions toward federal agencies. 
Historians have chronicled citizens’ opposition to the New Deal on the grounds 
that government aid “demoralized” its recipients, undermining a sense of self-reliance in 
the poor.24 Scholars have noted comparatively few protests, however, that claimed the 
New Deal encroached on the traditional roles of neighborhoods, churches, and private 
agencies. Thus, the image that emerges is of the affluent American trying to remove the 
speck from his brother’s eye (making sure the poor man or woman remains personally 
accountable) while ignoring the log in his own eye (overlooking the erasure of his own 
social responsibility). One of the most interesting features of this scenario was the 
comfortable American’s lack of interest in the New Deal’s implications for his own 
agency. For all his “defense” of the poor man and woman’s will, his own culturally 
sanctioned sphere of influence was shrinking unnoticed under his feet. Not an employee 
of a New Deal agency himself, if ever he wanted to respond personally to the plight of 
the unemployed, he would find it harder to do so than he would have a generation before. 
As ordinary citizens’ personal contact with the poor grew rarer, he and others like him 
had less to contribute to discussions of poverty relief on a local or national level. Such a 
                                                
24 See Alan Dawley’s Struggles for Justice (1991), James Patterson’s America’s Struggle Against 
Poverty in the Twentieth Century (2000), and Alice O’Connor’s Poverty Knowledge: Social 
Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History (2002). 
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trend eventually hardened into a new social arrangement where only professionals knew 
the poor and, in a bit of circular reasoning, only professionals were considered qualified 
to assist them. 
While some affluent Americans were anticipating the “demoralizing” effects of 
federal aid to the poor, scholars of poverty were entertaining a new perspective on the 
agency of the poor. In the 1930s and 1940s, scholars like Robert and Helen Lynd, W. 
Lloyd Warner, William F. Whyte, and E. Wight Bakke began to investigate poverty not 
only in terms of political economy, as their Progressive forbears did, but in terms of 
culture. Revising the old moralist doctrine that the vices of the poor perpetuated their 
economic situation, these new scholars’ work recognized and described “cultures of 
poverty” that differed from middle- and upper-class cultures but were quite rational and 
functional for all that.25 The poor participated in distinctive cultures not because they 
could not assimilate the values of the affluent but because their material circumstances 
called for different modes of behavior. This new thesis recast the poor as agents in their 
own right, thoughtful makers of culture instead of poor imitators who needed help 
becoming more like the affluent.  
While this change implies no formal limitation of the middle and upper classes’ 
agency, it does at the end of the Long Progressive Era provide a snapshot of the poor and 
the affluent moving in opposite directions—the former gaining new recognition as actors 
                                                
25 See, for example, Robert and Helen Lynd’s Middletown: A Study in American Culture (1929); 
W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt’s The Social Life of a Modern Community (1941); William F. 
Whyte’s Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum (1943); and E. Wight 
Bakke’s The Unemployed Worker (1940) and Citizens Without Work (1940). For helpful 
discussions of the culturalist trend in sociology that these works exemplify, see Alice O’Connor’s 
Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. 
History (2001), esp. Chapter 2, and James T. Patterson’s America’s Struggle Against Poverty in 
the Twentieth Century (2000), esp. pp. 88-89. 
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and the latter relinquishing familiar roles as engaged citizens and neighbors. These 
opposite courses had been set at the advent of “scientific philanthropy” when moralizing 
Progressives (in a very different tone than the culturalist scholars above) saddled the poor 
with responsibility for their poverty and when trained professionals supplanted concerned 
neighbors as the agents of charity. Meanwhile, another reassignment of roles, equally 
significant for the shape and cultural work of poverty fiction, was occurring in the literary 
sphere. 
History of Reading 
Fiction reading in the Long Progressive Era underwent an evolution that closely 
paralleled the changes I have described in the realm of poverty relief. Antebellum reading 
was grounded in the philosophy of self-culture. Post-World War I reading was grounded 
in the philosophy of the Book-of-the-Month Club and the university-tenured New Critics. 
In the antebellum period reading was undoubtedly a form of entertainment, but it was 
also a means of self-discipline. Literary culture was predicated on the sense that one’s 
character formation was her own responsibility, and reading moral fiction morally was 
one way of fulfilling that duty. After World War I, reading fiction was still about self-
improvement, but the general reader now sought not character but Culture—and that 
from the recommendations of trained literary professionals. Culture was no longer a self-
reflexive activity; it was a commodity that specialists possessed by virtue of extensive 
apprenticeships and that general readers could acquire at a reduced cost by reading what 
(and how) those specialists recommended. Responsibility for reading—both the choice of 
books and the application of particular hermeneutics—had shifted from the general 
reader to the literary professional. 
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In antebellum America, self-culture designated the work of disciplining one’s 
moral and intellectual faculties to recognize and love the good, the true, and the beautiful. 
Assiduous performance of this task produced character, a keyword for these thinkers, 
which entailed self-mastery, autonomy of the will.26 Reading literature played a central 
role in self-culture, refining the reader’s intellect and emotions through contact with what 
Matthew Arnold would famously call “the best that has been thought and said in the 
world.” Even in the antebellum period, there existed a “literary cultural elite” whose deep 
familiarity with the Western cultural tradition helped position them as guides for the 
general reader; but unlike their twentieth-century descendants, these cultural arbiters 
meant to equip the general reader to select and appropriate literature on his own. They 
offered not reading lists or cocktail knowledge but “the power of ready and subtle 
thought” (Stevenson qtd. in Rubin 7). As Joan Shelley Rubin expresses it, “Relying on 
their counsel, the ‘average man’ would not so much surrender to their dicta as ‘engage in 
obeying his own instructed mind’” (Rubin 7). James L. Machor adopts a similar model of 
the relationship between antebellum reviewers and middle-class readers, representing the 
former as “tutelary agents empowering the reading public” (38). In the words of one such 
reviewer, their task was to “enlighten the public mind, . . . That each may become the 
                                                
26 For an extended study of American discourses of character in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, see James Salazar’s Bodies of Reform: The Rhetoric of Character in Gilded Age America 
(2010). For more on the closely allied discourse of self-culture, see Chapter 1 of Joan Shelley 
Rubin’s The Making of Middlebrow Culture (1992), which focuses on William Ellery Channing, 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Charles Eliot Norton as the doctrine’s major proponents. In Creating 
the Culture of Reform in Antebellum America (2006), T. Gregory Garvey usefully links 
Emerson’s treatment of self-culture, which can be reductively interpreted as a purely 
individualistic pursuit, to the politics of reform. On a transition from nineteenth-century 
“character” culture to twentieth-century “personality” culture, see Warren Susman’s “‘Personality’ 
and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture” in Culture as History: The Transformation of 
American Society in the Twentieth Century (1984). 
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judge of what he reads” (qtd. in Machor 38). Hence, these literary elite were assistants in 
a labor of self-culture that ultimately aimed at the reader’s independence from their 
guidance. 
Through the post-Civil War years this relationship evolved such that the literary 
elite, finding their role formalized and subsidized in the emerging modern university, 
increasingly did less to empower readers and more to appropriate readers’ power to 
themselves. As economic prosperity replaced a culture of production with one of 
consumption, a lust for Culture overwhelmed the antebellum drive for character through 
self-culture, and literature became less an edifying discipline and more a distinguishing 
ornament. This transition announces itself in the title of Noah Porter’s 1871 Books and 
Reading: Or What Books Shall I Read and How Shall I Read Them. The title’s second 
question (“how shall I read them?”) reaches back to a model of cultural mediation that 
trained readers in skills that they could apply independently. But the first question (“what 
books shall I read?”) adds to the old model a new pedantry and a wider, more totalizing 
scope. The title assumes a nearly helpless reader, disoriented by the challenge of “books 
and reading” but possessing the wisdom, at least, to consult an expert like Porter, the 
president of Yale University.27 This book, its title suggests, can show the way even to 
such a benighted soul. 
While Porter’s volume includes an appendix of suggested readings on various 
topics, its bulk is reserved for instruction on how to select books and how to read well. 
                                                
27 This portrait of the reader is reproduced in William Dean Howells’s The Rise of Silas Lapham, 
when the nouveau riche Irene Lapham consults the well-bred but decidedly modern Tom Corey 
about which books her family should include in the library of their showy new home (98-101). In 
that scene she enacts both the commodification of culture (she could as easily be asking which 
upholstery or crown moldings to choose) and the layperson’s deferral to literary authority that I 
describe above. 
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Closer to the turn of the century, however, literary elites like Charles Eliot Norton, 
Charles Dudley Warner, and Charles W. Eliot abandoned the careful how-to work and 
simply provided the public with reading lists in the form of multiple book series—
Norton’s Heart of Oak Series in the 1890s, Warner’s thirty-volume Library of the 
World’s Best Literature (1897), and Eliot’s Harvard Classics (1909). This cultural 
innovation was rather like a doctor saying, “Take two of these and call me in the 
morning.” No longer was the emphasis on training readers to improve their own selection 
and assimilation of literature, and to improve themselves in the process; now the selection 
had been carried out by established men of letters, and, as to proper methods of reading, 
the mere consumption of these books was considered enough to make the reader more 
cultured.28 
These new principles are most clearly on display in Eliot’s Harvard Classics, 
which were also known as his “Five-Foot Shelf” because, while president of Harvard 
University, Eliot had periodically imagined “a five-foot shelf of books that would furnish 
a liberal education to anyone willing to devote fifteen minutes per day to reading them” 
(Rubin 28). Rubin points out that, while in his introduction to the series Eliot maintains 
the antebellum linkage between culture and self-making, “he also identified a liberal 
education with a list of great books, a move which, to some observers, smacked of the 
                                                
28 Amy Blair calls this status-oriented form of literary consumption “reading up”; it occurs 
whenever “a reader approaches a text because experts have deemed it ‘the best’ thing to read and 
reads in the interest of self-interest”—that is, in hopes that reading the text “elevates the reader in 
a cultural and social hierarchy” (3, 2). Blair’s book, Reading Up: Middle-Class Readers and the 
Culture of Success in the Early Twentieth Century United States (2012), builds on the work of 
Joan Shelley Rubin in The Making of Middlebrow Culture and Janice Radway in A Feeling for 
Books: The Book-of-the-Month Club, Literary Taste, and Middle-Class Desire (1997), but it 
focuses especially on the cultural work of Hamilton Wright Mabie’s literary column in The 
Ladies’ Home Journal from 1902 to 1912. 
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substitution of specific knowledge for a refined sensibility. Additionally, his willingness 
to quantify the time required for reading suggested cramming rather than training, 
undermining the idea that culture required sustained effort” (28). Eliot’s Harvard 
Classics, then, like Norton’s and Warner’s series, signal a transition whereby reading lost 
its identity as a self-directed practice for the building of character and came to resemble a 
prescribed diet or exercise regimen aimed at making good impressions. 
This trend reaches its height with Harry Scherman’s invention of the Book-of-the-
Month Club in 1926. Catering to would-be readers who could not independently keep 
pace with the modern print industry’s overwhelming output, the Book-of-the-Month Club 
deployed a subscription model to deliver to readers the “best” of those new books. The 
Club made no secret of who would select the “best” literature each month; the panel of 
literary authorities charged with this task—including Henry Seidel Canby, Dorothy 
Canfield Fisher, William Allen White, Christopher Morley, and Heywood Broun—was 
strategically publicized in order to validate the enterprise. These learned men and women 
could be trusted, so the marketing campaigns maintained, to identify the highest quality 
writing from the contemporary presses. The subscription service performed the remaining 
task of delivering the experts’ selections to the readers.29 
Thomas Strychacz argues that cultural changes like the Book-of-the-Month Club 
must be understood in relation to the emergence of the modern university: “Any account 
of the historical processes governing the establishment of authoritative discourses in 
American consumer society must include a description of how universities at the end of 
                                                
29 The definitive histories of the Book-of-the-Month Club remain Rubin’s The Making of 
Middlebrow Culture (1992) and Radway’s A Feeling for Books (1997). My treatment of the club, 
and of many of the literary marketing phenomena that anticipated it, is indebted to both of these 
books. 
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the nineteenth century institutionalized specialized discourses and communities of 
competence [. . .]” (22). The professionalization of literary study in the university 
legitimated the growing divide between generalists and specialists in the broader literate 
culture, even as some of the new professionals explicitly disavowed that trend. The New 
Critics and Formalists, for example, whose methods came to dominate literary studies 
beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, eschewed the impulse to remake literary studies in the 
image of the thoroughly specialized sciences. Strychacz claims, however, that these 
critics’ legacy of esoteric scholarship runs counter to their denunciations: “As 
antagonistic as many formalist critics were to an urban, managerial society, their work 
ultimately forged a covert relationship with that society’s structures of authority” (35). If 
the New Critics were not would-be scientists, they were the quintessential literary 
specialists of mid-century; and, as such, they attained much of the symbolic value and 
deference that accrued to their colleagues in the sciences. 
Gerald Graff’s argument in Professing Literature supports Strychacz’ conclusions. 
Offering an “institutional history” of literary pedagogy in America, Graff focuses on the 
multi-generational conflict between those in the academy who prioritized appreciation 
and investigation of literature, respectively. While these parties wore different names at 
different stages of Graff’s nearly two-century history, together they embodied an ongoing 
controversy over the modern impulse to professionalization as it impinged on literary 
studies in America. Genteel generalists of the nineteenth-century and New Humanists in 
the twentieth similarly opposed the narrowing of literary studies to arcane investigation 
modeled on the sciences and abstracted from daily life, whether that investigation took 
the form of philology in the nineteenth century or literary history in the twentieth. 
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Literature, they insisted, should be a light guiding readers into noble thought, feeling, and 
conduct; but reducing literature to an object of technical study by university professors 
deprived it of its power to elevate the national culture—or even the bemused students of 
those professors. However, Graff, like Strychacz, exposes the contradictions in this 
oppositional position: 
It was because they believed that Arnoldian culture should exert national 
leadership that the generalists eagerly supported the professional ambitions 
of departments of English and urged the legitimation of American literature 
as a college subject. Yet this larger vision of cultural leadership was 
precisely what led the generalists to find fault with those departments for 
betraying this leadership responsibility to professional interests. (81-82) 
 
In Graff’s and Strychacz’ accounts, then, literary academics secured a cultural authority 
for themselves that many of them quickly learned to despise because, in granting them a 
platform from which to model good reading for the culture, that authority threatened lay 
readers’ capacities for self-determination, a priority that as humanists these professors 
held dear.30 Thus, in the Long Progressive Era, many of the structures that aimed to 
democratize literary reading or weave it more deeply into public life in fact generated a 
class of professional readers who stood between the publishing house and the general 
reader, digesting, evaluating, and interpreting the products of the former for the latter. 
Much like the affluent man or woman who wanted to serve the poor, over the course of 
                                                
30 In Fantasies of the New Class: Ideologies of Professionalism in Post-World War II American 
Fiction (2011) Stephen Schryer extends this narrative of literary professionalization into the latter 
half of the twentieth century. He identifies the “new class” as those postwar literary intellectuals 
who critiqued the “social engineering” and “bureaucratic rationalism” of the welfare state that in 
its rigid institutionalism tended to produce formulaic and unimaginative social solutions (3, 13). 
The new class imagined a different role for the intelligentsia. This generation of literati thought 
their cultural leadership should be exercised not through technocratic reforms but through a kind 
of cultural education that developed critical intelligence in the middle class and “an aesthetic 
capacity to live with paradox, to keep contraries in play without resolving them” (4). The new 
class’s role was to be exemplary; they fantasized that practicing subtle thought and feeling in 
their own work provided the masses a compelling cultural model by which they, too, could resist 
the bland flatness of mid-century bureaucratic culture. 
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the Long Progressive Era the general reader grew less capable of fulfilling her desire 
independently of highly professionalized mediating structures. 
It is worth noting one more parallel between the evolution of poverty relief and 
literary reading in this period. In Print in Motion: The Expansion of Publishing and 
Reading in the United States, 1880-1940 (2009), Carl Kaestle and Janice Radway 
describe print culture of that period in terms of a “tension between centralization, 
concentration, and standardization on the one hand, and specialization, small-scale 
production, and the diversification of published reading material on the other” (21). In the 
emergence of reading guides for the upwardly mobile and institutionally sanctioned 
hermeneutics for university students, we have seen something of the consolidating forces 
to which Kaestle and Radway refer. However, another feature of print culture in this 
period is the “creation of literatures that illuminated the abilities of people previously 
excluded from the domains of legitimate book culture” (4). Kaestle and Radway explain 
that the “centralizing tendencies” that so affected affluent reading culture “were checked 
somewhat by the contrapuntal effects of the emergence of print forms targeting [. . .] a 
range of [demographic groups] who had reason to question dominant cultural formations 
and the views and values that underwrote them”—among them “non-English speakers, 
African Americans, working-class readers, women,” and “socialists” (21). Thus, parallel 
to the field of poverty relief, reading culture in the Long Progressive Era witnessed the 
shrinking of affluent readers’ traditional roles and the expansion of readerly roles among 
previously disenfranchised groups, including the poor. 
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Reading Poverty Fiction 
How, then, do the modern penchants for doubt and reform, and their expression in 
professionalized reform and literary cultures, pertain to reading poverty fiction in the 
Long Progressive Era? The trend toward specialization transformed the fields of poverty 
relief and reading. Just as the assembly-line worker unseated the craftsman, so the social 
worker encroached on the traditional domain of the charitable neighbor and the literary 
critic on that of the general reader. Under the new dispensation, the charitable neighbor 
may, through “scientific” training, become a social worker, but until that time he 
remained unqualified to offer assistance to the poor. Likewise, the general reader may 
pursue a course of study to become a literary critic; but, if she did not, she should consult 
professionals about her choice of books and about appropriate responses to them. 
The figure of the fiction reader changed dramatically as a new class of literary 
professionals turned literary appreciation and interpretation into specialized tasks and as 
literature repeatedly staged dramas of the individual will straining against natural or 
cultural constraints. As a persona on which to project anxieties about increasing 
professionalization and apparently diminishing agency, the middle-to-upper-class reader 
of the period from 1860 to 1945 tells the story of social reform in America’s Long 
Progressive Era. That reader mirrors the complex, shifting position of the affluent 
American throughout that period vis-à-vis the nation’s social problems and the new 
professions constructed to address them. Writing fiction about poverty amid the cultural 
trends I have outlined, Rebecca Harding Davis, William Dean Howells, Edith Wharton, 
and John Steinbeck constructed their readers as exemplary figures whose agency as 
participants in the text and as concerned citizens implicitly comments on contemporary 
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debates about the methods of social reform, the function of literary criticism, and the 
nature of human freedom and responsibility. 
 The historical narratives of poverty relief and literary reading that I have traced 
continually intersected in the texts I study, leaving indelible traces throughout. For 
example, the fictions of Rebecca Harding Davis and William Dean Howells reflect their 
times, casting poor characters as rather passive recipients of charity from the affluent. In 
Life in the Iron-Mills, the poor protagonist Hugh looks desperately to Doctor May and a 
preacher for insight about how he can improve himself, while Hugh’s cousin Deb 
becomes a member of a Quaker community where “long years of sunshine, and fresh air, 
and slow, patient Christ-love, [are] needed to make healthy and hopeful [her] impure 
body and soul” (73).31 In Howells’s fiction the poor appear primarily as a topic of 
bourgeois conversation, but, when they do show up in physical form, it seems to be in 
flashes of misery, as in the case of a beggar in A Hazard of New Fortunes who receives a 
bit of change from Basil March with tearful gratitude and embarrassing enthusiasm. 
However, the poor are different in Edith Wharton’s and John Steinbeck’s work—active 
and wise. In Wharton’s Book of the Homeless, the refugees guide their affluent 
caregivers; Wharton admits that the clients of her hostels “help us to help them” (xxi). 
Similarly, Steinbeck’s Tortilla Flat praises the wisdom of a poor paisano community’s 
“strong but different philosophical-moral system” (Life in Letters 97) and in Cannery 
Row Doc declares the unemployed denizens of the Palace Flophouse the “true 
philosophers” (129). 
                                                
31 It should be noted, however, that Life in the Iron-Mills is counter-cultural even on this point: as 
a member of the Quaker community, Deb becomes “more loving”—and given the text’s model of 
love, one should also assume more activist—than her new neighbors who first extended charity to 
her (73). 
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 A parallel transformation in textuality occurs over the span of the fiction in this 
study. A mere tissue in Davis’s hands, the fictional text becomes a living organism in 
Steinbeck’s. In Life in the Iron-Mills the narrator’s story constitutes only the “outside 
outlines of a night,” which point beyond themselves to a “muddy depth of soul-history 
[that] lies beneath” (47). Her story posits an extra-textual “depth” to be reached by 
penetrating the text, by going through it somehow. However, the narrator of Cannery 
Row compares the stories in this book to delicate marine animals that a collector procures 
only when they “ooze and crawl of their own will onto a knife blade”; likewise, he will 
compose his narrative by “open[ing] the page and [letting] the stories crawl in by 
themselves” (2, 3). Like the poor, fictional texts grow more solid and animated from 
Davis to Steinbeck. 
Bourgeois selfhood follows a different trajectory, though, from integration and 
sovereignty to disintegration and permeability. In Life in the Iron-Mills human beings 
bear the image of God. The text references Christ as the archetypal human being, and his 
participation in the triune Godhead models personhood that is simultaneously discrete 
and relational. The three Persons of the Trinity do not merge with one another but they 
are one. The Trinity models unity in diversity—a perfectly integrated identity. However, 
Steinbeck literally and figuratively dismembers the human being, as in the image of 
“little unborn humans [. . .] sliced thin and mounted on slides” in Doc’s Cannery Row 
laboratory. Listed in an inventory of Doc’s aquatic specimens, these “humans” are no 
more integral than dissected anemones, buttlestars, or sharks. Indeed, the inventory 
mingles them with other creatures, reinforcing a view of personhood that Steinbeck 
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advances both implicitly and explicitly: the human being is so fundamentally related to 
her environment as to be indistinguishable from it. 
Despite the consistency of these three trends throughout the fiction I study, these 
texts commend two different types of readerly response: intervention and observation. 
The former is social reform; the latter is, at its best, self-reform and, at its worst, 
voyeurism. While Davis and Wharton, the authors who maintain a humanist confidence 
in the power of the reader, urge their readers to social activism, Howells’s and 
Steinbeck’s interrogation of the human suggests to the reader only a posture of reflective 
watching. Between Davis and Steinbeck, the difference in the reader’s role is dramatic. 
Life boldly calls the reader to intervene in the lives of poor people, while Steinbeck’s 
work suggests they step back from the spectacle of poverty and reconsider not only the 
negative unintended consequences of intervention but also the notion of an independent 
human subject on which agency—the very ability to intervene or withdraw—is often 
predicated. However, there is no a straightforward and uninterrupted decline in the 
reader’s agency across the period that these authors bookend. The figure of poverty 
fiction’s reader does not so much progress from Davis to Steinbeck as she wanders 
among the options they represent, zigzagging and doubling back on her path, as indeed 
the chronological structure of this dissertation insists: Davis the intervener, Howells the 
observer, Wharton the intervener, Steinbeck the observer. 
The ambivalence of poverty fiction in the Long Progressive Era, reflected by this 
nonlinear movement, constitutes much of its relevance in a contemporary setting. 
Scholars argue that post-World War II fiction expresses paranoia about the incursions of 
the State on private life, but fiction of the Long Progressive Era, while engaged in a 
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struggle with modern institutions over individual agency, does not imagine a monolithic, 
sinister State in the mode of post-war writers. The earlier writers manifest a deep 
ambivalence about their place in relation to the emerging professions and the work of 
poverty relief, honoring the work of reform but worrying over the highly systematic 
forms it was taking. This was an era of possibility. In the post-war era the State grew so 
ominous in writers’ imaginations that alternative visions and nuanced responses were 
hard to come by. In the Long Progressive Era, writers’ ambivalence permitted the 
suggestion of many ways forward. The future was unclear and undetermined. I argue that 
contemporary citizen-readers can learn from and undergo transformation through this 
period’s poverty fiction, whose authors were willing to make choices from within a set of 
tensions that they did not seek to simplify or simplistically resolve. 
Chapter 2 shows how Rebecca Harding Davis paired an awareness of 
environmental influences on human behavior with a persistent belief in individual 
agency. She aimed to resuscitate human volition from what she deemed the stifling 
effects of professionalized philanthropy and sensational literature. The former recast a 
universal duty to the poor as the special calling of trained professionals. Meanwhile, 
contemporary literature, with its sensational and sentimental proclivities, enervated the 
will; calculated to produce thrilling affects, such literature invited greedy consumption by 
the reader and asked little in return. The holograph version of Life in the Iron-Mills 
(1861), unknown to critics until its recent recovery, presents the Incarnation of Christ as 
an exemplary act of will in the face of—indeed, constituted by—limitations on one’s 
power. The embodiment of God models the self-constraining behavior that Davis 
considers, paradoxically, empowering; and it models a sort of reading that culminates not 
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in affect or even in thought but in the literal practice of charity, in embodied presence 
among the poor. 
William Dean Howells was no less troubled by poverty than Davis was, but 
Chapter 3 shows how his interrogation of human agency corresponds to a dramatically 
different notion of reading than hers. In his fiction from the mid-1880s onward, Howells 
shares Davis’s sensitivity to environmental constraints on the will, but he adds to this a 
keen analysis of the will’s own weakness, particularly under the influence of an ironic 
perspective that recognizes the cultural contingency of every moral claim. Moreover, A 
Hazard of New Fortunes (1890) imagines the self as a microcosm of New York City’s 
anarchic social landscape, composed of many competing voices among which none 
dominates. When no moral claim and none of the self’s constitutive voices can establish 
authority over others, agency falters and, in one character’s words, “It’s hard to get 
outside” the self (A Hazard of New Fortunes 471). Especially in his late fiction Howells 
explores Spiritualism, seemingly in hopes of transcending the self and grasping some 
unforeseen agency; but The Undiscovered Country (1880) and The World of Chance 
(1893), which pair utopian economics with Spiritualism, only reframe the earlier 
impediments to choice by presenting characters whose internal voices are literal and no 
easier to arbitrate between. Facing this impasse, Howells invites readers only to add their 
voices to the conversation. If solidarity in paralysis is meager compensation, he 
bequeaths to readers his own self-castigating mantra: “Words, words, words! How to 
make them deeds, things?” 
Edith Wharton imagines a disintegrated self, and environmental constraints on 
that self, much like Howells does, and her writing on poverty and reform thematizes the 
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difficulty of choosing between alternatives. However, Chapter 4 argues that the personal 
and social limitations that debilitate Howells’s characters become, in Wharton, the 
necessary conditions of agency. If paralyzed idealism takes center stage in his fiction, 
active compromise drives hers. More specifically, Wharton’s essays, her novels The 
Valley of Decision (1902) and The Fruit of the Tree (1907), and her multigeneric 
collection The Book of the Homeless (1916) reveal the foundation of her aesthetics and 
ethics to be sympathy, a particular kind of compromise made when one surrenders his 
autonomy and enters a transformative liminal space between self and other or, in the case 
of fiction reading, between reader and text. Sympathy involves a willful dissolution of the 
self’s boundaries and a merging with a personal or textual other. This model of social and 
aesthetic practice corresponds, on one hand, to Wharton’s “innate distaste for anything 
like ‘social service’” and, on the other hand, to her opposition to modern commercial 
discourses that represented culture as a commodity. Her aversion to “social service” 
fixates on reductionism and hubris in philanthropy, which disregards the complexity and 
unyielding individuality of social problems and people. In the aesthetic realm, she claims 
that commercialism flattens art, which is not merely to be consumed. Having an internal 
structure, art limits the range of reasonable interactions with it; and having a sort of 
personality, it invites audiences to a dialogue. However, across the texts this chapter 
studies, Wharton enacts the compromise that she prescribes, incrementally surrendering 
her doctrinaire opposition to both consumptive reading and “social service.” The latest of 
these works, The Book of the Homeless, is an unabashedly commercial endeavor intended 
to raise funds for her World War I charities, and consuming this text enacts that sympathy 
to which Wharton believes fiction calls its readers. 
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 Chapter 5 studies the mid-career writing of John Steinbeck, whose critique of 
poverty relief radicalizes Howells’s but borrows the premises of Wharton’s 
commendation of sympathy. Wharton contests the depiction of poor people as passive, 
ephemeral objects and declares them fitting subjects for mutual relationships with 
affluent people. In Tortilla Flat (1935) and Cannery Row (1945), Steinbeck also 
recognizes the subjectivity of the poor but draws an opposite conclusion: he pronounces 
the middle and upper classes unfit for any but an observational relationship with the poor 
because, he maintains, attempts at reform inevitably do violence to those being reformed. 
Howells’s similar retreat from social reform stems largely from his relocation of social 
conflict to the individual psyche—a movement of the outside to the inside. In The Sea of 
Cortez (1941) and Cannery Row, Steinbeck extends this development by disavowing any 
distinction between outside and inside. Influenced by marine biologist Ed Ricketts, 
Steinbeck’s ecological vision deconstructs biological (and moral) taxonomy and, with it, 
the discrete category of human being (and the distinction between good and evil). This 
scientifically inflected perspective bespeaks Steinbeck’s ambivalent relationship to a 
culture of professionalism that arrogated authority to technically trained experts in 
virtually every field of labor, including social reform and literary reading. While 
Steinbeck explicitly eschews this technocratic impulse, his narrators assume an expert’s 
role in their quasi-scientific repudiations of agency. Paradoxically denying both the 
justice and the possibility of social reform, Tortilla Flat and Cannery Row follow 
Howells’s novels in inviting readers not to a dialogue with the text but to a participation 
in the author’s perspective. 
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Curiously, Steinbeck echoes Rebecca Harding Davis, the author to whose writing 
this study now turns, in declaring the ministry of Jesus Christ a model for reading. 
However, as with most every question of textuality, the poor, selfhood, and agency, about 
Christ the two authors disagree. I will examine Steinbeck’s perspective in Chapter 5, but 
Reforming Readers begins with Davis’s concept of incarnational reading.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Come Right Down With Me”: Incarnational Reading 
in Rebecca Harding Davis 
 
 
“It is the first duty laid down for us by the Elder Brother of us all. We must visit, feed, 
help the sick, the poor, the prisoner, in person, not by agents, giving to the work whatever 
intelligence, zeal and tenderness is in us.” 
Davis, “At Our Gates” (1889) 
 
“[I]t is necessary we should consider how to treat [the poor], gravely and calmly, 
uninfluenced by either mawkish sentimentality or that cold-blooded logic which is 
equally narrow and unjust.” 
Davis, “Indiscriminate Charity” (1877) 
 
 
In the first quotation above, Rebecca Harding Davis identifies care for the 
disenfranchised as the preeminent moral duty of Christians. By discussing the proper 
exercise of that duty in polemical terms, emphasizing how it ought not to be performed, 
both quotations relate Davis’s convictions about charity to her historical moment, when 
poverty relief especially was conditioned by two prevailing discourses—the one marked 
by “mawkish sentimentality” and the other by “cold-blooded logic.” Both of those 
approaches involve, as I will explain, a measure of disengagement from the poor; Davis, 
however, prescribes a movement toward those in need, preaching charity “in person” and 
calling for “direct individual intercourse between the classes” (“Indiscriminate Charity”). 
While Davis wrote about these issues extensively in essay form, Life in the Iron-Mills 
(1861), her first major work of fiction, also mediates between the discursive poles that 
she rejects; in this text she pioneers an aesthetic praxis culminating in the Christian 
charity that her essays advocate. 
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For Davis, “consider[ing] how to treat [the poor]” is both an ethical and an 
aesthetic problem. When she renounces “cold-blooded logic” and calls for charity “in 
person, not by agents,” she alludes to the mid-century rise of “scientific philanthropy,” a 
movement that subjected poverty to the epistemological tools of science and spawned an 
array of philanthropic agencies to administer aid according to the results of empirical 
research. But the “mawkish sentimentality” she decries on the other side is nowhere more 
recognizable than in nineteenth-century sentimental fiction, where morally simplistic 
characters and plots promote, above all, strong affective responses from readers—often at 
the expense of rational analysis and behavioral change.1 In confronting these ethical and 
aesthetic challenges, Davis draws on a common source of inspiration, namely, the 
Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, according to which the Second Person of the Trinity 
assumed a human form in Jesus Christ.2  
In terms of ethics, Davis’s critique of scientific philanthropy and her insistence on 
direct, personal, embodied care for the poor mirrors the work of Christ, who renounced 
divine prerogatives and lived among the poor to whom he ministered. Moreover, the 
Incarnation models agency as self-limiting choice, a definition that not only defends 
                                                
1 Jane Tompkins’ Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790-1860 and 
Shirley Samuels’ edited volume, The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in 
Nineteenth-Century America, represent the first major works in what is now a vast body of 
scholarship that attends to the long-overlooked tradition of sentimentality in American literature. 
These two books offer an excellent introduction to American sentimental literature and to the 
criticism that continues to proliferate around it. 
 
2 The Gospel of John begins with a dense theological prologue that, echoing the opening lines of 
Genesis, identifies Jesus as “the Word” and as God: “In the beginning was the Word, and the 
Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1). Later in the prologue, the writer speaks 
of the Incarnation, saying, “And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we have seen 
His glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth” (John 1:14a). As I will 
demonstrate, this mystery of the Word becoming flesh profoundly influences Davis’s vision of 
literature and its function. 
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human choice against biological and environmental determinism but even posits such 
constraint as an essential condition of meaningful action. Christ effects salvation for the 
world by, not despite, subjecting himself to the limitations of embodied existence. 
Likewise, the charity that Davis preaches is not rendered impossible or ineffective by 
modernity’s purported impositions on selfhood; rather, such charity is constituted by acts 
of solidarity with those most severely limited in the modern world, especially the poor. 
This chapter also aims to show how the Incarnation structures Davis’s aesthetic. 
Life in the Iron-Mills commends a mode of engaging the text that I call incarnational 
reading—a real-world performance of a text’s ethical imperatives. In the case of Life in 
the Iron-Mills, incarnational reading consists in the reader’s direct, personal service to the 
poor. Such reading runs counter to the forms of disengagement that Davis claims 
sentimental fiction fosters, for it culminates not in an emotional experience but in 
embodied action. At the same time, Davis recognizes the likelihood that readers will read 
her text sentimentally. Writing as she does, in a manner that stakes the text’s success on 
one (unconventional) kind of reading, constitutes a sacrifice of authorial control that 
parallels Christ’s subjection to bodily existence. Both acts are expressions of agency, 
choices that compromise one’s sovereignty in the hope of a greater good. Through acts of 
incarnational writing and reading, the word indeed becomes flesh, rendering the practice 
of fiction a charitable work enacted jointly by author and reader.3 Better to describe this 
                                                
3 Locating the Incarnation at the center of this text radicalizes a strain of Davis criticism that has 
emphasized the body in Life, particularly the ways in which characters’ bodies signify about their 
class status and social power. In “Representing and Self-Mutilating the Laboring Male Body,” 
Caroline S. Miles reads Life in conversation with a “nineteenth-century American rhetoric that 
equated white manhood with transcending and replacing the material body” and that 
“represent[ed] embodiment in terms of victimization, enslavement, and blackness” (89, 94). In 
this rhetorical context, the mill worker Hugh Wolfe’s thick corporeality excludes him from the 
social privilege enjoyed by the refined and nearly “impalpable” Mitchell, an affluent white visitor 
50 
transformation of fiction into action, I situate Davis’s incarnational ethics and aesthetics 
in historical debates over poverty relief and fiction-reading practices. Then, in a close 
reading of Life in the Iron-Mills, I describe how that text, merging Davis’s ethics and 
aesthetics, stages a radical intervention both in contemporary discourses of poverty and, 
when the text is read incarnationally, in the lives of the poor as well. 
“Cold-blooded Logic” 
In fiction and nonfiction Davis wrote frequently of the individual’s ethical 
responsibility to the poor. In “Indiscriminate Charity” she argues that, to “ordinary 
human beings,” caring for the needy who come in one’s path “would appear [. . .] only 
the dictates of common sense, as well as the direct teaching of Him who bade us 
individually feed the hungry and clothe the naked”; and the quotation from “At Our 
Gates” that opens this essay affirms the primacy of that responsibility among all the 
“dut[ies] laid down for us” by Christ.4 However, the philanthropic institutions of her day 
                                                                                                                                            
to the mills (Davis, Life 51). In “Benevolent Maternalism and Physically Disabled Figures” 
Rosemarie Garland Thomson constructs a parallel argument about a literary tradition that, by 
portraying female charity as the work of able-bodied benefactresses on behalf of physically 
disabled women, granted the former an influential social role to perform outside of the domestic 
realm, while systematically excluding the latter from any such privilege. In Thomson’s reading, 
the Quaker woman and Deb inhabit these roles of empowered benefactress and anathematized 
beneficiary. For other studies that take up Davis’s fascination with the body, see Mark Seltzer’s 
“The Still Life” and Kristen Boudreau’s “‘The Woman’s Flesh of Me.’” A quotation from 
Miles’s article indicates both my indebtedness to this body of criticism as well as my 
discontinuity with it: she writes, “It is the laborer’s body that captures Davis’s artistic imagination, 
that inspires her to write the story of Hugh Wolfe, that reminds us of the signifying power of 
bodies [. . .]” (90). I argue, however, that one particular, historical, and extraordinary body—the 
body of God in Jesus—inspires Davis to write Life and, moreover, that in this text the Incarnation 
inverts the value systems described by these critics and, thus, favors embodiment at every turn, 
not only in the characters but also in the reader. 
 
4 Davis’s fiction and essays seem to constitute scholars’ primary source of information about her 
religious beliefs; biographers tell us little of this on the basis of her private writings or others’ 
testimony. As a teenager Davis attended Washington Female Seminary, where she “studied 
geometry, literature, music, and drawing, and took courses in Evidences of Christianity, Mental 
Philosophy, and Butler’s Analogy”—and graduated as valedictorian in 1848 (Harris 23). In her 
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suffer some of this wide-ranging social analyst’s most withering critiques. Lampooning 
the methods of late-nineteenth-century poverty relief, Davis writes, “How different it was 
once! The Good Samaritan put his hand into his own pocket and gave to the wounded 
man; now he would hand him over to a band of lady visitors, and let loose a society for 
repressing mendicancy upon him, before he should have a drop of oil or wine” to soothe 
his pains (“A Grumble” 103). What can account for her simultaneously claiming charity 
as the preeminent Christian duty and satirizing her generation’s busiest agents of charity? 
The answer lies in a nineteenth-century shift in the theory and practice of poverty relief. 
As Chapter 1 described, the nineteenth century saw Americans move from a 
primarily theological understanding of poverty to an ostensibly scientific one, and the 
methods of poverty relief changed along with this epistemological shift. When Americans 
believed that the poor performed a divinely ordained role in society, for which they were 
not to blame, the middle and upper classes administered aid “straightforwardly, without 
long investigations or elaborate procedures, without severe discomfort or dislocation” 
(Rothman 31). With their poverty implying no reason for ostracism, the poor inhabited a 
fairly central place in their communities; they were known to and aided by their 
neighbors. However, the advent of a scientific approach to poverty required a new class 
of specialists to study and manage poverty, and it presented new explanations for this 
                                                                                                                                            
literary biography entitled Rebecca Harding Davis and American Realism, Sharon M. Harris 
writes, “Although she was a Christian raised in the Episcopalian faith, Davis rejected organized 
worship at an early age and periodically struggled with her faith, especially during the Civil War 
years. When she came to terms with her own beliefs, she aligned herself with a loving and 
merciful God [. . .]” (49). This faith in a benevolent God seems to have animated an activist ethic 
of love to others. A bit of advice to her son Richard, included in Harris biography, captures the 
pragmatic tenor of her religion: “When her eldest son was away at school and felt dissatisfied 
with his advisor’s suggestion that prayer was a sufficient antidote to melancholy, Davis counseled, 
‘When you feel as if prayer was a burden, stop praying and go out and try to put your Christianity 
into real action” (55). 
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condition, from adverse environmental factors to personal vices. Philanthropic agencies 
emerged to investigate poverty at the local level and to administer (or withhold) aid to 
individual applicants according to their particular circumstances. With the rise of these 
agencies, poverty relief grew more systematic, exacting, and impersonal. No longer 
deemed capable of understanding or relieving poverty, communities abdicated care of the 
poor to specialized institutions. 
It is this later response to poverty that Davis holds in such low regard, and her 
critique emphasizes two of its weaknesses. First she deconstructs the assumption, which 
she attributes to the new philanthropic institutions, that “every man who asks for food is a 
scoundrel and fraud until he proves himself otherwise” (“At Our Gates”). While 
conceding the point that “much trickery and imposture” exists among the poor, she turns 
this argument against those who make it an excuse to neglect the poor: “are the rich all 
honest in purpose and clean in hands when they set about earning a living?” 
(“Indiscriminate”) Thus she subjects cynics to the same moral scrutiny to which the new 
philanthropic agencies subjected their applicants. In accordance with an early American 
theological tradition, Davis assumes that the poor stand on the same moral plane as the 
wealthy, if not on a higher one. She maintains the universal responsibility to aid the poor, 
“be [the poor man] honest or a thief,” and she further contends, “The more of a fraud or a 
criminal he is the more he needs [a helping hand]” (“At Our Gates”).5 
Perhaps more than scientific philanthropy’s dismissal of the “undeserving poor,” 
that movement’s tendency to cordon off the poor from mainstream society disturbs 
                                                
5 Here Davis’s theological debt bypasses Winthrop and goes directly to Jesus, who, when 
criticized by the morally circumspect Pharisees for associating with “tax collectors and sinners,” 
answered, “Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick; I have come 
to call not the righteous but sinners to repentance” (New Oxford Annotated Bible, Luke 5:31-32). 
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Davis, who believes that alleviating poverty depends on “direct individual intercourse 
between the classes” (“Indiscriminate”). The emergence of agencies that specialize in 
poverty relief contributes, Davis contends, to a widespread failure of community and 
mutual understanding: 
[T]o those who have most carefully considered the condition of the 
dangerous classes, statistics of prison reform, bureaus of charity and the 
systems for their relief, the truth has been more apparent with each year 
that the failure in these systems arises from this very disposition of 
individual men and woman [sic] to throw the onus of responsibility wholly 
on to organized charitable bodies, the refusal, in short, of educated people 
to recognize in the needy, men and women like themselves. 
(“Indiscriminate”) 
 
Ultimately, Davis laments the social and physical distance that “bureaus of charity” put 
between rich and poor because they exclude the possibility of embodied, holistic care for 
the needy, who require not only the money or food that agencies can offer but also “the 
human compassion, the trust, the strong word and loving touch which shall heal soul as 
well as body and give them another chance for this world and for Heaven” 
(“Indiscriminate”). Here, in her emphasis on proximity and bodily contact, Davis most 
clearly displays the importance of the Incarnation for her social ethic. Her commentary 
on poverty relief invariably maintains the necessity of moving toward the needy and 
sharing their experience because she believes God did precisely that in the person of 
Jesus. 
“Mawkish Sentimentality” 
 What then of Davis’s fiction? Given her conviction of the need for direct, 
individual contact with the poor, can poverty fiction be anything more than another 
obscuring layer, like the philanthropic agencies, between middle-class readers and the 
poor? Indeed, while Davis recognizes a “danger” in philanthropic work “that we are 
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moved as much by excitement and emulation and the love of picturesque and adventure [. 
. .] as by a pure and nobler motive,” she perceives the same hazard, perhaps amplified, in 
the reading of sentimental fiction—that is, fiction whose success depends on its ability to 
stimulate powerful affects in the reader (“Two Methods”).6 Davis was hardly alone in this 
concern; her opinions on the issue, manifest in her fiction, engage a contemporary 
controversy over the social function of fiction, which was every bit as vociferous as the 
one surrounding methods of poverty relief. 
In Carnival on the Page Isabelle Lehuu describes an antebellum “publishing 
revolution” during which the very definition of literacy came under scrutiny. When “a 
multitude of news sheets, magazines, and inexpensive paperbacks,” generally of a 
sentimental bent, first infiltrated the market, they reshaped a print culture previously 
dominated by “rare, expensive, and revered books” (17). Amid this diversification of 
reading materials and readers, reading itself became “not just a measurable ability but 
rather a contested terrain where social differences were exposed and opposite values 
confronted” (Lehuu 9). Between advocates of the old and new print cultures, the conflict 
of values surrounded the task of defining reading’s proper function. 
In The Letters of the Republic Michael Warner attests that a century before Life in 
the Iron-Mills was published, upon the emergence of the American novel, “Americans 
                                                
6 When I refer to sentimental literature, I mean also to indicate literature more frequently 
described as sensational. While “sentimental” and “sensational” often refer to discrete bodies of 
literature with different formal characteristics and cultural functions, the practices of 
sentimentalism and sensationalism should be understood as proximate points on a continuum. 
Even circumscribed by the narrowest definitions, these genres share not only the aim of affecting 
readers emotionally but also the liability of distancing readers from the real-life people that they 
represent fictionally—the former by eliding action while prioritizing “right feeling” and the latter 
by repelling readers through disgust. In Life in the Iron-Mills, the development in Doctor May’s 
attitude toward Hugh Wolfe, which I describe below, demonstrates the simplicity of alternating 
between these forms of literature—and their attendant ethical evasions. 
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endlessly avowed a fear that fiction would detach readers’ sentiments from the social 
world of the polity, substituting a private drama of fancy. They wrote of such fears in 
virtually every magazine and newspaper in the country” (175). Christopher Castiglia 
argues, without particular reference to literary reading, that the antebellum period brought 
precisely this detachment of private and public, of psychological interior and political 
exterior, as Americans came to “misrecognize the location of the social, finding it, not in 
association with others, but in the turbulent and conflicted interiors of [their] own bodies” 
(2). At the time of Life’s publication, then, cultural critics attuned to this abandonment of 
the public sphere worried all the more about the publishing revolution that Lehuu 
describes. Janice Radway’s account of the new cheap books’ appeal helps explain 
antebellum fears about the antisocial drift of literate culture: 
In many cases [these readers] aimed simply to experience pleasure in its 
manifold forms, accompanied by diverse affective and somatic effects. 
Whether cheap fiction books were to produce the skin-crawling sensation 
of fear, the upwelling tears of pathos, the erotic excitements of romance, 
or the bated breath of suspense, they were picked up precisely because 
they were successful at moving the body and provoking the emotions. 
(142) 
 
Most arbiters of culture perceived a threat in this mode of reading. If Americans in the 
early republic feared that the novel would privatize a reading culture that had previously 
fostered engagement in the public sphere, then the more ephemeral publications of the 
antebellum period threatened to atomize literate culture still further and to draw 
individual readers more deeply into “private drama[s] of fancy.” Cultural critics worried 
over these changes not only because privatization made it more difficult to regulate the 
moral content of the nation’s reading but also because, on a structural level, it defined a 
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space where individual readers could disengage themselves from the claims of social life, 
a virtually unthinkable prospect in pre-nineteenth-century America. 
Hence, Lehuu explains that in the antebellum period, books offering instruction 
on appropriate reading indicate that, “if practiced with restraint and with a purpose, 
reading was regarded as a useful recreation, but excessive reading for mere pleasure was 
morally wrong” (128). Useful is the crucial term: reading was expected to be socially 
generative, encouraging virtuous public activity rather than private self-indulgence. 
However, Lehuu contends that newspapers’ sensationalist human-interest stories “offered 
exposure as a substitute for human contact” (51), and Carolyn Betensky similarly claims 
that “social-problem novels” of this period encouraged “the idea that it matters how I feel 
about poverty, whether or not I do anything more than care about it” (1). This “valuation 
of bourgeois feeling as an end in itself,” independent of action, signals a change in 
American reading practices that many traditionalists, Davis among them, disapproved of 
and sought to reverse (51). 
Unlike later realists such as William Dean Howells, Hamlin Garland, and Henry 
James, Davis did not employ nonfiction to articulate her aesthetic principles; rather, she 
used fiction to theorize about fiction. For example, in her first full-length novel, Margret 
Howth (1861), the narrator explicitly positions the text in opposition to sentimental 
literature with its escapist tendencies. Calling this text “very crude and homely”—“a dull, 
plain bit of prose”—the narrator anticipates the reader’s disappointment over the text’s 
drabness (6). “I know the glimpses of life it pleases you best to find,” she writes, and 
proceeds to delineate the characteristic marks of literature in the sentimental tradition: 
“idylls delicately tinted, passion-veined hearts, cut bare for curious eyes; prophetic 
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utterances, concrete and clear [. . .]. You want something, in fact, to lift you out of this 
commonplace, to kindle and chafe and glow in you” (7). But the narrator denies the 
reader these pleasures, confessing, “I want you to dig into this commonplace” (7). These 
passages obstruct the path of escape—of “fancy”—that had lain open to the reader. 
Counter to authors in the sentimental vein, Davis consistently practices an aesthetic of the 
quotidian—what Sharon M. Harris calls her “theory of the commonplace”—in order to 
promote her readers’ engagement with the real world through immersion in her fiction 
(3).7 Thus, Michele L. Mock calls Davis a “textual activist” because she understands 
fiction as a “participative and dialogic expression of social activism” (126). In Life in the 
Iron-Mills the narrator invites readers deep into the text in order to return them finally to 
the world of daily, public life. My analysis of that text demonstrates the means by which 
it impels the reader, in accord with Davis’s ethics and aesthetics, to enter the lives of the 
poor in Christian charity. 
Gregory S. Jackson situates Life in the Iron-Mills in a literary tradition that he 
calls “homiletic realism,” a mode of fiction that adapted the form of early American 
Christian sermons in order to “facilitate private devotion, strengthen moral autonomy, 
and foster social engagement through particular acts of reading” (158). The homiletic 
novel accessed audiences’ powers of volition through their imaginations, “employ[ing] 
                                                
7 Davis’s short story “Marcia” (1876), a miniature künstlerroman, further elaborates Davis’s 
response to sentimental fiction. The story tells of the eponymous writer-protagonist’s sojourn in 
Philadelphia, a flight from her Mississippi home in pursuit of a literary career. The narrator, an 
author himself, praises Marcia’s writings for their rejection of “sunsets, duchesses, [and] violets” 
in exchange for the “dirt and dreary monotony” of rural Mississippi and its “swamp, the slimy 
living things in the stagnant ponds, the semi-tropical forest, the house and negro quarters” (310, 
312). The narrator says that in Marcia’s fiction “[t]here was none of the usual talk of countesses, 
heather, larks, or emotions of which she knew nothing,” unlike the sentimental fiction in which 
one can find “not a solid grain of common-sense, not a hint of reality or even possibility” (312). 
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allegorical frames to create social environments immediately present to readers [. . .] in 
which individuals imagined possibilities for personal transformation” (31). Jackson 
argues that this type of fiction directly responded to “two challenges plaguing most late-
nineteenth-century congregations: Christian resignation in the face of naked social need 
and parishioners’ enervating doubts about religion’s relevance in a fast-paced age of 
industry, mechanization, and scientific advancement” (159). Like the sermonic tradition 
it adapted, homiletic realism proceeded on the conviction that experience was the best 
tutor of the will. However, since direct experience of social need was precisely the thing 
lacking in these congregations, the homiletic novel constructed a virtual reality that 
authors hoped would stimulate the will and elicit social intervention. A pioneer of this 
literary practice, Life in the Iron-Mills invites readers deep into the text in order to return 
them finally to the real world. My analysis of that text demonstrates the means by which 
it impels the reader, in accord with Davis’s ethics and aesthetics, to enter the lives of the 
poor in Christian charity. 
Reading Life 
Davis’s story features two members of the working class in a factory town, Hugh 
Wolfe and his cousin Deb. With an untutored talent for sculpture and an inarticulate 
sensitivity to beauty, Hugh longs for a life beyond the iron mills where he works, for a 
realm of aesthetic and spiritual experience for which his social position offers little 
vocabulary. When some affluent men visit the iron mills and pause to discuss a sculpture 
that Hugh has carved in his free time, Deb steals money from one of the men and offers it 
to Hugh, who ultimately keeps the money after wavering between a belief that theft is 
always wrong and, on the other hand, a sense that broad economic inequities justify his 
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keeping it. When authorities apprehend him and sentence him and Deb to prison terms, 
Hugh despairs of the life he longed for and commits suicide, using a bit of tin like that he 
used to employ for sculpting. As officials and curious observers file in and out of his 
bloody jail cell, an unknown Quaker woman sits quietly with Deb in her grief. This 
woman, after Deb’s release from prison, brings her to live with the Quaker community, 
where Deb experiences healing and an unprecedented thriving in body and spirit. 
Christ’s Incarnation inspires both the content and structure of Life in the Iron-
Mills. But this foundational element has been obscured by an episode in the text’s 
editorial history that remains largely unknown and unremarked. In her essay “The 
Censored and Uncensored Literary Lives of Life in the Iron-Mills,” Janice Milner 
Lasseter studies the holograph version of the text, from which the Atlantic Monthly 
inexplicably deleted a paragraph between Davis’s submission and their publication of 
Life. Although the edited version remains the standard for contemporary editions of Life, 
the holograph version preserves the theological center of the text. In the edited version, 
near the end of the day in which Hugh struggles to decide whether or not to keep the 
stolen money, he visits a church where the minister is preaching charity but in erudite 
language suited to the cultured congregation—and, therefore, incomprehensible to Hugh. 
On the heels of this failed encounter, though, the holograph version hints that this “trial-
day of [Hugh’s] life” (Davis, Life 65) would have ended differently “[i]f [Christ] had 
stood in the church that night” (qtd. in Lasseter 176).8 
                                                
8 In the deleted paragraph, the narrator wonders, “Could Wolfe have seen [Jesus] as He was, that 
night, what then? [. . .] If He had stood in the church that night, would not the wretch in the torn 
shirt there in the pew have ‘known the man’? His brother first. And then, unveiled his God” (qtd. 
in Lasseter 176). 
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The critical difference between the preacher and Jesus lies in the character of their 
respective ministries—the preacher’s eloquently abstract, Jesus’s coarsely embodied. The 
narrator calls the preacher there a “Christian reformer” with a “heart [. . .] summer-warm 
with charity,” but the church building is constructed “to meet the requirements and 
sympathies of a far other class than Hugh’s” (64). And while the mellifluous words of the 
sermon “sounded in [Hugh’s] ears a very pleasant song,” they ultimately “passed far over 
the furnace-tender’s grasp, toned to suit another class of culture” (64). The failure of this 
sermon for Hugh lies in the clergyman’s well-intentioned, liberal assumption that he can 
“cure this world-cancer with a steady eye that had never glared with hunger, and a hand 
that neither poverty nor strychnine-whiskey had taught to shake” (64). The preacher 
wants to effect salvation from a position of uninhibited power; no hunger or want or 
addiction should constrain his freedom to act. By contrast, the text’s holograph version, 
calling Jesus a reformer “who did not fail,” emphasizes the incarnational—that is, self-
limiting—character of his ministry: “A social Pariah, a man of the lowest caste, thrown 
up from among them, dying with their pain, starving with their hunger, tempted as they 
are to drink, to steal, to curse God and die. Theirs by blood, by birth. The son, they said, 
of Joseph the carpenter, his mother and sisters there among them” (qtd. in Lasseter 176). 
Unlike Davis’s preacher, Christ fully inhabits the world of those to whom he ministers, 
embracing its burdens, and the narrator suggests that this way of life is essential to 
anyone who would intervene in Hugh’s story. The edited text hints at the necessity of 
incarnational charity, but this excised passage from the holograph version makes sense of 
those intimations pervading Life, integrating them into a coherent theological system and, 
as I will explain, a consistent mode of relating text, reader, and “real life.” 
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 The narrator’s explicit instructions for engaging her story assume fresh 
significance when the Incarnation is restored to the center of the text. Before the narrative 
descends into the squalor of Hugh’s underclass life, the narrator addresses her implied 
middle-class reader: 
This is what I want you to do. I want you to hide your disgust, take no 
heed to your clean clothes, and come right down with me, —here, into the 
thickest of the fog and mud and foul effluvia. I want you to hear this story. 
There is a secret down here, in this nightmare fog, that has lain dumb for 
centuries: I want to make it a real thing to you. (41) 
 
The language here is thoroughly incarnational. Just as Christ came down from heaven to 
earth, so the reader, to “hear this story” and encounter its “secret,” must “come right 
down with [the narrator]”; and as Christ divested himself of divine prerogatives upon 
entering a world marred by sin and death, so the reader must shed the vestments of 
middle-class identity, “tak[ing] no heed to [her] clean clothes” amid the “fog and mud 
and foul effluvia” of Hugh’s neighborhood. The text, then, calls for readerly acts of 
descending and stripping that are modeled on the Incarnation.9 
                                                
9  I apply these metaphors of descending and stripping to the work of reading, but 
incarnational motifs structure Davis’s aesthetic generally, in Life in the Iron-Mills and in other 
texts. In Life, Hugh Wolfe functions not only as a type of the country’s new industrial labor force 
but also as a figure of the artist. His practice of hewing figures out of the korl is itself an art of 
descent and divestiture (“Life” 48). Excavating the “strangely beautiful” forms hidden in blocks 
of industrial waste material, his work suggests Davis’s own aesthetic project (48). 
Moreover, the narrative structure of Life rehearses the incarnational motif: the road 
leading from the town proper to the iron mills “lay on the river, a mile below the city-limits,” and 
it “had been quarried from the solid rock, which rose abrupt and bare on one side of the cinder-
covered road” (45). Thus, passage to the mills involves a descent from town and, sometime in the 
past, a stripping of the rocky landscape, a shedding of layers. Moreover, when some affluent men 
visit the mills—where, significantly, the “half-naked” workers have shed their clothes to 
withstand the heat (53)—the visitors compare the scene to Dante’s Inferno, invoking a still more 
schematic narrative of descent than Life itself represents (50). 
Finally, Hugh’s sculpting art also resembles the engraving craft esteemed by the writer-
protagonist of “Marcia,” published fifteen years after Life in the Iron-Mills. Marcia’s fiction, 
which mirrors Davis’s unsentimental realism, performs the same work with words that engraving 
(and sculpting) perform with material media: as the latter artforms achieve expression by carving 
away unwanted material, Marcia’s literary realism tells a truth through its elimination of 
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But what does it mean to read incarnationally? And how would such reading 
differ from that which is characterized by “mawkish sentimentality” or “cold-blooded 
logic”? Davis’s metaphor suggests depth, engagement, charity, and embodiment; but to 
understand more fully the practice to which Life calls its audience, one must first look to 
the multiple scenes of failed reading in this text, which help through antithesis to define 
incarnational reading. The most conspicuous of these reading scenes occurs when three 
highly literate visitors to the iron mills stumble upon the figure of a starving woman that 
Hugh has sculpted (or “hewn”) from korl, the refuse of the iron-smelting process.10 The 
crude work of art, so unexpected in this setting, rouses their interpretive faculties. The 
text metonomizes each of the three visitors—the wealthy mill owner Kirby as the “pocket 
of the world,” the compassionate doctor May as the “heart,” and the analytical flâneur 
Mitchell as the “head” (56, 56, 57)—and each of these men produces a corresponding 
reading of the sculpture, and of Hugh.  
Kirby, one of the owners of the mill, is callous and dismissive: he scoffs at 
Hugh’s pastime and only grudgingly concedes that there may exist “some stray gleams of 
mind and soul among these wretches” (54). By themselves, Kirby’s disdain for Hugh and 
his general dehumanization of the workers mark his reading as a failure by the narrator’s 
standards, which require at least attentiveness to these characters’ stories. But a more 
                                                                                                                                            
sentimental excesses. As noted previously, in her writing “there was none of the usual talk of 
countesses, heather, larks, or emotions of which she knew nothing”; her fiction is distinguished 
not so much by the content it presents as by the content it removes (i.e., “sunsets, duchesses, 
violets”). 
 
10 The text shows this group to be well-read when they not only compare the mills to Dante’s 
Inferno but even a particular worker to one of the poem’s characters (“Yonder is Farinata himself 
in the burning tomb” [50]). Moreover, despite being in the mills for a tour, which one would 
expect to command their full attention, the men discuss a newspaper article that one of them reads 
aloud. Reading apparently pervades their lives. 
 
63 
significant condemnation lurks in Kirby’s declaration that he “wash[es] his hands of all 
social problems” (55); for Mitchell compares him to Pilate, the Roman official who 
succumbed to public pressure for Jesus’s crucifixion but washed his hands of 
responsibility for Jesus’s death (New Oxford Annotated Bible, Matt. 27:24-26). Kirby 
hands Hugh over not to violent men but to a harsh socioeconomic world in which Hugh 
lacks an advocate such as Kirby could be. 
 Appalled by the mill owner’s heartlessness, Doctor May responds far more 
emotionally to Hugh and the korl-woman and proves himself an exemplary reader in the 
sentimental mode. He identifies Hugh as a “latent genius to be warmed into life by a 
waited-for sunbeam,” which he can provide in a “friendly word or two” (56). Himself a 
“philanthropist, in a small way,” the doctor “complacently” affirms Hugh’s talent and 
charges him, “Make yourself what you will. It is your right” (56); and having offered 
Hugh nothing more than verbal encouragement, May finds himself “glowing with his 
own magnanimity” (56).11 Again, in times after this night, when May prays for the 
laboring classes to which Hugh belongs, he “glow[s] at heart, recognizing an 
accomplished duty” (58). Granted, May almost certainly believes prayer a materially 
effectual practice; I do not intend to argue that he does nothing kind or meaningful in 
response to Hugh. Rather, it is the narrow scope of his action and his feeling of self-
satisfaction at that uncostly aid that marks him as a typical sentimental reader. Fitting 
                                                
11 Davis’s critique of May evokes a passage in the biblical book of James: “If a brother or sister is 
poorly clothed and lacking in daily food, and one of you says to them, ‘Go in peace, be warmed 
and filled,’ without giving them the things needed for the body, what good is that? So also faith 
by itself, if it does not have works, is dead” (NOAB, Jas. 2:15-17). 
 
64 
squarely in that role, he derives a pleasurable feeling from the mere impulse to help Hugh 
and from a few words and prayers that constitute for him a very small sacrifice.12  
 If Doctor May neatly exemplifies the sentimental reader, then a third visitor to the 
mills, Mitchell, personifies the epistemological posture of scientific philanthropists. 
Admittedly, he represents no mirror image of these new charity workers; he explicitly 
disavows philanthropy, arguing that “Reform is born of need, not pity” (57). Maintaining 
that “No vital movement of the people’s has worked down, for good or evil,” he places 
the burden of reform on the shoulders of the poor: “Some day, out of their bitter need will 
be thrown up their own light-bringer, —their Jean Paul, their Cromwell, their Messiah” 
(57). But in this conviction Mitchell is no stranger to the scientific philanthropists; while 
Americans before the nineteenth century freely assumed the care of the poor, the 
innovative charity workers of Davis’s era assigned the poor increased responsibility for 
their own uplift. For Mitchell, as for Davis’s new philanthropists, this shifting of 
responsibility entails a stance in relation to the poor that can aptly be described as “cold-
blooded.” 
                                                
12  The text more firmly links May with the sentimental tradition when, after Hugh’s arrest 
and sentencing, it shows him reading a report of Hugh’s trial in a sensationalist newspaper. The 
passage immediately preceding this scene, and following Hugh’s decision to keep the stolen 
money, frames May’s reading in a manner that condemns sensationalist representation:  
Do you want to hear the end of [Hugh’s story]? You wish me to make a tragic 
story out of it? Why, in the police-reports of the morning paper you can find a 
dozen such tragedies: hints of shipwrecks unlike any that ever befell on the high 
seas; hints that here a power was lost to heaven,—that there a soul went down 
where no tide can ebb or flow. Commonplace enough the hints are,—jocose 
sometimes, done up in rhyme. (65) 
The next sentence finds Doctor May reading a newspaper that contains the report of Hugh’s trial, 
to which he responds indignantly, “Scoundrel! Serves him right! After all our kindness that night!” 
(65). Here the reader witnesses the easy movement from the emotions fostered by sentimental 
literature, which May exhibits in the iron mills, to those provoked by sensational writing, which 
he expresses in this scene. 
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 Life’s introduction to Mitchell emphasizes his habits of ocular penetration and 
self-preserving retreat, movements that define the work of the new philanthropists whom 
his character evokes: 
The young man talking to Kirby sat with an amused light in his cool gray 
eye, surveying critically the half-clothed figures of the puddlers, and the 
slow swing of their brawny muscles. He was a stranger in the city,—
spending a couple of months in the borders of a Slave State, to study the 
institutions of the South,—a brother-in-law of Kirby’s,—Mitchell. He was 
an amateur gymnast—hence his anatomical eye; a patron, in a blasé way, 
of the prize-ring; a man who sucked the essence out of a science or 
philosophy in an indifferent, gentlemanly way; who took Kant, Novalis, 
Humboldt, for what they were worth in his own scales; accepting all, 
despising nothing, in heaven, earth, or hell, but one-idead men; with a 
temper yielding and brilliant as summer water, until his Self was touched, 
when it was ice, though brilliant still. Such men are not rare in the States. 
(51) 
 
His “anatomical eye” renders his vision sharp, severe, rapacious, as he “survey[s] 
critically” the bodies of the mill workers, “stud[ies]” Southern institutions in “a couple of 
months,” and “suck[s] the essence out” of complex systems of thought. Indeed, Hugh 
fancies him “a Man all-knowing, all-seeing” (59). But for all the penetration of Mitchell’s 
gaze, he maintains distance from the objects of his investigation. Though his eye is an 
efficient implement of retrieval and taxonomy, it remains “cool,” with an “amused light” 
in it (51). He is “blasé.” Most importantly, he guards himself against the sort of scrutiny, 
and change, to which he subjects everything around him; for when “his Self [is] 
touched,” his “temper”—usually “yielding and brilliant as summer water”—turns to 
“ice.” Thus, when Mitchell and his companions encounter Hugh and the korl woman, his 
“probing eyes” are “mocking, cruel, relentless” in their inspection of Hugh (54); but he 
stands “aloof” from the scene, exuding the “air of an amused spectator at a play” (53, 
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55).13 For his part, Hugh immediately perceives that, though he possesses some aesthetic 
kinship with Mitchell, there is “between them [. . .] a great gulf never to be passed” (52). 
As Caroline Miles argues, that chasm marks the distance between Hugh’s thick 
corporeality and Mitchell’s virtual disembodiment—characterized by “the impalpable 
atmosphere belonging to the thorough-bred gentleman” (51). It is precisely this distance 
that Christ’s Incarnation inspires Davis to close. 
After three failed responses to the korl-woman—Kirby’s, May’s, and 
Mitchell’s—one might reasonably doubt the capacity of Hugh’s sculpture, or of art as 
such, to effect meaningful change in an audience. Amy Schrager Lang considers such 
doubt the very impetus of the text; she argues that “the questionable capacity of art to 
represent, much less redeem, the iron puddler becomes itself the story’s subject” (85). 
According to Andrew J. Scheiber, Davis intends not “the creation of aesthetic values, but 
[. . .] the interrogation and demolition of them” because she understands “that to achieve 
the aesthetic effect is all too easy, and that true discipline is not in artistic creation, but in 
                                                
13 A connoisseur of ideas, aloof and uncommitted, Mitchell closely resembles Davis’s sketch of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson in her essay “Boston in the Sixties” (1904), where she reflects on a 
conversation she had with him upon their first meeting. Sensing Emerson’s interest in her 
Virginian experience of the Civil War, Davis eagerly and loquaciously tells him what she has 
witnessed of the conflict, only to conclude later that his interest was quite impersonal: 
If [Thomas] Edison had been there [Emerson] would have been just as eager to 
wrench out of him the secret of electricity, or if it had been a freed slave he 
would have compelled him to show the scars on his back and lay bare his 
rejoicing, ignorant, half-animal soul, and an hour later he would have forgotten 
that Edison or the negro or I were in the world—having taken from each what he 
wanted. (449) 
Davis’s offense at Emerson, and his fictional avatar Mitchell, seems less personal than 
philosophical and ethical, for Emerson’s gaze tends to exploit its objects. Both figures “suck the 
essence” out of something or someone they observe but never permit themselves to be changed in 
the encounter. 
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resistance to the temptations it presents” (102).14 After all, when Mitchell “look[s] at the 
furnace-tender [Hugh] as he had looked at a rare mosaic in the morning” (Davis, Life 17), 
it is what Mark Seltzer calls the “aestheticization of the natural body” that neutralizes any 
ethical response he might make to Hugh and permits Mitchell to commodify him—an 
object for aesthetic consumption, an “amusing study” rather than a man (Davis, Life 17). 
Life implies not only that art permits of self-serving readings but that some forms of art, 
like sentimentalism, even encourage them. Nonetheless, it is important to affirm Davis’s 
commitment to art, and particularly literature, as such. 
In his study of homiletic realism, Gregory Jackson contends that that literary 
mode’s allegorical nature militates against voyeurism because it implies a fundamental 
connection between the fictional world of the text and the quotidian world of the reader, 
between representation and reality. By “blurring the distinction between the real and the 
figural” and calling readers to translate fiction into action, the allegorical foundation of 
homiletic realism “denie[s] readers the role of passive onlooker” (8, 32). I argue that Life 
in the Iron-Mills also resists voyeuristic reading, but the text does not follow Jackson’s 
account in doing so. Davis refuses to abandon literary representation not because her 
chosen mode bars the door to escapism. She vividly dramatizes three escapist “readings” 
of Hugh’s korl-woman. For Davis, art diagnoses moral problems and encourages 
audiences to redress them, but she insists through the korl-woman that art does not 
                                                
14 In Vanishing Moments: Class and American Literature (2006), Eric Schocket identifies these 
temptations as invitations to be “conciliated, compensated, or otherwise distracted” by the literary 
experience of sympathetic identification with the laboring classes. Although he reads Davis as 
offering this false conciliation, he concurs with Scheiber in arguing, “When it comes to textual 
representations of labor, [. . .] we need to resist being interpellated into the text’s affective 
apparatus of identification. Indeed, “disidentification” would be a more productive critical stance, 
since it would lead us to explore the structural causes for inequity” (32). 
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redress the problems itself. 
Davis persists as a fiction writer on the basis of a paradox that Jackson overlooks, 
namely, that the Incarnation calls readers to exercise their agency by limiting their 
freedom. God’s becoming human, and the affluent’s becoming poor, are peculiar acts of 
will in that their moral power derives from a renunciation of power. Jackson situates the 
homiletic novel in a contest between, “on the one hand, evangelical factions attempting to 
muscularize volition and, on the other, various strains of determinism, ranging from a 
lingering predestinarianism to emergent forms of evolutionary causality,” and he sees the 
homiletic novel unambiguously affirming and cultivating volition (159). I read Life in the 
Iron-Mills in a similar manner but find Jackson’s invocation of muscular Christianity 
misleading when applied to this text, for Life associates agency with weakness and 
humility, not with brawn and self-assurance. Life calls readers to exercise their volition in 
identifying with the poor, but it does not present this self-sacrificing work as a simple 
solution to poverty, an irresistible reform movement that scatters social ills with a glance. 
The text remarks the failures of “many a political reformer [. . .] and many a private 
reformer too, who has gone among [the poor] with a heart tender with Christ’s charity, 
and come out outraged, hardened” (42). Identifying with the poor is not a steroid for the 
moral muscles; it is the willful assumption of a burden that just might crush one. This is 
why Life in the Iron-Mills can critique art per se without repudiating it. 
The notion that Davis knowingly pursues her moral purpose through a flawed 
medium corresponds to her incarnational theology that couches divine intervention in 
human affairs in the same terms. For Davis, the model of meaningful human action is the 
work of redemption performed by God in Christ under the limiting conditions of human 
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existence. Therefore, the hazards of sentimentalism do not disqualify literature as a 
means of promoting justice; rather, those pitfalls mark literature as a suitably confining 
medium, much like human flesh to God.15 
 With the exception of Christ, only one “reader” in Life satisfies the narrator, 
namely, the Quaker woman who comforts Deb in Hugh’s jail cell after his suicide. 
Although she hardly speaks to Deb—and when she does, her words are few and 
economical—her ministry of presence is also decidedly lingual. It emerges from the 
center of Quaker communal life, the Quaker “meeting-house” where “Once a week they 
sit [. . .] in their grave, earnest way, waiting for the Spirit of Love to speak, opening their 
simple hearts to receive His words” (73, my emphasis). These men and women are 
incarnational readers: having received the words of God, having encountered the Word 
himself, they go about embodying that divine language among the poor. And in her quiet 
attendance on Deb, the Quaker woman displays the aesthetic nature of her embodied 
reading, as she brings “a vase of wood-leaves and berries,” opens the window to the 
“woody fragrance” of “fresh air,” and promises Deb that Hugh will not be buried 
“[u]nder t’ mud and ash” of the “town-yard” but by the Quaker’s home on the hills, 
where “the light lies warm” and “the winds of God blow all the day,” “where the blue 
smoke is, by the trees” (72). By her physical presence in the jail cell, her material gifts to 
Deb, and the “slow, patient Christ-love” that enfolds Deb into the Quaker community, 
this woman transfigures the language of the meeting-house into corporeal care. 
                                                
15 For a related argument about the potential in linguistic imperfection, see Patrick Greaney’s 
Untimely Beggar: Poverty and Power from Baudelaire to Benjamin (2008). Greaney’s complex 
thesis asserts that because French and German modernist literature associated poverty with power 
and potential (e.g., in the prospect of revolution), that literature represented the poor in a 
deliberately “impoverished language” through which authors hoped to participate in the power of 
the poor. 
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Moreover, the Quaker woman provides the text’s closest approximation of 
Christ’s incarnational ministry. The divine Word motivates her to perform the actions 
that the narrator desires from her reader and that Christ models: she descends to the jail 
from the hills where she lives, and her physical form—a “homely body, coarsely dressed 
in gray and white”—is divested of accessories (72). This simple embodiment 
distinguishes her from every other character who aims to engage the poor; in Hugh’s jail 
cell “local editors,” “boys with their hands thrust knowingly in their pockets,” and other 
visitors are “coming and going all day,” but the Quaker woman offers Deb her consistent 
physical presence, “outstay[ing] them all” (72).16 
If this incarnational reading originates in the Quaker meeting-house, though, how 
can a non-Quaker reader of Life enact such a reading? How can he make the word flesh? 
Davis’s text itself constitutes a space like the Quaker meeting; its words, too, call for 
embodiment. The narrator repeatedly indicates that she wants the reader to experience 
something beneath the surface of her story; she locates hope for the poor there and 
prophesies that the reader will perceive it, too, “if your eyes are as free as mine to look 
deeper” (41). And about the “terrible tragedy,” “soul-starvation,” and “living death” of 
her characters’ lives, the narrator claims, “I can paint nothing of this, only give you the 
outside outlines of a night, a crisis in the life of one man: whatever muddy depth of soul-
                                                
16 In Davis’s previously referenced short story “Marcia,” the eponymous writer-protagonist nearly 
starves to death while trying to get her realist fiction published; and, at the nadir of her career, she 
lies sick in bed surrounded by curious acquaintances who never before realized she was in such 
poor health. Closely paralleling Hugh’s deathbed tableau, this scene in “Marcia” puts an author in 
the position of defeat and prostration that Hugh occupies in Life. This juxtaposition of Hugh the 
industrial laborer and Marcia the writer emphasizes the constraint, both commercial and formal, 
under which authors produce their art. The scene suggests, as I have argued above, that writing 
fiction possesses an incarnational quality of its own when authors subject their aesthetic and 
ethical aims to flawed forms and generic conventions. 
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history lies beneath you can read according to the eyes God has given you” (47). 
However, representing this story as merely the “outside outlines of a night” and, 
elsewhere, the “outline of a dull life” problematizes the invitation to “look deeper” and 
read “beneath” (47, 40). There is no depth in an outline; there is no “beneath” in which to 
read. But the textual impasse that Davis creates is active and meaningful, in that it impels 
the reader to conclude that this “deeper” space lies outside the confines of the narrator’s 
story. In calling the reader into “muddy depths of soul-history” of which she “can paint 
nothing,” the narrator prescribes not only, or even primarily, an interpretive work within 
the text but an embodied movement into real lives—the lives of one’s local poor—
beyond the text.17 
                                                
17  In Rebecca Harding Davis and American Realism, Sharon M. Harris reads the narrator 
ironically; she finds her rhetoric of hope (“the promise of the Dawn”) decidedly sentimental and 
considers this a marker of Davis’s disapproval. By Harris’s reading, the bourgeois narrator 
remains inured to the radical social critique that Davis mounts through Hugh, Deb, and the korl-
woman. Several critics since Harris have taken a similar line (see Scheiber, Pfaelzer, Lang, and 
Goodling). But this interpretation is problematic on at least two levels. 
First, it is anachronistic, assuming a model of writing and reading that did not obtain in 
1860s America. In Getting at the Author: Reimagining Books and Reading in the Age of 
American Realism, Barbara Hochman argues that until the 1880s the interpretive convention she 
calls “reading for the author” dominated nineteenth-century American reading practices; in this 
hermeneutic frame “reading was a ‘kind of conversation’ with the writer,” whose “‘individuality’ 
emerged from his or her text in the course of reading” (2, 1-2). The modern dissociation of author 
and narrator, on which Harris’s reading of Life depends, had not yet taken hold; rather, “the 
digressive, self-reflexive narrator was associated with the writer of the text and often seen as the 
repository of moral, social, and intellectual values” (7). For a complementary discussion of 
antebellum reading practices and the figure of the narrator, see Nina Baym’s Novels, Readers, 
and Reviewers: Responses to Fiction in Antebellum America. 
Second, the language that Harris identifies as sentimental and, therefore, antithetical to 
Davis’s social and aesthetic vision is actually language that aligns the narrator with the Quaker 
woman’s ministry to Deb and with Davis’s “theory of the commonplace,” Harris’s own coinage. 
Critics sometimes stumble over the narrator’s comments on the material objects lying about her 
room: she says, “A half-moulded child’s head; Aphrodite; a bough of forest-leaves; music; work; 
homely fragments, in which lie the secrets of all eternal truth and beauty. Prophetic all!” (74) 
These items, so the argument goes, invoke a romantic aesthetic and indicate the narrator’s 
distance from the rough world of Hugh and the laboring classes. But the reader has seen “a bough 
of forest-leaves” before in Life, when the Quaker woman brings Deb “a vase of wood-leaves and 
berries” in Hugh’s jail cell. And Davis’s theory of the commonplace, as Harris articulates it, 
could well be summarized in the narrator’s assertion that “the secrets of all eternal truth and 
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Life in the Iron-Mills thus explodes the sentimental account of fiction reading, 
which terminates in the reader, in the achievement of some affect. Carolyn Betensky 
argues that “[s]ocial-problem novels teach us to read our own reading, know our own 
knowledge, and feel our own feeling about the poor and working classes as important” 
(6). But Life redefines reading to transcend these self-congratulating exercises and to 
encompass charitable action, which a reader performs as an expression—an 
incarnation—of a fictional text.18 Because Davis assumes this model of reading, she 
understands the writing of fiction as the commencement of an aesthetic event. Hence, the 
whole practice of fiction as Davis conceives it becomes for her an appropriate, and better, 
alternative not only to sentimental literature but also to scientific philanthropy because 
the aesthetic event she initiates ends in ethical labor, which is not less but more corporeal 
                                                                                                                                            
beauty” can be found in quotidian “work” and such “homely fragments” as these that lie about the 
narrator’s room. The narrator’s language is, then, consistent with Davis’s own aesthetic vision. 
The tension between literary romanticism and realism, transcendence and immanence, that 
inheres in her vision and in the narrator’s words is precisely the tension affirmed in the 
Incarnation, an antinomy the flattening of which entails not only theological heresy but also, in 
this case, a misunderstanding of Davis. 
 
18 Davis’s absorption with the Incarnation persists throughout her career, as evidenced, for 
example, by her annual practice of writing a Christmas story and her 1889 essay, “The Plague 
Spot of America,” in praise of Fr. Damien’s and Fr. Boglioli’s literally self-sacrificing ministry to 
lepers in Hawaii and Louisiana, respectively. Further, her 1866 short story “The Harmonists” 
applies her incarnational ethics to a critique of utopianism. The story narrates an idealist’s 
disillusionment with a community modeled on George Rapp’s nineteenth-century utopian 
settlements in Pennsylvania and Indiana. The idealist Knowles travels to that fictional community 
expecting to find a spiritual and intellectual life purified of earthly passions and attachments, and 
he sounds decidedly anti-incarnational when he warns his companion, the narrator, that they 
“must leave all worldly words and thoughts outside, as a snake drops his skin” (173, emphasis 
added). When Knowles meets the utopians and finds them rather crude sensualists, he recoils and 
seeks out the community’s leaders, saying of the commoners, “These are the flesh of the thing; 
we’ll find the brain presently” (175). When the leadership only confirms Knowles’s first 
impressions, he finally renounces the utopian ideal in favor of a more comprehensive social 
interdependence, choosing to “go back into the world” where “a thousand fibres of love and trade 
and mutual help [. . .] bind us to our fellow-man, and if we try to slip out of our place and loose 
any of them, our own souls suffer the loss by so much life withdrawn” (178). In renouncing an 
ideal of spiritualized independence and submitting to the “fibres” that “bind us to our fellow-man,” 
Knowles embraces the life of agency through self-limitation that the Incarnation models to Davis. 
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and personal than the policies of the new philanthropy workers. It comes as little surprise, 
then, that in her essay “Women in Literature” (1891), Davis hopes that some of her 
sisters “will not always be content to expend their force in society, or even in charitable 
work” but will take up authorship, writing “the inner life and history of their time” (404). 
She can, without contradiction, express her familiar skepticism toward late-nineteenth-
century “charitable work” because the literary writing that she commends to women 
needs only incarnational readers to render it a lively, embodied practice of care for the 
disenfranchised. The next chapter accentuates Davis’s accomplishment in coordinating 
her ethics and aesthetics, for there William Dean Howells imagines a similarly integrated 
fiction but, almost in spite of himself, sacrifices his ethical vision to an aesthetic 
investment in personalities like Mitchell’s—the dilettantish observer whose complex 
interiority perpetually resists commitment.
  
 
“It’s Hard to Get Outside”: William Dean Howells and the Heteroglossic Self 
In his essay “Tribulations of a Cheerful Giver” (1895), William Dean Howells 
echoes Rebecca Harding Davis’s “Indiscriminate Charity,” her essay defending private 
charity offered without regard to the recipient’s merits. However, the authors deliver their 
defenses in very different tones, which correspond to their dissimilar approaches to 
poverty relief. Both authors commend a form of charity that “scientific philanthropy” was 
supposed to have rendered obsolete, but Davis’s essay is hortatory, calling for a return to 
the old-fashioned form, while Howells’s is confessional, appealing only for toleration of 
his anachronistic view. Being careful not to “cast slight upon the organized efforts at 
relieving want,” and noting his own participation in such efforts in Boston and New 
York, Howells writes, “All I contend for is the right—or call it the privilege—of giving 
to him that asketh, even when you do not know that he needs, or deserves to need” (136). 
Where Davis condemns the practices of her generation and embraces her untimeliness, 
Howells defers to contemporary convention and all but apologizes for his indecorum. 
These different dispositions toward the same charitable practice reflect Howells’s and 
Davis’s respective philosophies not only of poverty relief but also of human agency. 
Howells’s essay notes his own practice of institutionalized and private charity, but 
it marks him as a “giver” less confident of his individual influence than Davis was of 
hers. His deference toward “organized efforts” at poverty relief is telling: if he actively 
engages the poor, he also passively submits to all manner of social norms—including 
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methods of poverty relief—over which he feels little control and which he expects to 
distort even his most charitable intentions. Doubting his agency, he sounds beset—a 
victim, as his title indicates, of “tribulations.” 
Howells often sounds a more confident note when, as a literary critic, he preaches 
his gospel of socially conscious realism. His long essay Criticism and Fiction (1892) 
synthesizes his campaign for a new literature that would “tend to make the race better and 
kinder” (85), especially with regard to economic inequality. He sees a “humanitarian 
impulse” already sweeping contemporary fiction and claims that “Art [. . .] is beginning 
to find out that if it does not make friends with Need it must perish” (85). However, 
despite these professions of optimism, Howells’s fiction entertains serious doubts, if not 
outright despair, about literature’s capacity to transform readers. His skepticism begins 
with himself, a reader profoundly moved by Leo Tolstoy’s egalitarian social vision but 
unwilling to enact it himself.1 In a letter to Edward Everett Hale, Howells draws a 
frustrated contrast between his own copious writing on poverty and his scanty action: 
“Words, words, words!” he laments; “How to make them things, deeds [. . .]?” (Howells 
Letters 419) The question implies a blockage between his beliefs, so often committed to 
paper, and his material, embodied manner of life. Either the author’s will is too weak to 
make the adjustments he imagines, or his will—the human will per se—is truly incapable 
of bridging the gap—blocked, that is, by a more powerful, external agency. His poverty 
fiction entertains both possibilities. 
                                                
1 In a famous letter to Henry James, he professes a feeling that “‘civilization’” must “[come] out 
all wrong in the end, unless it bases itself anew on a real equality,” but he confesses, “Meantime I 
wear a fur-lined overcoat, and live in all the luxury my money can buy” (Howells Life in Letters 
417). 
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The question Howells puts to himself also resonates with his readers, who may 
well ask what, if any, difference Howells’s “words” make for their ethical conduct. While 
Howells never brought his practice into line with his Tolstoyan convictions, his poverty 
fiction commends to readers the unsatisfying compromise on which he settled. This 
chapter describes the consolations, as three Howells novels present them, of 
psychologizing social conflict, of moving the discordant public sphere “inside”; and it 
demonstrates the means by which those novels tend to perform that relocation for readers. 
Christopher Castiglia argues that in antebellum America, “the interior became a 
micro-version of the social” (3). The individual human psyche assumed new significance 
“not simply as an individual’s ‘private’ realm of desires, affects, and appetites, but as a 
realm of disruption and attempted order that, mirroring the often tense struggles between 
popular demand and juridical control, may be called an interior state” (3). I contend that 
even in the late 1900s, particularly after Howells’s public response to the Haymarket 
Affair in 1886, his fiction enacts the trend that Castiglia describes.2 The novels Annie 
Kilburn (1887), A Hazard of New Fortunes (1889), and The World of Chance (1893) 
increasingly transfer social conflict to the individual psyche, merging two arenas that 
remain independent in his earlier work. Furthermore, these novels develop a 
                                                
2 On May 4, 1886, at a peaceful labor demonstration in Chicago’s Haymarket Square, an 
unknown person threw a bomb, and its explosion and the ensuing gunfire from police left at least 
eleven people dead and many more wounded. Thereafter, the courts convicted eight anarchists of 
conspiracy, though none knew each other and none was alleged to have thrown the bomb. Four of 
the men were hanged on November 11, 1887; one escaped the gallows by committing suicide in 
prison; and in 1893, Illinois governor John Altgeld pardoned the remaining defendants. Howells, 
like many others after him, considered the trial of these men a travesty of justice and wrote a 
letter to the New York Tribune calling on readers to petition the Illinois governor to commute the 
anarchists’ sentences. Though he solicited public support from many of his literary friends, none 
joined him in the cause. For a fuller study of the Haymarket Affair in historical context, see Carl 
Smith’s Urban Disorder and the Shape of Belief: The Great Chicago Fire, the Haymarket Bomb, 
and the Model Town of Pullman (1995) For a study of Howells’s response to the events, see 
Garlin Sender’s William Dean Howells and the Haymarket Era (1979). 
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corresponding idea of selfhood, which abandons Enlightenment ideals of unity and 
sovereignty for multiplicity and contingency. In Howells’s late fiction, the self contains 
multitudes—and gets very little done. 
Irony 
To preface my analysis of the psychologizing move in the A Hazard of New 
Fortunes and The World of Chance, I want to describe an ironic attitude that several of 
Howells’s characters assume toward themselves in the earlier novel Annie Kilburn and in 
Hazard. Analyzing this posture, typical of Howells’s favorite characters, provides an 
introduction to the ethical and aesthetic problems that all three novels wrestle with and 
fail to overcome. These novels register a tension between Howells’s two chief goals for 
his fiction: an ethical goal to make his readers more humane and charitable, especially by 
staging encounters with morally exemplary characters in the line of Leo Tolstoy, and an 
aesthetic aim to write realistically, particularly through the representation of complex, 
ambivalent characters rather than flat heroes and villains. 
Annie Kilburn situates these contradictory impulses in the communal life of 
Hatboro, Massachusetts, a small town whose stark socioeconomic divisions Reverend 
Peck works by word and deed to eliminate. His Social Gospel ethics, condemning the 
separation of rich and poor, end up dividing the affluent classes, some of whom admire 
Peck’s ethical commitment and others of whom resent his critique of Hatboro’s economy. 
The eponymous protagonist and her closest friends feel the power of Peck’s claims, but 
none sacrifices her social standing to join the preacher in his life and ministry among the 
poor. Thus, the text reproduces Howells’s central conflict as an author: Reverend Peck 
enacts the radical, ethical commitment that Howells finds so compelling, while Annie and 
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other affluent liberals equivocate in an “agnosticism [that] extends among [the] cultivated 
people to every region of conjecture” (673). Annie Kilburn tells the story of these 
liberals’ moral evasions and introduces a mechanism for coping with the internal tension 
that results: a self-ironic perspective is the therapy that agnosticism prescribes and the 
means by which these characters excuse their inaction. 
The text introduces this therapy through Annie’s acclimation to it. Upon returning 
to Hatboro after living for several years in Italy, she wishes “to be of some use in the 
world” and imagines herself playing Lady Bountiful to Hatboro’s poor, dispensing gifts 
from her abundance. When Reverend Peck criticizes her naive vision, Annie descends 
into a cycle of self-questioning that produces no action. Having recognized the 
complicity of such charity in perpetuating class divisions, Annie must find another way 
“to be of some use.” However, she cannot fathom the alternative that Peck presents of 
sacrificing her class status for a life among the poor. She feels caught between two 
untenable options. By this time, however, a visit from her childhood girlfriends has 
acquainted her with the self-ironic perspective from which Hatboro’s ruling class regards 
itself and which comes to structure—and lighten the mood of—her ethical introspection. 
The narrator describes her friends’ technique as they share town gossip: “Annie’s friends 
had also to distinguish themselves from the rest of the villagers, and it was easiest to do 
this by an attitude of criticism mingled with large allowance. They ended a dissection of 
the community by saying that they believed there was no place like Hatboro’, after all” 
(663). This practice of “criticism mingled with large allowance” enables the women to 
scrutinize their community in a way that ostensibly distinguishes them from it but, then, 
to reclaim their place within the community and affirm its merits. This paradoxical 
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manner of self-appraisal, at once critical and tolerant, is the whole lesson of Annie 
Kilburn for its protagonist, and for the reader who enters Hatboro even more a stranger 
than Annie. 
Peck’s challenge to Annie’s philanthropy tests her nascent skills in self-irony. 
When her friend Putney teases her about Peck’s criticism and calls her a “moral Cave 
Dweller,” Annie “did not find the atonement to which [Putney] brought her altogether 
painful. It seemed to her really that she was getting off pretty easily, and she laughed with 
hearty consent at last” (727). Annie enjoys the sympathetic satire of her friend and finds 
that his perspective, in which her folly actually makes her more likable, is one she can 
appropriate for herself. Ultimately, this ambivalent self-appraisal insulates her against the 
radical character of Peck’s moral challenge—not by resolving the tension between her 
ethical theory and practice but by sanctioning it, even celebrating it, as a permanent 
condition. 
Putney voices the ironist’s credo—and Howells’s—when he tells his son “There’s 
always something to say on both sides” (726). Several critics have read Howells as a 
predecessor of Richard Rorty’s ironist, one of the set of people who are “always aware 
that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of 
the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves” (73). 
Thomas Peyser, for example, considers Howells “too aware of the multiplicity of values 
held by different people around the globe ever to give [himself] over wholeheartedly to a 
narrow or parochial way of looking at things” (Utopia 97).3 By accepting the incoherence 
                                                
3 For a related reading of Howells, which links his use of irony to the project of literary realism, 
see Phillip Barrish’s excellent chapter on him in American Literary Realism, Critical Theory, and 
Intellectual Prestige, 1880-1995 (2001), esp. pp. 40-45. 
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of her ethical position, Annie gains the peculiar sort of conflicted stability that Charles 
Harmon considers essential to American liberalism: 
Howells implies that dramatizing one’s self-division is a way to achieve a 
provisional self-integration; that exploring self-doubt is how middle-class 
liberals endow themselves with the cultural prerogatives of self-assurance; 
and that believing American culture is in crisis—fearing that there are no 
sure values to hand down from generation to generation—is precisely 
what gives a large part of American culture its continuity. (186) 
 
Harmon’s analysis cogently describes the work of irony in the lives of Annie and her 
friends, but it appears in an essay on A Hazard of New Fortunes, the novel that followed 
Annie Kilburn and to which this chapter now turns. 
A Hazard of New Fortunes transports the previous novel’s main ethical conflicts 
to the expanded stage of New York City and more explicitly interrogates the ethical work 
of literature by organizing the plot around a literary magazine start-up. At the beginning 
of the novel, the protagonist Basil March leaves his job with an insurance firm to accept a 
position as editor of the new publication, Every Other Week. The job involves moving his 
family—his wife Isabel and their son and daughter—from Boston to New York, where 
the conspicuousness of poverty compels Basil and Isabel to evaluate their affluent 
lifestyles. Before examining the struggles with agency and selfhood that attend the 
couple’s self-assessment, I want briefly to sketch the role of Annie Kilburn-esque irony in 
their lives, for it constitutes the psychological framework from within which they face a 
new city’s ethical challenges. 
The Marches’ irony consists in seeing themselves from multiple perspectives 
simultaneously without privileging any one of them. The text most clearly outlines this 
ironic structure in the context of a meal, as Basil and Isabel reflect on their 
underwhelming dinner on a train from Boston to New York: “They thought well of 
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themselves now that they could be both critical and tolerant of flavors not very sharply 
distinguished from one another in their dinner [. . .]” (40). The Marches delight not only 
in the subtlety of their palettes but also, and more importantly, in their ability to critique 
and tolerate flavors simultaneously—the same capacity for “criticism mingled with large 
allowance” that Howells teaches Annie Kilburn. The Marches’ application of this skill 
beyond the culinary realm to their own social attitudes and habits is the couple’s defining 
moral practice.4 
The same train ride occasions a more substantive act of self-irony, as the Marches 
experience a “comfortable self-abhorrence” over the fact that they do not miss their 
children who remain at home (39). “Abhorrence” denotes an intense emotion; that they 
experience it “comfortabl[y]” does not so much qualify the intensity of the emotion as it 
proves the vigor and robustness of their ironic sense, which can hold together a self 
pulled fiercely in opposite directions. The depth of the Marches’ dependence on irony 
also manifests itself in a conversation between Basil and Isabel during a period when she 
is nostalgically “lamenting the literary peace, the intellectual refinement” of their Boston 
life and he, walking about the city and listening to various preachers, is wrestling with the 
radical economics of Christianity (306). When Basil tells Isabel that the Boston life they 
miss was “very pretty” but “it was not life—it was death-in-life,” the moment marks a 
fork in the road, a potential crisis for the couple (306). Basil’s religious searching has 
                                                
4 Phillip Barrish argues that realist authors and characters accrued cultural distinction by 
cultivating a taste for the “really real.” In Howells’s post-Haymarket fiction, Barrish claims, the 
“really real” consists of the “irreducible complexities and ironies, as such, of America’s social 
problems” (38). Similarly, Thomas Peyser identifies the “key attribute” of many of Howells’s 
protagonists as “the ability to generate witty commentary exposing the antinomies and absurdities 
of high society” (106). The Marches are marked as favorites of Howells by their skill in 
recognizing the social problems and their insolubility as well as the contradictions they live as 
high-society progressives. 
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brought them to a place where making significant changes in their lives has become 
imaginable. However, irony plays its familiar role here, diffusing a crisis of identity:  
[Isabel] liked to hear him talk in that strain of virtuous self-denunciation, 
but she asked him, “Which of your prophets are you going to follow?” and 
he answered, “All—all! And a fresh one every Sunday.” And so they got 
their laugh out of it at last, but with some sadness at heart, and with a dim 
consciousness that they had got their laugh out of too many things in life. 
(306) 
 
This passage indicates that, familiar and reliable as irony is for the Marches, its 
consolations are not perfect. On this occasion, the couple feels more acutely than usual 
the cost of their salvaged equilibrium. 
Agency and Selfhood 
In Howells’s fiction irony responds to something; it is, in contemporary 
therapeutic parlance, a coping mechanism. In the following section I want to specify 
more precisely the threat to which irony responds and the kind of self that it both assumes 
and perpetuates. A useful starting point is the character of Margaret Vance, whose 
relative insignificance in the novel constitutes her significance for this analysis. When 
Howells introduces Margaret, she is a sophisticated socialite and, like many in her class, 
“a congeries of contradictions and inconsistencies” (254). With the Marches she takes 
pleasure in an ironic view of herself. However, some altruistic behavior effects a change 
in her character. Compromising her reputation, she visits a family whom the New York 
elite have ostracized and whom she too finds rather uninteresting, but her action carries 
an unintended consequence: “As she went home [from the visit], Margaret felt wrought in 
her that most incredible of the miracles, which, nevertheless, any one may make his 
experience. She felt kindly to these girls because she had tried to make them happy [. . .]” 
(259). Her external act of will alters her internal condition. Margaret begins the novel as a 
83 
socialite vexed by competing desires and loyalties; she ends it as a nun, an identity in 
which she is “at rest” and empowered, as Isabel quips, to “do all the good she likes” 
(495). Such dramatic personal change follows in some way from her decision to visit the 
unfriended family, or from a series of decisions like that one; it is a kind of willful act 
that transforms her very self in the process. 
Margaret’s life seems to answer Howells’s query about how words can become 
things and deeds: by making small choices that, in time, reform one’s character and 
facilitate new patterns of behavior.5 However, Margaret hovers on the periphery of the 
text, and a scene from her early socialite days renders this marginalization exceptionally 
ironic. After first meeting her, Basil waxes rhapsodic on Margaret’s virtues, and when 
Isabel affirms that such sophisticated girls “are the loveliest of the human race” but 
suggests that “perhaps the rest have to pay too much for them,” Basil promptly replies, 
“For such an exquisite creature as Miss Vance [. . .] we couldn’t pay too much” (250). 
While the sight of a girl running from the police interrupts this conversation, with the 
implication that she and others like her embody the cost of cultivating Miss Vances, 
when read backward from the end of the novel after Margaret’s transformation, the scene 
points rather to Howells’s lack of investment in Margaret. He did not pay enough—to 
develop her more thoroughly, to make her central to the text, to make the reader attend to 
her. Instead, he splurged on Basil and Isabel to achieve an aesthetic effect, a realist 
characterization, and the cost lies in Howells’s unrealized ethical purpose of rendering 
idealism compelling. 
                                                
5 This answer resonates with William James’s comments on the ethical value of habit in The 
Principles of Psychology. When Howells reviewed that book in the July 1891 issue of Harper’s, 
he singled out the “Habit” chapter for special praise (315-16). 
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In the novel’s final lines, another encounter with Margaret, now a nun devoted to 
a life of poverty, reiterates Howells’s neglect of her. When Isabel and Basil pass her on 
the street in the wardrobe of her new community, “the peace that passeth understanding [. 
. .] looked at them from her eyes” (495). While Margaret continues her “free, nun-like 
walk” down the street, the text remains with the Marches who walk in the opposite 
direction and speculate about her current life. In the book’s last line, Basil concludes, 
“Well, we must trust that look of hers” (495). His statement is a small act of faith, a little 
refusal of his wonted agnosticism. Still, it costs him very little, virtually nothing. Indeed, 
standing at the periphery of the text, underdeveloped, Margaret hardly compels belief. 
Because Howells keeps her at the margins and the Marches at the center, the novel calls 
the reader to “hazard” very little on Margaret’s agency-rich story, not even a walk down 
the street in her direction. 
A very early scene concerning the Every Other Week articulates the principle 
according to which Howells prioritizes the Marches over Margaret. When the magazine’s 
creator, Fulkerson, recruits Basil as his editor, the offer prompts an internal tug-of-war 
for Basil, and the narrator’s peculiar interest in this situation provides a gloss on 
Howells’s aesthetics and ethics. The narrator compares Basil’s vacillating perspective on 
the job to those of a man considering a crime; commenting that “The process is probably 
not at all different,” he adds the interesting judgment that “to the philosophical mind the 
kind of result is unimportant; the process is everything” (81). So it is in Howells’s 
poverty fiction: the performance or neglect of poverty relief (see Margaret and the 
Marches, respectively) interests him less than the processes by which characters engage 
the idea of social reform. The novel’s drama lies in the characters’ inward lives, in their 
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shifting opinions and motivations, in their tentative stalking of (and retreat from) decisive 
action. For this reason, Margaret Vance’s intriguing path from socialite to nun claims 
very little of the narrator’s attention; her commitment to a life of service involves a kind 
of closure, an end to processes of self-ironic introspection. 
 Despite the indecision of the Marches or of characters like the dilettante Beaton, 
Margaret’s (underdeveloped) narrative indicates that A Hazard of New Fortunes does not 
simply eviscerate the notion of human agency. The text depicts human beings functioning 
in dynamic relations with their environments, and those characters are not thereby 
deprived of all freedom. After all, they have a hand in building the environments that in 
turn constrain them. However, A Hazard of New Fortunes tends toward a strong 
environmentalism, and a conversation between its protagonist couple illustrates how the 
novel’s superficially balanced perspective tilts in one direction. Basil March professes to 
his wife Isabel that the contemporary “economic chance-world,” which offers no one 
financial security, drives people to cruel competition. When Isabel protests that things 
would not be as bad if people “were not so greedy and so foolish,” he agrees that “We 
can’t put it all on the conditions; we must put some of the blame on character” (437). But 
he immediately reverts to an environmental emphasis, claiming, “But conditions make 
character; and people are greedy and foolish, and wish to have and to shine, because 
having and shining are held up to them by civilization as the chief good of life” (437). 
Less ambiguous is Basil’s assertion that even if he and Isabel were to sacrifice their 
social standing and move into a poor neighborhood, it would do the poor “not the least 
[good] in the world” (66). Where Annie Kilburn dramatizes weakness of will in the face 
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of complexity, the later novel posits an incapacity of will to overcome social conditions.6 
Basil and other characters in Hazard demonstrate their share of volitional weakness, like 
the “cultivated people” in Annie Kilburn, but Howells further constrains the characters of 
the later novel with social conditions unresponsive to their (imagined) best efforts. 
 These failures of the will—in Annie Kilburn and Hazard, from weakness or 
incapacity—stimulate the ironic response that both novels depict. Annie’s and the 
Marches’ brand of self-irony responds to a perceived gap between the person each thinks 
she should be and the person she thinks she is. This multiple selfhood fosters and feeds 
on Howells’s “criticism mingled with large allowance.” One can trace the constitution of 
this ironic self throughout A Hazard of New Fortunes. The novel suggests, for example, 
that metropolitan landscapes produce a peculiar type of social self that lacks distinct 
borders. The narrator describes the Marches’ personal reformation on moving from 
parochial Boston to worldly New York: 
This immunity from acquaintance, this touch-and-go quality in their New 
York sojourn, this almost loss of individuality at times, after the intense 
identification of their Boston life, was a relief, though Mrs. March had her 
misgivings, and questioned whether it were not perhaps too relaxing to the 
moral fibre. March refused to explore his conscience; he allowed that it 
might be so; but he said he liked now and then to feel his personality in 
that state of solution. (296-97) 
 
The “almost loss of individuality” that Isabel perceives and the “state of solution” in 
which Basil’s personality hangs depend on what the text elsewhere calls a “solvent in 
New York life that reduces all men to a common level [. . .] and brings to the surface the 
deeply underlying nobody” (243). 
                                                
6 For more on the distinction between weakness and incapacity of will, and an illuminating study 
of agency and reading, see Andrew H. Miller’s book The Burdens of Perfection: On Ethics and 
Reading in Nineteenth-Century British Literature (2008). 
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 While the foregoing passage imagines a self (or, perhaps, a “nobody”) in relation 
to other selves, Hazard also makes claims about the internal structure of the self, 
particularly in the context of Isabel’s concerns with morality. As the Marches discuss 
Dryfoos’s unwonted benevolence after his son’s death, Basil doubts that events ever 
change people, and when Isabel asks what does change people, his answer presents a 
model of selfhood that corresponds to and underlies Hazard’s treatment of agency: 
Well, it won’t do to say, the Holy Spirit indwelling. That would sound like 
cant at this day. But the old fellows that used to say that had some 
glimpses of the truth. They knew that it is the still small voice that the soul 
heeds; not the deafening blasts of doom. I suppose I should have to say 
that we didn’t change at all. We develop. There’s the making of several 
characters in each of us; we are each several characters, and sometimes 
this character has the lead in us, and sometimes that. (485-86) 
 
In Basil’s account, the self sounds very much like a Howells novel: both feature “several 
characters” who move in and out of the foreground, and neither changes with a dramatic 
turn of events but rather “develop[s]” as “sometimes this character [. . .] and sometimes 
that” assumes the lead role. This seemingly anarchic quality lies at the heart of Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s notion of heteroglossia, which he considers a defining feature of novelistic 
form. Heteroglossia refers to the diverse voices—languages, discourses, dialects, 
idiolects—that populate modern novels and compete for attention, if not dominance. 
Bakhtin argues that within this linguistic (and ideological) diversity, “official,” unifying 
forces are also at work. Novelistic discourse is always both anarchic and governed, 
centrifugal and centripetal. 
 A Hazard of New Fortune divides time democratically among a diverse cast of 
characters, but it clearly privileges the Marches and their perspectives. Thus, the novel is 
itself classically Bakhtinian. Morever, Hazard provides a model of its own form in Every 
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Other Week, the literary magazine that Basil edits. With its incongruous band of 
contributors and its unconventionally mixed media, the publication’s first issue seems to 
Basil a product of “crazy fortuities” (195).7 However, these “heterogeneous forces did co-
operate” to make the first issue “representative of all [the staff’s] nebulous intentions in a 
tangible form” (195). While Basil can conceive of this “homogeneity” as the result of his 
editorial “manipulation,” he also senses his lack of volition in the matter: “To be sure, he 
had chosen all the material, but he had not voluntarily put it all together for that number; 
it had largely put itself together, as every number of every magazine does” (196). Basil’s 
originality is constrained by an already existing form for literary magazines, which 
dictates that they must contain “a story, and then a sketch of travel,” “a literary essay and 
a social essay,” “a dramatic trifle,” and so on (196). As with the Bakhtinian novel, Every 
Other Week manifests the differences among its contributors, the unifying vision of its 
editor, and a dynamic relation between these poles that inheres in the form itself. 
 Curiously, Howells posits this novelistic form as a model of the self. While Basil 
imagines each person as a composite of “several characters” who alternately take the 
“lead” role, Fulkerson markets Every Other Week, that novel in miniature, as “the idea of 
self-government in the arts” (213). By this formulation, the novel is the literary 
expression of self-government; in its management of heteroglossia, the novel enacts 
aesthetically the task that each person performs existentially: coordinating the “several 
                                                
7 Speaking of the improbable constitution of Every Other Week, Basil opines, “I don’t believe 
there’s another publication in New York that could bring together [. . .] a fraternity and equality 
crank like poor old Lindau, and a belated sociological crank like Woodburn, and a truculent 
speculator like old Dryfoos, and a humanitarian dreamer like young Dryfoos, and a sentimentalist 
like me, and a nondescript like Beaton, and pure advertising essence like Fulkerson, and a society 
spirit like Kendricks” (324). 
 
89 
characters” of whom her self is comprised.8 The notion of selfhood supposed in this 
analogy corresponds to one that Christopher Castiglia describes in antebellum American 
culture, where, he argues, “the interior became a micro-version of the social, not simply 
as an individual’s ‘private’ realm of desires, affects, and appetites, but as a realm of 
disruption and attempted order that, mirroring the often tense struggles between popular 
demand and juridical control, may be called an interior state” (3). Thus, social conflict is 
translated into psychological conflict, and political action is replaced by self-discipline.9 
Howells’s “social fiction” of the late 1880s dramatizes precisely these movements, while 
participating in the reconception of selfhood that they entail; if the modern self resembles 
a state, it also resembles the thoroughly socialized novel that Bakhtin theorizes. 
 Upon facing the complexity of modern social life, many of Howells’s characters 
relocate social conflicts to their own psyches, expecting to find conflict more manageable 
there but finding interiority, so constituted, a prison. The consummate dilettante Beaton, 
for example, possesses an “aesthetic and moral complexity” that is “chiefly a torment to 
itself”; his habit of capricious self-indulgence leaves his emotions flat and his will 
“somehow sick” (394). He suspects that “if he could once do something that was 
thoroughly distasteful to himself, he might make a beginning in the right direction,” but 
after some tentative experiments in this vein fail, he concludes that “His trouble was that 
                                                
8 Hazard extends the novel-as-self metaphor when Fulkerson describes the relationship of image 
and text in Every Other Week. Calling for a design in which a picture “spreads [. . .] over the print 
till you can’t tell which is which,” he says that such pictures “behave [. . .] sociably” (140). 
Characters, then, are not the only players in a text expected to “get along”; all the elements of a 
text, including its pictures, interact with one another like persons in a social landscape. 
 
9 Castiglia concretizes the manifestation of these movements in Jacksonian America: “reform 
moved from a focus on structural injustices such as slavery to individual vices such as drinking, 
gambling, masturbation, eating spicy foods, smoking, reading trashy novels, and wearing tight 
corsets” (8). 
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he could not escape himself; and for the most part, he justified himself in refusing to try” 
(394, 395). Confronting his angst later in the novel, Margaret Vance asserts that “There is 
no comfort for us in ourselves” and then adds what could well serve as an epigraph for 
both novels: “It’s hard to get outside” (471). 
Though Margaret does “get outside,” we have witnessed Howells’s lack of 
attention to her story, and his attention to or neglect of the novel’s various characters 
guides the reader’s own cognitive and affective focus. The Marches command the 
reader’s attention not only because the text foregrounds them in the plot but also because 
Howells deploys his own irony in a manner that encourages the reader to identify with 
the couple. This affiliation occurs early in the novel when the narrator offers an extended 
third-person introduction to the protagonists that gently lampoons their self-satisfaction: 
we are told that they feel “a glow almost of virtue” over their well-appointed house and 
that Basil’s literary life seems to them “very meritorious” (26, 27).  Even so, the narrator 
continues, 
neither [Basil] nor his wife supposed that they were selfish persons.  On 
the contrary, they were very sympathetic; there was no good cause that 
they did not wish well; they had a generous scorn of all kinds of narrow-
heartedness; if it had ever come into their way to sacrifice themselves for 
others, they thought they would have done so, but they never asked why it 
had not come in their way. (27) 
 
This ironic description invites the reader to share the narrator’s smiling judgment on the 
Marches’ self-absorption.  The reader and narrator now share the Marches’ secret, which 
even the couple seems not to know, namely that they have never been called on to 
sacrifice for others because, “very much wrapt up in themselves and their children,” the 
Marches make no space for others (26). 
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A Hazard of New Fortunes would be a very different book if the reader 
maintained this privileged relationship with the narrator throughout.  The surprise of the 
novel is that the Marches are in on the secret, or they very quickly come to be.  Basil 
especially sees himself as comprehensively as the narrator does.  What happens when the 
reader finds that the Marches see themselves as clearly as he and the narrator do? After 
the reader chuckles at Basil and Isabel’s apparent lack of self-awareness, this surprise 
forges a double bond of sympathy between the reader and protagonist.  First, the reader 
must exchange her critical posture toward Basil for one of welcome.  The narrator’s 
critical perspective on Basil, which he offers to the reader, is one that Basil himself 
shares.  So he belongs in the company of the narrator and reader, not under their scrutiny.  
Secondly, finding herself in error about the Marches may destabilize the reader’s own 
sense of self-awareness: while she thought she was enjoying a privileged perspective, she 
was actually in the dark. The dramatic reconstruction of the relationships among narrator, 
character, and reader—from ones based on unequal knowledge to ones based on 
sympathy—makes all the difference in the reader’s moral judgments about the novel’s 
action and particularly the Marches’ disengagement from the poor.  The Marches are now 
friends of the reader, and the event that established this relationship—the embarrassment 
of the reader in her erroneous judgment of the Marches—counsels caution in future 
judgments. It encourages the reader to adopt the same tentative posture that the Marches 
demonstrate. 
The text excludes other characters from this circle of identification and affection. 
This structure of irony distinguishes the Marches as the characters who most profoundly 
shape the reading experience because that peculiar form of irony invites the reader into a 
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relationship with them, making them peers and friends. Like Margaret, many characters 
cannot command the reader’s attention for long. Fulkerson is too frivolous to engage the 
reader; Dryfoos, the magazine’s financier, is too aggressively capitalistic and emotionally 
inaccessible; and the artist, Alma Leighton, lacks depth, functioning only as a critic of 
Beaton. Beaton, like the Marches, wrestles with the problem of human agency, but 
ultimately his self-deluding proclivities in this realm disqualify him for the reader’s 
sympathy. The sociopolitical radicals Lindau and Conrad are certainly compelling, but 
they remain less influential in the reader’s experience because their lack of irony 
disallows them the novel’s primary means of inviting a relationship with the reader. The 
reader has very limited emotional access to these characters because they do not 
participate in the self-satire of the Marches and because they seem unruffled by questions 
about their own agency. 
In A Hazard of New Fortunes a particular use of irony not only compensates 
characters for their anxieties about agency but also guides readers’ sympathies and colors 
their perspectives. In Hazard, the characters who would otherwise be objects of irony are 
capable of regarding themselves from multiple perspectives; the critique traditionally 
reserved for narrator and reader together, and enabled by a character’s ignorance, 
Howells’s characters perform on themselves. Their sophisticated self-knowledge brings 
them up to the level of narrator and reader; it initiates them into the circle of privileged 
information. Hence, all three parties enjoy the faculty of seeing themselves both as they 
are and as they “should” be, and solidarity easily arises from sharing this complex 
position. 
93 
Through this manipulation of irony, Hazard tends to reproduce in readers the 
strangely gratifying crisis of agency that Howells himself inhabits. An ambivalent self-
reflexiveness, at once critical and sympathetic, constitutes the central pleasure of reading 
these novels. Critic Thomas Peyser describes this experience in terms of a conversation, 
and his language sits well with the concept of heteroglossia. He argues that “Howells 
deals with the disruptions of cosmopolitan skepticism by trying to inaugurate a culture of 
conversation, a culture that contains competing views of an uncertain world by putting 
them into endless dialogue” (27). Howells does imagine society as a democratic 
assemblage of voices, and Peyser is right to see the author’s fiction similarly: “he 
presents us with novels full of talk about social transformation that nevertheless issue in 
nothing but a kind of enlightened deadlock” (102). What this assessment fails to 
recognize is that Howells removes the conversation further from the public sphere than 
even the novel takes us. Since a truly public “conversation” proves too disorderly for him 
and many others, he not only fictionalizes it but also drives it into the individual psyche. 
With these two alternative conversations established, Howells invites readers to a virtual 
sociality with fictional characters as internally divided as they are. 
Spiritualism and Selfhood 
John Crowley marks A Hazard of New Fortunes as the moment in Howells’s 
career when the author’s “impetus for addressing public issues lost velocity” (19). 
Certainly, his fiction after 1890 engages matters of socioeconomic injustice less explicitly 
and frequently than his fiction of the late 1880s does. The later era replaces depictions of 
urban class stratification and labor unrest with explorations of strange psychological and 
metaphysical phenomena. Dreams, mesmerism, and Spiritualism become Howells’s 
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métier across works like The Shadow of a Dream (1890), A World of Chance (1893), 
Questionable Shapes (1903), and Between the Dark and the Daylight (1907)—as though 
he were returning to a Hawthornian romanticism. Recent scholars have taught us to seek 
the political even in these preternatural settings, though, and their counsel proves fruitful 
in the study of Howells’s late fiction. 
One can profitably read Howells’s fictional treatments of Spiritualism as 
investigations of agency, continued from his classic poverty fiction in a different setting. 
In Ghosts of Futures Past: Spiritualism and the Cultural Politics of Nineteenth-Century 
America (2008), historian Molly McGarry argues that, oriented around séances for 
communicating with the dead, Spiritualism offered practitioners extraordinary power: 
“the potential for affective connection across time, personal transformation, and utopian 
political change” (8). However, in Necro Citizenship: Death, Eroticism, and the Public 
Sphere in the Nineteenth-Century United States, Russ Castronovo interprets 
Spiritualism—and a range of related practices concerning death and the afterlife—in a 
manner to similar to Christopher Castiglia’s thesis that nineteenth-century Americans 
displaced politics from the public sphere to the psychological interior, in the process 
changing politics profoundly. Castronovo reads practices like mesmerism, clairvoyance, 
and séances as venues indulging “a fantasy of democracy that seems beyond the 
disruption, contestation, and unresolved agitation of politics” (xi). He describes a “necro 
ideology” that marks “the unmarked soul as refuge from the politicized body, idealizing 
the afterlife as a perfected social order, and representing passivity and somnolence as 
democratic virtues” (13). I find McGarry’s and Castronovo’s contradictory theses useful 
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for analyzing two of Howells’s Spiritualist fictions, The World of Chance (1893) and, 
briefly, his earlier novel The Undiscovered Country (1880). 
In The Undiscovered Country, the Shakers understand Spiritualism in terms more 
like McGarry’s than Castronovo’s. The text follows the Spiritualist experiments and final 
disillusionment of Dr. Boynton and his daughter Egeria, a medium, as they move from 
Boston to a rural Shaker community, which Boynton imagines as a setting more 
conducive to his work. To the Shakers, however, Spiritualism is a means to their utopian 
communal life; and by treating communications with the dead as an end in themselves, 
Boynton alienates himself from the Shaker community. In The World of Chance, a man 
named Denton has an “internal Voice” that “tells him what to do” (189)—a “familiar 
spirit” or “a kind of ghost” (189)—which Denton’s father-in-law relates to Spiritualism, 
calling it “a survival of some supernatural experiences of his among the Shakers” (190). 
The consistent message of this Voice is explicitly concerned with poverty, telling Denton 
that someone must “atone” for the socioeconomic injustices of modern life and urging 
him to imagine his children, his sister-in-law, and himself as potential sacrifices.10  
Comparing The World of Chance to The Undiscovered Country reveals the 
evolution of Howells’s use of Spiritualism. In The Undiscovered Country, the function of 
communications with the dead is either apolitical, as with Egeria who channels messages 
bearing no relation to social conflict, or utopian, as with the Shakers who consider those 
communications an aid to their distinctive communal life. However, in The World of 
Chance, Denton’s Voice urges not the establishment of a new economic or political 
system but a symbolic atonement for social injustice, a sacrifice of one human life. The 
                                                
10 Richard Brodhead reads the novel’s plot as an “unmeaning idiosyncrasy” and argues that this 
idiosyncratic quality “puncture[s] the significance of his chosen dramatic situation” (93). 
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individualized character of this message, with which Denton carries on a painful private 
struggle, illustrates Howells’s relocation of social conflict to the personal interior. The 
contrasts between The Undiscovered Country and The World of Chance frame Howells’s 
use of Spiritualism as a corroboration of Castronovo’s thesis and an instantiation of the 
privatization of politics that Castiglia describes. Moreover, rather than offering an 
empowering alternative to the solipsistic novelistic self, these novels radicalize that 
model of selfhood by literalizing the interior voices it posits and intensifying the conflicts 
between them. As in all of Howells’s poverty fiction, it is useful to consider what social 
phenomena condition this (new) form of heteroglossic selfhood. 
 Howells’s poverty fiction dramatizes a contest between human agency and forces 
transcending the self: in A Hazard of New Fortunes, those external forces are primarily 
environmental; in The Undiscovered Country and The World of Chance, those forces are 
both environmental and metaphysical—including spirits of the dead, chance, and 
Providence. I will focus the rest of this analysis primarily on the later World of Chance, 
which, according to Scott Dennis, “stridently amplifies the characters and themes in A 
Hazard of New Fortunes” (293). Set in New York like Hazard, The World of Chance also 
features a writer-protagonist, Percy Bysshe Shelley Ray, whose encounters with an aging 
utopian, Hughes, affords parallels to Basil March’s relationship with the radical Lindau 
and whose sense of irony, nourished here by the sardonic philosopher Kane, perpetuates 
his agnostic curiosity toward the semi-Tolstoyan vision that Hughes preaches. As Ray 
pursues the publication of his first novel, which itself features romantic elements 
including mesmerism, the vagaries of literary reception occasion an extended inquiry into 
the metaphysical influences on human behavior. Baffled by the unexpected successes or 
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failures of books, the publishers and authors that Ray knows repeatedly cite luck or 
chance as the only viable explanation. Initially, the protagonist partially accepts this 
metaphysical rationale, while reserving some agency for himself. The first time a 
publisher offers to review his novel manuscript, Ray tells himself that he “must try to be 
very good and to merit the fortune that had befallen him,” as though the good “fortune” 
came in prophetic recognition of his subsequent behavior. Indeed, he enters into a 
struggle with fortune, “str[iving] to arrest the wheel which was bringing him up, and must 
carry him down if it kept on moving”; and he aims to bargain with the Divine, making 
promises of virtue and assuming that “the thing most pleasing to his god would be some 
immediate effort in his own behalf, of prudent industry or frugality” (66). At this point 
Ray cannot accept that a happy outcome, like the review or acceptance of his manuscript, 
may occur independently of his agency. 
 After his novel is published, however, he regards its mysterious success and 
decline as effects of chance or Providence. In fact, he begins to “wonder if life had not all 
been a chance with him”; it seems to him that “nothing [. . .] was the result of reasoned 
cause”—neither his book nor economics nor human psychology (374). As these 
meditations evolve, he comes to suspect that what is called chance actually manifests an 
arcane providential order, of which we get a “glimpse [. . .] once or twice in a lifetime” 
(375). While the sincerity of this turn to order (on the novel’s last page) remains 
uncertain, such ambiguity is irrelevant to the text’s broader inquiry about human agency, 
for neither chance nor Providence, as conceived here, accommodates human enterprise. 
Both operate remotely and ineluctably, overwhelming other agencies, so that human 
activities produce the “effect of intention”—to take Howells’s language out of context—
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only to the extent that the ubiquitous machinations of chance and/or Providence remain 
invisible.11 
 In The World of Chance Kane shares Basil March’s opinion that the individual is 
“what [conditions] shape him to,” and he posits a self so environmentally contingent that 
a person could not move into different conditions “without breaking himself in pieces and 
putting himself together again” (207). The effects of this novel’s metaphysical landscape 
on the self resemble those of social conditions on Basil and Isabel March. Much as Basil 
enjoys experiencing his self in a “state of solution” in the New York scene, in The World 
of Chance Ray finds his self dissolved, or negated, in the culture of his writer friends, 
whose lack of direction and “want of meaning”—in short, their submission to chance—
forms a “bond” that carries them together “through vast cyclones of excitement that 
whirled them round and round, and made a kind of pleasant drunkenness in their brains, 
and consoled them for never resting and never arriving” (214). When this vision of a 
storm-tossed, inebriated social body passes, Ray immediately adopts an opposite 
perspective that shows “himself and those around him full of distinctly intended effort, 
each in his sort” (214). However, this dramatic switch, which reasserts the discrete, 
purposive individual, underlines the threat that Isabel March recognizes in New York’s 
social “solvent”: it endangers individual agency, compromising what she calls the “moral 
fibre” (214). 
                                                
11 In some instances The World of Chance and A Hazard of New Fortunes lay responsibility for a 
negative outcome on “human nature.” However, characters use even this “humanist” attribution 
to deny their own agency, more than once making the defense that they “had at least not invented 
human nature” (Hazard 167). By this strange formula, to blame human nature is to blame 
something or someone other than oneself. 
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 While a world governed by chance throws people together in these transformative 
ways, Howells’s representations of Spiritualism specify a particular set of internal 
relations corresponding to these external ones. The resulting self is much like the 
novelistic self of Hazard; only, in the Spiritualist model, the heteroglossia that constitutes 
personhood is literal. In The Undiscovered Country Egeria is a spiritualist medium, a 
channel through whom the dead communicate with the living. As a medium, her person 
becomes a heteroglossic forum. However, more than the subject of an arcane power, she 
is the docile object through whom other agents exercise their wills. Her mediumship 
depends on her renunciation of self-government. Her own consciousness must be 
suspended for her to channel the voices of the dead, who also exert control over, and once 
injure, her body. If the hypnotic role confers on her some privileged status and perhaps 
some unique powers, it also exhausts her physically and psychologically, and after her 
extended recovery from two taxing séances, she confesses a desire to abandon her 
mediumship. Egeria’s spiritualist experience suggests the division, rather than a 
multiplication, of agency that attends all heteroglossic selves, even the mundanely 
novelistic. 
 In The World of Chance, Denton’s experience of the Voice, whose dictates his 
family repeatedly talks him out of obeying, is so continuous as to constitute a sort of 
relationship. On one occasion when Ansel leaves a conversation with his wife and Ray 
and is then heard talking in an adjacent room, Mrs. Denton wryly comments that “Ansel 
doesn’t say much in company, but he’s pretty sociable when he gets by himself” (222). 
Clearly referencing Ansel’s private conversations with the Voice, Mrs. Denton’s remark 
highlights the fundamental similarity between Ansel’s interior life and the novelistic self 
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that Howells presents in A Hazard of New Fortunes. The novelistic self and Ansel’s 
spiritualist self are both heteroglossic; they are constituted by an internal dialogue among 
equal, competing voices.12 The spirituality of Ansel’s Voice does not make it more 
authoritative for him than various emotional or intellectual impulses for others; though it 
“tells him what to do,” it does not compel obedience, apparently even in Ansel’s suicide, 
which seems more an act of despair than conviction. Ansel’s refusal to obey the Voice 
indicates that it exists in a basically balanced relationship with other internal voices, not 
to mention those of his family. 
 Howells does not imagine the reader only as an observer of these heteroglossic 
selves. He believes in his models of personhood enough to think they describe his 
readers. Therefore, when a character comments on episodes involving hypnosis in Ray’s 
novel, “We felt like we were living it,” she presents the model of readership governing 
Howells’s novel: it works on a reader like hypnosis, insinuating into his consciousness a 
previously external voice. Where A Hazard of New Fortunes plays host to an ongoing 
anarchic conversation and urges the reader to participate, The World of Chance aims to 
implant a similar conversation inside the reader. 
 While Howells dramatically revises the concepts of agency and selfhood that 
Rebecca Harding Davis employs, imagining the work of novels as hypnotic suggestion 
also implies a different notion of textual agency. Davis is at pains to express the 
limitations of fictional texts; Life in the Iron-Mills suggests that it, and all works of art, 
are useless if an audience does not somehow perform them in the public sphere. The text 
is a mere tissue between reader and world, and the reader makes this tissue “work” only 
                                                
12 Ansel resembles the novelistic self more closely than Egeria does because the multiple voices 
constitute rather than displace his consciousness. Moreover, this heteroglossic state is continual 
with him, not occasional. 
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by penetrating it. Howells’s The World of Chance, on the other hand, imagines the novel 
suspending readers’ conscious agency and imposing on them a will of its own. 
 This is a late development for Howells. His previously referenced letter to 
Edward Everett Hale, distinguishing sharply between “words” and “things, deeds,” 
denies language vitality and power. However, writing a “Bibliographical” preface for a 
1909 edition of Hazard, Howells recognizes this novel as “the most vital of my fictions”; 
it took its form, says the author, “as nearly without my conscious agency as I ever allow 
myself to think such things happen” (4). As though it were its own author, the novel 
“compelled into its course [materials] which [Howells] had not known lay near” (4). 
Given Hazard’s comparison of the novel to the self, it is not surprising that Howells 
attributes a kind of sentience to this work. From here it is no great leap to imagining the 
novel as hypnotist. Even in Hazard Basil claims that novelists, by way of their fiction, 
“really have the charge of people’s thinking nowadays” (485). 
 However, the context of Basil’s comment is his larger argument that, contrary to 
the canons of popular fiction, people do not change in response to major life events. So 
he claims that novels shape most people’s opinions on this issue even as he contradicts 
the teaching of novels. Herein lies a crucial qualification of Howells’s empowerment of 
texts. His fiction presents the people over whom novels exert great power, including the 
readers of Ray’s book who feel themselves hypnotized, as uncritical readers. 
Sophisticated readers like Basil—ironists—can distance themselves from fiction and 
thereby critique it. Late in his career Howells plays at the personification of texts: his 
“Bibliographical” essay for A Hazard of New Fortunes asserts that the novel came into 
being virtually on its own and “stood on its own feet” (6), while his collection of essays, 
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Imaginary Interviews (1910), opens with an interview of the “Easy Chair,” Howells’s 
abandoned editorial platform at Harper’s now made “an animate presence” (3). But such 
personifications are indeed play, for they coincide with the waning of Howells’s 
confidence in his cultural influence. In these late years Howells does not think his texts 
are acquiring greater power. Quite the opposite: he feels himself pushed to the cultural 
periphery, and imagining his writings as loyal friends is a grandfatherly sort of joke, 
tinged with sadness. Nonetheless, Howells brings us some distance from Davis’s 
intentionally thin texts that point always beyond themselves to the “real world,” and in 
doing so he prepares us for the solid structures of Wharton’s fiction, the literary built 
environments that she imagines shaping her readers. 
  
 
Compromising Ideals: Sympathy as Social and Aesthetic Practice in Edith Wharton 
 William Dean Howells’s poverty fiction foregrounds the bourgeois self 
perpetually in conflict with itself—or, more precisely, the bourgeois self as a site of 
displaced and never-resolved social conflicts. Edith Wharton’s writing on poverty, an 
underappreciated portion of her oeuvre, thematizes the same middle- and upper-class 
ambivalence, but where Howells internalizes social conflict and ends up with characters 
disengaged from social reform, Wharton forces psychological ambivalence “outside,” 
resolving internal conflict through social interactions. Exemplifying this practice is The 
Book of the Homeless (1916), an edited collection of essays, fiction, and other artworks 
that helped finance Wharton’s refugee homes during World War I.1 
In the author’s long and varied literary career The Book of the Homeless seems 
like a singularity, even a contradiction of social and aesthetic principles to which 
Wharton was fervently committed. In her 1934 autobiography A Backward Glance, while 
reflecting on the charity work that this book aided, she announces her “innate distaste for 
anything like ‘social service’” (348)—and does not say the distaste mellowed with time. 
As for the book’s aesthetic incongruities, Wharton’s essay “The Vice of Reading” (1903) 
                                                
1 At the outbreak of World War I, Wharton had been living in Paris for seven years; and while 
waiting for an opportunity to remove to England, she “was asked by the Comtesse d’Haussonville, 
President of one of the branches of the French Red Cross [. . .] to organize a work-room for such 
work-women of [her] arrondissement as were not yet receiving government assistance” (A 
Backward Glance 340). Although “totally inexperienced in every form of relief work,” Wharton 
answered the request affirmatively and established a work-room that would be only the first of 
many such charities, including hostels for refugees and children’s homes. The scale of the relief 
work that Wharton administered was rivaled only by that of the Red Cross. 
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sharply criticizes the “mechanical reader” for his instrumentalist approach to literature, 
which commodifies literature and makes it for something else, not an end to itself. But 
what sort of book could be less an end to itself than this “Who’s Who” of cultural 
elites—Joseph Conrad, Thomas Hardy, William Dean Howells, William James, Claude 
Monet, Pierre-Auguste Renoir, Auguste Rodin, George Santayana, Igor Stravinsky, W. 
B. Yeats, and Theodore Roosevelt all contributed—which, together with an auction of the 
contributed manuscripts and artworks, aimed to raise money for a charity? I do not intend 
to reconcile this text neatly with the social and aesthetic positions that Wharton assumes 
in her autobiography and “The Vice of Reading.” Rather, I argue that its uneasy 
rapprochement with those positions provides the very key to understanding Wharton’s 
philosophy of the duty to one’s neighbor, particularly the poor, and also to literary texts. 
The Book of the Homeless testifies to Wharton’s work on behalf of refugees, a labor that 
sacrifices her inclination against “anything like ‘social service’”; likewise, the text 
compromises Wharton’s aesthetics for the sake of an ethical commitment. For Wharton, 
such compromise defines the related tasks of caring for the other and reading literature. It 
is the structure of sympathy, the fundamental principle that underlies and orders her tastes 
and behaviors.2  
 Although in 1914 Wharton considered herself a novice (“totally inexperienced”) 
in charitable work, she had already written two novels concerning poverty relief, which 
                                                
2 Writing on Wharton’s novel The Fruit of the Tree (1907), which this chapter examines at length, 
Allen F. Stein argues that Wharton presents compromise as “the law of all social life” (336). 
Closely attuned to the “limitations inherent in human nature,” Wharton makes the necessity of 
compromise her “prevailing truth”—“not [. . .] in the sense of a lack of principle, certainly, but 
[. . .] in the sense of a willingness to accept that one cannot achieve all one might wish to” (330, 
331, 336). This chapter specifies sympathy as the particular form of compromise that governs 
Wharton’s social and aesthetic practices, and the chapter tracks her evolving exercise of 
sympathy from the beginning of her career through her involvement in World War I. 
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progressively developed the aesthetic and ethical categories that structured her work as 
the United States’s preeminent charitable organizer during World War I. Those two 
novels, The Valley of Decision (1902) and The Fruit of the Tree (1907), underline a moral 
duty to care for the poor; and the first of these, like William Dean Howells’s poverty 
fiction, dramatizes the ebb and flow of a would-be philanthropist’s willpower. The novel 
is set in Italy on the cusp of the Enlightenment, and the protagonist Odo, heir to the 
duchy of Pianura, loves the poor and embraces the new liberalism that imagines a more 
egalitarian society. However, when he comes to power with intent to initiate social 
reforms, his political opponents’ resistance and the masses’ own disorderliness temper his 
idealism. In its title, The Valley of Decision suggests the state of suspended, even tortured 
agency that so often characterizes Howells’s favorite characters, while the titles of the 
book’s subdivisions—“The Old Order,” “The New Light,” “The Choice,” “The 
Reward”—trace the movement of agency.3 As William Vance argues, “the core of the 
narrative concerns what will happen to Odo and what he will choose to be and to do” 
(187).4 Vance lists “the limits of power” among the novel’s many themes; I place that 
philosophical problem first among Wharton’s concerns here. Even while Odo remains 
                                                
3 The title manifests the same concern as that of Wharton’s short story collection from the year 
before, Crucial Instances (1901). “Crucial instance” is a philosophical term originating with 
Francis Bacon that invokes the image of a crossroads (see the Latin root, crucis). In Bacon’s 
empirical framework, it is an experiment that enables one to determine the cause of a 
phenomenon by eliminating the other possible causes. Similarly, in Wharton’s usage it is an 
existential moment where many paths lay before an agent and the choice of one path excludes the 
others. 
 
4 Vance interprets Odo as a “mask” for Wharton, which conceals a very “personal investment [. . .] 
in her hero’s ambivalence and self-definition” (169). He argues that Wharton “project upon Odo 
her own speculative, curious, independent, novelistic attitude toward life, which wholly inhibits 
him as a politician but makes possible precisely her own self-realization as a novelist” (195). The 
implications of this “attitude toward life” manifest in Odo’s habit of ethical vacillation, described 
below. 
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committed to justice for the poor, he finds the execution of it more challenging than he 
had imagined. Imagining his hero St. Francis’s era as one “when hearts inflamed with the 
new sense of brotherhood had but to set forth on their simple mission of almsgiving and 
admonition,” Odo concludes that now “To love one’s neighbor had become a much more 
complex business, one that taxed the intelligence as much as the heart [. . .]” (572).5 In 
fact, loving one’s neighbor taxes Odo’s will as much as his heart and intelligence. 
Though he is known for his revolutionary social vision, in recognizing the complexity of 
social reform, Odo habitually falls prey to “a stealing apathy of the will, an inclination 
toward the subtle duality of judgment that had so often weakened and diffused his 
energies” (508). Faced with the complexity of sociopolitical systems, the intransigence of 
rivals, and the intractability of the poor, Odo moderates his high estimate of the 
individual’s agency, eventually regarding life not as the sum of individual strivings but as 
“an incomplete and shabby business, a patchwork of torn and ravelled effort” (239). 
The same insight defines Wharton’s treatment of agency in The Fruit of the Tree, 
a novel that James Tuttleton reads as a gloss on “the perils of abstract idealism.” In this 
text John Amherst aspires to improve conditions in a town built around the factory that 
his wife Bessy owns, but her family’s resistance to his progressive ideals and her own 
recoil from self-sacrifice interfere with Amherst’s goals. When Bessy dies, Amherst 
remarries and, though his second wife, Justine Brent, shares his social idealism, other 
                                                
5 This language echoes William Dean Howells’ novel Annie Kilburn, in which Reverend Peck 
shows Annie the inadequacy of individualized charity under unjust social conditions. After this 
revelation she maintains that “we must continue to do charity” but asks a friend, “But don’t you 
see how much more complicated it is? That’s what I meant by life not being simple any more. It 
was easy enough to do charity when it used to seem the right and proper remedy for suffering; but 
now, when I can’t make it appear a finality, but only something provisional, temporary— Don’t 
you see?” (818) 
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disagreements ruin their romantic expectations of married life. A chastened Justine 
channels Odo from the earlier novel when she frames all of human existence as a series 
of compromises: 
But life is not a matter of abstract principles, but a succession of pitiful 
compromises with fate, of concessions to old tradition, old beliefs, old 
charities and frailties. [. . .] And she had humbled herself to accept the 
lesson, seeing human relations at last as a tangled and deep-rooted growth, 
a dark forest through which the idealist cannot cut his straight path without 
hearing at each stroke the cry of the severed branch: “Why woundest thou 
me?” (624) 
 
As disappointed as Justine sounds here, Wharton’s novels present her and Odo’s 
disillusionment as experiences pregnant with possibilities of a renovated, pragmatic 
agency. Elsewhere, The Fruit of the Tree depicts compromise in more explicitly hopeful 
terms. Once, after making a difficult decision for the good of her marriage, Justine 
reflects on the benefits of having made a similar choice with lower stakes in the past: 
“such a patchwork business are our best endeavors, yet so faithfully does each weak 
upward impulse reach back a hand to the next” (565). If this “patchwork business” of 
human effort is “incomplete and shabby,” as The Valley of Decision says it is, it is also 
sustaining and empowering in moments of great need, as Justine recognizes. 
Against a passive, Howellsian response to the limitations of all human action, 
Wharton’s novels thematize compromised idealism as an appropriate engine of human 
relations. The principal characters in these novels repeatedly confront the limitations of 
their own agency; they find their wills bounded by agents other than themselves, be they 
institutional or personal, natural or supernatural. However, Odo’s and Justine’s 
compromises with these forces outside themselves set the pattern for Wharton’s 
prescribed mode of engaging both the poor and literature, namely sympathy. Sympathy is 
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the compromise that Wharton commends for social and aesthetic relations; it is the 
content of her intervention in contemporary debates over both poverty relief and fiction 
reading in America. 
Sympathy 
The Valley of Decision disdains liberal thinkers of the Enlightenment who, in their 
“sentimental optimism,” recognize neither the sacrifices that reform demands nor the 
violence that revolution will entail (7, v. 2). For these figures in the “early days of 
universal illusion,” “Utopia was already in sight; and all the world was setting out for it 
as for some heavenly picnic ground” (147, v. 1). But Wharton suggests that their “tearful 
philanthropy” lacks any “close contact with misery” (7, v. 2; 223, v. 1). Against this 
merely intellectual “philandering with reform,” the text advances St. Francis as the figure 
of genuine service motivated by sympathy. As a boy, harassed by his foster family, Odo 
finds a “melancholy kinship” with St. Francis because, painted on the wall of the 
Pontesordo chapel, the saint’s face is “lit with an ecstasy of suffering that seemed [. . .] to 
reflect [. . .] the mute pain of all poor downtrodden folk on earth” (3, v. 1). When Odo’s 
foster mother drags him from the chapel to receive word of his father’s death, he 
desperately glances toward this painting of St. Francis, “who looked back at him in an 
ecstasy of commiseration” (10). Underscoring the centrality of Franciscan charity, the 
novel ends with an adult, world-weary Odo revisiting the chapel at Pontesordo and 
praying under the saint’s gaze. St. Francis’s com-miseration, his being miserable with the 
sufferer, contrasts the philanthropy that the novel’s utopian reformers only discuss at a 
distance from real need.6  
                                                
6 Elsewhere, the novel emphasizes the intimate knowledge of suffering that sympathy entails 
when it says that one of Odo’s friends offered him “that penetrating sympathy which was almost 
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In The Fruit of the Tree, Wharton makes the same distinction between the 
experience of sympathy and a style of philanthropy that, aiming to serve the poor from 
afar, serves primarily the philanthropist’s ego. The novel criticizes “one-sided idealist[s]” 
whose social “panaceas” overlook the person (47). While Amherst recognizes “the need 
of a philosophic survey of the [labor] question,” he is convinced that “only through 
sympathy with its personal, human side [can] a solution be reached” (48). To him a 
central problem of the industrial system lies in the “disappearance of the old familiar 
contact between master and man,” and the most pressing need is “to bring [the employer] 
closer to his workers” (48). No legislation can reconcile these two until the employer 
“entered personally into [the employees’] hardships and aspirations—till he learned what 
they wanted and why they wanted it” (48). 
Wharton sketches the model for such interaction in a conversation between Bessy 
Westmore and Justine Brent, which juxtaposes two forms of charity, the one intense and 
self-conscious, the other lightly self-deprecating. When Bessy shrinks from the idea that 
Justine might resume her nursing work in “that dreary hospital” and Justine claims she 
finds the place interesting, Bessy “indulgently” grants that “many people go through the 
craze for philanthropy” (231). To Bessy’s mind, her friend’s interest in nursing the sick 
exemplifies a fashion among affluent women to engage in systematic charitable work—a 
“craze” that eventually dissipates as inexplicably as it first took hold. But Justine laughs 
at the ascription to her of a “philanthropic” motive, claiming “I don’t think I ever felt 
inclined to do good in the abstract”; instead, a slippage in categories of self and other, 
described again by a corporeal metaphor, accounts for her charity: 
                                                                                                                                            
a gift of divination” (163). This uncanny understanding of another’s pain stands in sharp contrast 
to the philanthropists’ innocence of poverty. 
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[I]t’s only that I’m so fatally interested in people that before I know it I’ve 
slipped into their skins; and then, of course, if anything goes wrong with 
them, it’s just as if it had gone wrong with me; and I can’t help trying to 
rescue myself from their troubles! I suppose it’s what you’d call 
meddling—and so should I, if I could only remember that the other people 
aren’t myself!” (231) 
 
Justine’s “forgetfulness” distinguishes her service to others from “the craze for 
philanthropy”; a lost sense of autonomy separates the form of charity that Wharton 
commends from the self-conscious “social service” that she shuns. 
Selfhood 
 Wharton’s notion of sympathy requires a theory of porous, indiscrete selfhood. In 
The Writing of Fiction she argues, “The bounds of a personality are not reproducible by a 
sharp black line, but each of us flows imperceptibly into adjacent people and things” (7). 
The Valley of Decision and The Fruit of the Tree make a project of deconstructing the 
autonomous personality. The earlier novel sets about that task in a cabalistic medical 
treatment for the young prince of Pianura. The Duke, whose philosophical education left 
him “bewildered” by “distinctions between [. . .] the object and the sentient,” solicits the 
medical care of one Count Heiligenstern, whose quasi-animistic and magical philosophy 
tends to dissolve subject-object distinctions. In the central event of the young prince’s 
treatment, the Count assembles family and friends, including Odo, “to witness the 
communication of vital force to the prince, by means of the electrical current” (336). In 
the strange scene that follows, Odo feels the room and his own self subjected to, even 
permeated by, “some unseen influence” external to them: “It was as though the vast 
silence of the night had poured into the room and like a dark tepid sea were lapping about 
his body and rising to his lips. His thoughts, dissolved into emotion, seemed to waver and 
float on the stillness like seaweed on the lift of the tide. He stood spell-bound, lulled, 
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yielding himself to a blissful dissolution” (337). As the structure of the room seems to fall 
away, so the structure of Odo’s self yields to dissolution. 
The pervasive language of “dissolution” in this scene anticipates Wharton’s 
doctrine of selfhood in The Writing of Fiction, which bears repeating: “The bounds of a 
personality are not reproducible by a sharp black line, but each of us flows imperceptibly 
into adjacent people and things” (7). More telling than this echo, however, is the 
similarity between the passage from The Writing of Fiction and a description of Justine 
Brent’s sympathy as “penetrating—like some imponderable fluid, so subtle that it could 
always find a way through the clumsy processes of human intercourse” (446). The 
parallels between these latter passages, one about the self and one about sympathy, 
implies that sympathy is that which escapes the “bounds of a personality” and, in so 
doing, enables the self to “[flow] imperceptibly into adjacent people and things.” Both 
The Fruit of the Tree and The Valley of Decision demonstrate this mechanism. 
In the earlier novel Odo’s relationship with Fulvia disintegrates his otherwise 
tightly contained self, exposing it to the currents of life outside himself: “His other 
sentimental ties had been a barrier between himself and the outer world; but the feeling 
which drew him to Fulvia had the effect of levelling the bounds of egoism, of letting into 
the circle of his nearest emotions that great tide of human longing and effort that had 
always faintly sounded on the shores of self” (95).7 The image is like that of a broken 
levee, which no longer separates land from sea—much like the description of the Count’s 
                                                
7 Wharton’s language of “levelling the bounds of egoism” recalls Basil March’s claim in A 
Hazard of New Fortunes that there is a “solvent in New York life that reduces all men to a 
common level [. . .] and brings to the surface the deeply underlying nobody” (243). However, 
while for the Marches this leveling contributes to an “almost loss of individuality” that, in turn, 
inclines them toward passivity, in The Valley of Decision the leveling impels Odo toward a 
deeper engagement with “the outer world.” 
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rite, which permits “the vast silence of the night” to “[pour] into the room” and behave 
“like a dark tepid sea [. . .] lapping about” the witnesses. In a similar manner Wharton 
disintegrates the self in The Fruit of the Tree, thus preparing it to participate in 
sympathetic relations with others. 
In Fruit, to experience sympathy the self must be, above all, receptive and elastic. 
Justine recognizes the opposite of these characteristics in Bessy’s “hard small nature,” 
which constitutes a form of “imprisonment”: “Not to be penetrable at all points to the 
shifting lights, the wandering music of the world—she could imagine no physical 
disability as cramping as that” (227). Her counsel to Bessy is that she must reimagine her 
self as neither a consumer nor a commodity but as an entity dis-integrated and scattered 
about by its own adventurous catholicity: 
[A]s human nature is constituted, it has got to find its real self—the self to 
be interested in—outside of what we conventionally call “self”: the 
particular Justine or Bessy who is clamouring for her particular morsel of 
life. You see, self isn’t a thing one can keep in a box—bits of it keep 
escaping, and flying off to lodge in all sorts of unexpected crannies; we 
come across scraps of ourselves in the most unlikely places—as I believe 
you would in Westmore, if you’d only go back there and look for them! 
(229) 
 
This is the same posture that allows Justine habitually to find her self, as noted above, 
inside other people’s skins. Wharton again unites receptivity and elasticity in her account 
of sympathy when Justine describes her marriage with Amherst as “a multiplication of 
points of perception, so that one became, for the world’s contact, a surface so 
multitudinously alive that the old myth of hearing the grass grow and walking the 
rainbow explained itself as the heightening of personality to the utmost pitch of 
sympathy” (472). Here, a relationship with an other stretches out the self into a living 
“surface” that vibrates with “the world’s contact.” 
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 That Wharton disintegrates selves to fit them for sympathetic relationships 
distinguishes her theory of personhood from William Dean Howells’s and aligns it with 
Rebecca Harding Davis’s. In Howells’s fiction the disintegration of the self impedes 
decision-making and proves “too relaxing to the moral fibre” (Hazard 296). Rebecca 
Harding Davis does not posit a disintegrated self, but her incarnational theology, which 
sees self-limitation as a necessary condition of redemptive action, dovetails with 
Wharton’s notion that sympathetic relationships become possible not through a self-
aggrandizing consolidation of one’s personality but through an opening of its borders, a 
choice to become socially vulnerable. Wharton’s deconstruction of the self should not be 
mistaken, then, for a repudiation of the self or of human agency. Her oft-cited opposition 
to literary modernism rests largely on her claim that its practitioners “reduce to the 
vanishing point any will to action, and their personages are helpless puppets on a sluggish 
stream of fatality” (172). Wharton stakes her literary identity on the defense of the human 
agent. In Wharton’s fiction, though, as in Davis’s, that agent exercises its power most 
fully when it embraces and makes an asset of its limitations. 
Borderlands 
As sympathy seems to transcend the borders of the self, Wharton’s writing 
suggests that art, too, is best when it dissolves the boundaries between apparently discrete 
entities and, constructing a liminal space, reconstitutes those entities in a dynamic 
relationship. In a review for the Times Literary Supplement, Wharton heaps praise on 
Geoffrey Scott’s The Architecture of Humanism (1914), in which he argues for such a 
dynamic relationship between architecture and its inhabitants, claiming that “[w]e adapt 
ourselves instinctively to the spaces in which we stand, project ourselves into them, fill 
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them ideally with our movements” (169). Because architecture is modeled on the states 
and movements of the human body, “[t]he tendency to project the image of our functions 
into concrete forms is the basis, for architecture, of creative design. The tendency to 
recognise, in concrete forms, the image of those functions, is the true basis, in its turn, of 
critical appreciation” (159). In the relation between architecture and its inhabitants, both 
undergo a sort of change because “We [transcribe] ourselves into terms of architecture,” 
and, conversely, “We transcribe architecture into terms of ourselves” (159). Scott’s 
account of human beings’ relation to the built environment draws on the philosophy of 
American Renaissance architecture, the preferred idiom of Edith Wharton and 
Progressive urban reformers, too. 
The American Renaissance, nourished in Rome’s Ecole des Beaux Arts and 
pioneered by the architectural firm McKim, Mead & White, drew inspiration from the 
noble, orderly, symmetrical designs of the Italian Renaissance. It rejected, on the one 
hand, the structural asymmetries and decorative clutter of the Victorian-era Gothic and, 
on the other hand, the mechanical functionalism of the modern. This neoclassical ideal 
remains visible in Columbia University’s Low Library, additions to the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, Boston’s Public Library, the Mall in Washington, D.C., and many other 
designs in eastern and midwestern cities, although perhaps its consummate expression in 
the World’s Columbian Exposition of 1893 (the “White City”) no longer remains (Benert 
40-47). Labeled the City Beautiful movement in its urban planning phase, the American 
Renaissance assumed a “relationship between the built environment and the national 
character” (Fryer 13), and it practiced a politics of space that aimed to “bring order and 
harmony to American cities” and “help to acculturate and assimilate the foreign-born, the 
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poor, and the new rich alike” (Benert 38). 
Edith Wharton possessed close ties to this architectural movement. Herself 
enamored of the Italian Renaissance, she applied its principles in her first book, The 
Decoration of Houses (1897), co-authored with interior designer Ogden Codman. 
Wharton solicited Charles McKim’s opinion of the book prior to publication, hoping that 
she and Codman “might, in a slight degree, co-operate with the work [McKim was] doing 
in [his] Roman academy” (qtd. in Benert 30). While he suggested a few revisions to the 
introduction, McKim warmly approved the whole, responding, “Hats off to every word!” 
(qtd. in Benert 30) The Decoration of Houses aims to restore the “natural connection 
between the outside of the modern house and its interior” by treating interior decoration 
as “a branch of architecture” rather than, what it has become, “a superficial application of 
ornament totally independent of structure” (xix, xx, xix). In short, Wharton and Codman 
appeal for unity and cooperation between outside and inside, both of which exert a strong 
influence on the physical, mental, and emotional states of the inhabitants. 
One curious feature of Wharton’s book returns us to her praise of Geoffrey Scott 
and his attention to architectural boundaries and liminality: alongside an introductory 
chapter on architectural history, the two longest chapters in The Decoration of Houses are 
devoted to “Hall and Stairs” and “Doors.” Wharton’s lengthy discussion of these 
thresholds, combined with chapters on “Entrance and Vestibule” and “Windows,” reveals 
an unexpected fixation on in-between spaces. The book discusses rooms proper, but only 
a few get their own chapters. Other rooms she squeezes three-at-a-time into single 
chapters. The focus on transitional areas is counterintuitive, but it is consistent with her 
broader aesthetic and even ethical commitments. 
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When Geoffrey Scott italicizes his claim that human beings transcribe themselves 
“into terms of architecture” and “transcribe architecture into terms of ourselves,” he 
assumes there is something very important about this imaginative mingling of bodies and 
buildings (159). When The Decoration of Houses lingers unexpectedly on architectural 
thresholds, it draws attention to the same “something.” In Italian Villas and Their 
Gardens (1907), Wharton’s second book on spatial design, she locates “the ineffable 
Italian garden-magic”—a unique and powerful aesthetic experience—in another liminal 
space. As she narrates a history of Italian Renaissance gardening, Wharton asserts that a 
major development came in “the architect’s discovery of the means by which nature and 
art might be fused” in his designs, and she claims that the peculiar “enchantment” of 
Italian gardens emerges in “the subtle transition from the fixed and formal lines of art to 
the shifting and irregular lines of nature” (7). As in the actual gardens, such “subtle 
transition,” or “the blending of different elements,” repeatedly catalyze profound 
aesthetic experience in Wharton’s fiction. 
In an early scene in The Valley of Decision, a young Odo wanders about a grove 
dotted with several chapels, peering in at sculpted scenes of the Passion inside each one. 
The lifelike quality of these figures turns his casual walk into a religious drama, as 
though he were “treading the actual stones of Gethsemane and Calvary,” because, the 
narrator explains, at Odo’s age the “distinction between flesh-and-blood and its plastic 
counterfeits is not clearly defined” and “the sculptured image is still a mysterious half-
sentient thing, denizen of some strange borderland between art and life” (68). This 
“borderland,” the very sort that casts the Italian garden’s “spell,” stretches its mysterious 
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terrain through much of The Valley of Decision (6).8 In fact, Odo walks into it in his first 
tour of the palace gardens at Pianura, which appear “too beautiful to be real” and move 
him like “the music of the Easter mass” (23). For all his time spent in gardens in later life, 
“never after did he renew [this] first enchanted impression of mystery and brightness that 
remained with him as the most vivid emotion of his childhood” (24). 
Earlier than this, when sent from home to be raised by a poor family, Odo finds 
life harsh with his irascible surrogate mother and his sadistic playmates, and his time 
spent alone in a disused chapel with figures painted on its walls affords Odo his deepest 
sense of human connection. Odo has a name for each of the figures (“the King, the 
Knight, the Lady,” etc.), and some he has selected to be his images of living people 
whom he never sees, like his parents. When he receives word of his father’s death, he 
mourns for the corresponding figure in the chapel, wishing to “see whether the figure of 
the knight in the scarlet cloak had vanished from the chapel-wall” (12). But whether or 
not a painting has a real-world counterpart, together with all the others it forms Odo’s 
childhood society, for he “somehow felt as though these pale strange people [. . .] were 
younger and nearer to him than dwellers on the farm” where he lives (5). Moreover, the 
figure of St. Francis, whom he names “the Friend,” persists in the adult Odo’s memory, 
deeply influencing his work for social reform.9 
                                                
8 William Vance’s designation of The Valley as “historical romance,” an “ambiguous” genre that 
“straddles the worlds of fact and fancy” (169), locates the “borderland” not only at various points 
in the plot but even in the text’s formal constitution. 
 
9 The architectural emphasis in The Valley of Decision generates many such “borderland” 
experiences, but The Fruit of the Tree also manifests Wharton’s interest in liminal spaces, 
especially in the character of Justine, whose desire to live both passionately and dutifully makes 
her imagine the good life as one lived “on the banks, in sight and sound of the great current” or, 
alternately, as a “house-swallow,” which, having had its “fill of wonders” in flights abroad, 
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The “strange borderland between art and life” is not only architectural, though; it 
also runs between reader and text, as Wharton affirms when a young Odo, opening some 
long neglected books in an archive, “felt the same joyous catching of the breath as when 
he had stepped out on the garden-terrace at Pianura” (51). In fact, Wharton figures fiction 
as architecture and vice versa. Of Odo’s favorite frescoed chapel, described above, the 
narrator claims that it “was indeed as wonderful a story-book as ever fate unrolled before 
the eyes of a neglected and solitary child” (4). Inversely, in The Writing of Fiction 
Wharton draws a formal distinction between short stories and novels by comparing them 
to two types of buildings: “the short story is an improvisation, the temporary shelter of a 
flitting fancy, compared to the four-square and deeply-founded monument which the 
novel ought to be” (75).10 In her preface to The Book of the Homeless, Wharton describes 
that book in similar terms, as “a gallant piece of architecture,” and concludes her 
introduction with an offer of literary hospitality: “So I efface myself from the threshold 
and ask you to walk in” (xxiv, xxv). 
Wharton’s personal touch in this invitation highlights the relationship between her 
literature-as-architecture metaphor and her concept of sympathy. So does Odo’s 
“trembl[ing] with delicious sympathy” upon first reading the story of his beloved St. 
Francis. Odo’s reading constitutes one of the ecstatic “borderland” experiences that 
Italian Villas and Their Gardens introduces and that The Valley of Decision repeatedly 
                                                                                                                                            
happily returns to domestic warmth—its “familiar corner, and [its] house full of busy humdrum 
people” (303). 
 
10 Wharton’s essay “The Vice of Reading” imagines a book as a “gateway to some paysage choisi 
[chosen landscape] of spirit” (102). In The Decoration of Houses, we have seen what an essential 
architectural element Wharton considers doors, or gateways, to be; and if a “chosen landscape” is 
not a building, Wharton’s Italian Villas and Their Gardens demonstrates her tendency to 
recognize design in, and project design into, landscapes generally. 
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narrates, but the language describing Odo’s reading underscores the moral significance of 
all these architectural-literary ecstasies: they are a form of sympathy, partaking of the 
same dynamic relation that sympathy requires between two people.11 As sympathy 
consists in a mutual emotional relationship between two parties, so reading consists in 
“an interchange of thought between writer and reader” that requires a “reciprocal 
adaptability” (“Vice” 99). 
Wharton’s essay “The Vice of Reading” commends this give-and-take between 
text and reader over against what she calls “mechanical” reading, which is driven by an 
assumption that reading is a virtue and by a corresponding ambition “to keep up with all 
that is being written” (100). Wharton maintains that “Real reading is reflex action; the 
born reader reads as unconsciously as he breathes [. . .]” (99). Moreover, training is 
“wasted” on those who lack an “innate aptitude” for proper reading (100).12 Wharton’s 
argument with the mechanical reader concerns his “incorrigible self-sufficiency”—or, put 
otherwise, his “never doubt[ing] his intellectual competency” and his conflation of “zeal 
for self-improvement” with “brains” (100). In short, Wharton takes issue with the 
mechanical reader’s overweening will, which fails to acknowledge its own limits. This 
                                                
11 In Fruit, reading affords Justine an experience similar to Odo’s. She gains insight about 
Amherst “during the silent hours among his books, when she had grown into such close intimacy 
with his mind” (471). Here, of course, sympathy occurs at one further remove: Justine is not so 
much sympathizing with the authors as with another reader of the books. 
 
12 In a somewhat misleading word choice, Wharton also calls mechanical reading “volitional 
reading,” and she argues that “Reading deliberately undertaken [. . .] is no more reading than 
erudition is culture” (99). Without question, “The Vice of Reading” privileges a reflexive form of 
reading, which she does not consider a virtue because it is not intentional. We will see below that 
Wharton relaxes her censure of “volitional reading” later in her career, but even “The Vice of 
Reading” does not banish intention from reading altogether. Wharton claims, “To read is not a 
virtue; but to read well is an art, and an art that only the born reader can acquire” (100). To read 
well, then, is not effortless; it is an “art” to be mastered through work. The changing role of 
volition in Wharton’s concept of reading requires careful examination from this point through the 
rest of her writing life. 
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reader she condemns is no figment of her imagination either. Her essay addresses a 
contemporary change in American reading practices, described in Chapter 1, that recast 
fiction not as a site of pleasurable dialogue with authors but as a commodity for 
conspicuous consumption. 
 In Wharton’s early career, this trend of reading for social capital—or “reading 
up,” as Amy Blair calls it—was marked most clearly by the 1909 publication of Charles 
W. Eliot’s Harvard Classics—or his “Five-Foot Shelf,” so called for the diminutive piece 
of furniture that would accommodate the series. Purporting to “furnish a liberal education 
to anyone willing to devote fifteen minutes per day to reading them,” the Harvard 
Classics compressed literature into an unobtrusive location in one’s home and schedule, 
partitioning books from other parts of the reader’s life (Rubin 28). Eliot’s fifteen-
minutes-a-day plan recalls Wharton’s criticism of the reader who maintains “a fixed time 
for laying in his intellectual stores” and “reads for just so many hours a day,” rather than 
permitting his reading to form “a continuous undercurrent to all his other occupations” 
(101). Moreover, the relegation of the Harvard Classics to a shelf intimates Wharton’s 
vision of books conscientiously taxonomized and filed away by a mechanical reader, for 
whom “books once read are not like growing things that strike root and intertwine 
branches, but like fossils ticketed and put away in the drawers of a geologist’s cabinet” 
(102). In both of these regards—the temporal and spatial limitation of books—Eliot’s 
series and the trends it exemplifies deprive literature of what Wharton considers its 
defining quality: dynamism, or the tendency to foster relationships with things in its 
environment, like ideas, institutions, other books, and, of course, readers. 
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If a book can be simply relegated to a particular place, time, and function in a 
reader’s life, then the reader does not—cannot—engage in a sympathetic relationship 
with it. Such a relationship requires mutuality. However, mechanical reading subjects 
fictional texts and their authors to the reader’s self-improvement schemes. The reader, 
eager to acquire “culture,” raids the text in search of that commodity alone, dismissing 
the author’s appeals for a sustained conversation. A sympathetic reading, however, 
consists in a dialogue, taken up at one’s leisure. In such an interaction between reader and 
author, both parties interrogate one another. The reader may scrutinize and argue with the 
author, but she expects the author to return the favor. I argue that Wharton’s resistance to 
one-sided, mechanical reading partially accounts for her construction of literature as 
architecture. “[F]our-square and deeply founded monuments” and “gallant piece[s] of 
architecture,” as she variously imagines literary texts, do not readily yield to unruly 
inhabitants; the solid contours of these edifices decisively limit and direct the movements 
of visitors. An architectural literature requires compromises of its readers; that is, it 
invites them to a sympathetic relationship. 
Evolution 
The metaphor comparing reading and sympathy is problematic at two levels, 
though. First, Wharton’s account of reading excludes many from the privileges of literary 
culture—and, by extension, the responsibilities of charity—because she calls reading “an 
art that only the born reader can acquire” (“Vice” 100). By Wharton’s account, if one 
does not already read (or feel toward others) in the ways that she prescribes, then no 
amount of practice is likely to make much difference. The practices of reading and 
sympathy, in their genuine forms, proceed from innate capacities, not from training. 
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Hence, there are many who should leave to others both the richer, subtler rewards of 
reading and the duty of feeling with their neighbors. Another problem arises from the 
class-specificity of Wharton’s model. Her mechanical reader reads to be more cultured, to 
assimilate the values and characteristics of the wealthy; his existence is predicated on a 
lack. Similarly, the philanthropist, driven by excess of sentiment, lacks the emotional 
refinement of the well-bred patrician. Apart from the fact that the upper classes, in 
reality, have no monopoly on sympathy, the classed nature of Wharton’s model also 
excludes the poor from all sympathetic relations because, to Wharton’s mind, their 
poverty deprives them of agency, of any real personhood. Let me explain: while 
Wharton’s rich and poor are alike products of their environments, the poor somehow lack 
the capacity of the rich to transcend—to recognize and resist—the social and economic 
forces that shape them. Likewise, if they are vicious, they cannot be faulted for it. The 
poor are wispy, insubstantial figures. As such, they can no more experience a sympathetic 
relationship than an author subjected to instrumental reading can converse with an 
overweening reader because, as good reading requires the recognition of an author’s 
agency, so sympathy requires acknowledgment of another person, an equal. Any denial 
of the other party’s agency turns what might otherwise be a sympathetic relation into a 
philanthropic one, which is precisely the relation Wharton aims to avoid. It seems, then, 
given Wharton’s class essentialism that deprives the poor of volition, her sympathy 
cannot extend beyond the upper classes, who alone possess the solid personhood 
necessary to that emotional relationship. 
 Wharton’s poverty fiction, however, traces an evolution of her parallel models of 
reading and sympathy. The Valley of Decision thematizes sympathy in Odo’s 
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relationships with peers, saints, physical spaces, and art; but while Odo pities the poor 
and wants to see social and political reforms on their behalf, one cannot—indeed, the 
book does not—speak of him sympathizing with the poor. A poor family who mistreats 
their foster child incurs none of Odo’s anger because “they seemed to him no more 
accountable than cowed hunger-driven animals” (226); they were “but a sickly growth of 
the decaying social order” (268). Odo’s understanding the poor through these images, 
which imply an absence of agency, precludes the possibility that he could sympathize 
with them. Because, by Odo’s account, they lack the capacity for moral decision-making, 
because their wills are obliterated by their environments, the poor cannot rise to the 
experience of sympathy. 
 In The Fruit of the Tree, however, Wharton adapts her characterization of the 
poor. Here they are not fully human, but neither are they harassed animals or social 
cancers as in Valley. In a longer passage ostensibly praising Justine’s sympathy with the 
mill workers, her description of her relationship with them recalls The Valley of Decision 
while introducing significant new ideas: 
“What I really like is to gossip with them, and give them advice about the 
baby’s cough, and the cheapest way to do their marketing,” she said 
laughing, as she and Amherst emerged once more into the street. “It’s the 
same kind of interest I used to feel in my dolls and guinea pigs—a 
managing, interfering old maid’s interest. I don’t believe I should care a 
straw for them if I couldn’t dose them and order them about.” (457-48) 
 
Dolls and guinea pigs, then: these images, like those in Valley, represent the poor as sub-
human. They are playthings for the affluent. These images gesture toward the hierarchical 
relations fostered by a “philanthropy craze,” relations that serve largely to divert the rich 
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and, some critics claim, to consolidate their social power.13 Nonetheless, these images of 
the poor differ substantially from those in Valley. A child’s pet guinea pig is no brute 
beast, “cowed and hunger-driven.” Like a doll, if it is a plaything, it is also a playmate. 
Between a child and her pets and dolls exists a potential for intimacy and imaginative 
identification, in however juvenile a form. Often, the unequal relationships forged with 
these playmates are, for all their immaturity, the very schools of feeling with the Other. 
This passage certainly does not signal a new egalitarianism in Wharton, but it marks a 
significant change from Valley, making the poor potential companions to the affluent. 
 One should also consider Justine’s light self-deprecation here because the humor 
of her self-designation as “a managing, interfering old maid” is that of a maternal figure 
who overlooks the independence and competency of the people she presumes to advise. 
Justine is well aware of the gratification she receives from “dos[ing] them and order[ing] 
them about”; much earlier in the novel she posits that “[p]hilanthropy is the one of the 
subtlest forms of self-indulgence” (156). Above we noted her response to Bessy’s notion 
that she is undergoing a “craze for philanthropy”: “I’m not philanthropic,” she replies, 
                                                
13 Jason Puskar reads Fruit in the context of an early-twentieth-century “accident problem” in the 
industrial workplace, in response to which a “maternalist welfare state” emerged to insure greater 
safety in factory jobs. Male factory workers experienced this female-led push as a threat to their 
masculinity and an insinuation that they were incapable of managing their own bodies and 
environments. Puskar implicates Justine and Amherst in this emasculating agenda. Alternately, 
Kassanoff reads Fruit in relation to the economic panic of 1907, which raised questions 
nationally about the proper management of industry—whether the task belonged to wealthy 
industrialists or the government. Either way, the affluent hoped that consolidating industrial 
power in the appropriate hands (certainly not the workers’) would secure greater economic 
stability. Kassanoff interprets John’s and Justine’s reformist work as a “class-based strategy of 
social control” that bespeaks Wharton’s “deep-seated fears about political and cultural 
democratization” (69, 63). There is much to commend both Puskar’s and Kassanoff’s readings, 
but both disregard the real, albeit not radical, sacrifices that Amherst and Justine make in their 
service to the mill community. Moreover, in focusing narrowly on The Fruit of the Tree, Puskar’s 
and Kassanoff’s readings cannot recognize that text’s treatment of the poor as a transitional 
moment in Wharton’s career. 
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claiming that sometimes she so nearly identifies with poor people that “before I know it 
I’ve slipped into their skins; and then, of course, if anything goes wrong with them, it’s 
just as if it had gone wrong with me; and I can’t help trying to rescue myself from their 
troubles!” (231) She confesses one might call this “meddling,” except that she genuinely 
forgets “that the other people aren’t myself” (231). These quotations display Justine’s 
remarkable capacity for self-critique, and while her comparison of the mill workers to 
dolls and guinea pigs betrays her sense of class superiority, it also satirizes it. The notion 
of “slipp[ing] into their skins,” experiencing another’s trouble as one’s own, and losing 
track of one’s discrete identity in relation to another: these are quintessential marks of 
Whartonian sympathy. In the context of this novel, Amherst’s classification of Justine’s 
feeling as “warm personal sympathy” is not to be mistrusted on the basis of that 
sympathy’s imperfections. Rather, it should be understood as something very close to 
Wharton’s own ambivalent and evolving conception of sympathy at this time. 
 Given Wharton’s comparison of sympathy and reading, one would expect that the 
change in her ideas about the poor from Valley to Fruit would find an echo in her notions 
about literature. Indeed, Fruit radically revises Wharton’s early doctrine that reading and 
sympathy emerge not from training but only from innate aptitudes. While giving Bessy a 
tour of the mills, Amherst feels disappointed by her lukewarm reaction to the spectacle of 
human suffering; but rather than conclude she cannot feel sympathy, he reminds himself 
that “the swift apprehension of suffering in others is as much the result of training as the 
immediate perception of beauty. Both perceptions may be inborn, but if they are not they 
can be developed only through the discipline of experience” (59-60). I have argued that 
Wharton’s essentialism on reading and sympathy serves to equalize the relationships 
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between reader and text/author and between individuals involved in a sympathetic 
relationship. Could reading or sympathy be trained, then readers and sympathizers may 
overestimate their agency and forget the solidity of the text or the other person, which 
demands that a reader/sympathizer subject his intentions to the other’s, that he 
compromise. In the context of Wharton’s oeuvre, Amherst’s constructivist understanding 
of reading and sympathy—an implicit doctrine of which he reminds himself, not a 
conclusion on the basis of new information—marks a relaxation of the author’s strictures 
against utilitarian, or “mechanical,” reading and hierarchical philanthropy. Wharton 
seems to be reconciling herself to the inevitability of both and even imagining positive 
outcomes from these less-than-ideal practices. 
 The plot of Fruit registers this authorial struggle to embrace the vagaries of 
literary reception. From a seasoned perspective in 1936, Wharton can write of this 
phenomenon with equanimity: “The strangest, and not the least interesting, adventure of 
any work of the imagination is the inevitable distortion it undergoes in passing from the 
mind of the writer to that of his readers” (Intro to House of Mirth). In Fruit, she is 
learning to consider this “distortion” not only strange but interesting; she is searching out 
the silver lining.14 We see this in two crucial misreadings, both motivated by a reader’s 
utilitarian purpose, that the novel dramatizes. The first occurs when Justine, wishing to 
relieve Bessy’s pain and considering euthanasia, turns to Amherst’s books for comfort 
and distraction and interprets the marginalia in a work of Bacon’s as Amherst’s sanction 
                                                
14 Very early in her career Wharton invites the changes effected in a text by reading: “If the book 
enters the reader’s mind just as it left the writer’s—without any of the additions and 
modifications inevitably produced by contact with a new body of thought—it has been read to no 
purpose” (99). She expects books, upon reception, to be “diversely moulded by the impact of 
fresh forms of thought” (99). But here she sounds like an author who has not endured many 
misreadings—the sort of “distortion[s]” that in Fruit she struggles to accept. 
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for the action she wants to perform. In fact, Amherst does approve her decision in the 
abstract, but emotionally he is revolted by Justine’s decision. Her inferences about 
Amherst’s intentions from his margin notes are a bit right, a bit wrong: her reading is 
precisely the sort of “distortion” to which Wharton refers. Despite Amherst’s recoil from 
the concrete reality that his second wife euthanized his first, Justine’s reasoning and 
Amherst’s intellectual sanction of it strongly suggest that Wharton approves Justine’s 
decision. That she uses a utilitarian misreading to precipitate the central act of the novel, 
and thus to make her controversial moral argument, implies a dramatic reappraisal of 
readers’ misappropriations. The author, Wharton seems to tell herself, need not fear 
mechanical readers, for even they can somehow, unwittingly, enact the author’s 
intentions. 
 We see a radical extension of this principle in the novel’s closing scene where 
Amherst, having discovered Bessy’s blueprints for her own lavish pleasure grounds and 
assumed she meant the project for the mill town, holds a grand opening for the new 
facilities and invites the mill workers to “find health and refreshment and diversion here” 
and, even though the company could not afford all of the luxuries the blueprints 
specified, to “remember the beauty [Bessy] dreamed of giving you, and to let the thought 
of it make her memory beautiful among you and your children” (627). This misreading of 
the blueprints infuriates Justine, who knows their real provenance. Her response poses the 
ultimate challenge to Wharton’s new acceptance of mechanical reading: “by what 
mocking turn of events,” she demands, “had a project devised in deliberate defiance of 
[Amherst’s] wishes, and intended to declare his wife’s open contempt for them, been 
transformed into a Utopian vision for the betterment of the Westmore operatives?” (628). 
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Given Justine’s further fears that “this phantom that Amherst’s uneasy imagination had 
evoked”—a selfless and beneficent Bessy—could come between her and Amherst and 
“rob her of such wedded peace as was hers,” she tells herself that “no sane judgment 
could ask her to sit quiet under this last hallucination” (629, 628). Simply telling Amherst 
the truth about Bessy’s intentions would dispel the illusion and the threat it poses to her 
own happiness. However, when Amherst learns that Bessy showed Justine the blueprints 
before and he asks whether Bessy told her anything about “her wishes, her intentions,” 
with pain Justine chooses not to reveal the truth, ostensibly concluding it is less important 
than Amherst’s happiness at this new vision of Bessy. 
Here, then, a misreading—more blatant than the novel’s first—gives an 
unforeseen, concrete expression to Amherst’s and Justine’s charitable disposition toward 
the mill workers. If the earlier misreading leads Justine to perform the act that Amherst 
probably would have in her position, then this misreading generates an outcome 
consistent with Amherst and Justine’s vision but unpremeditated and unpredictable. 
There are consequences for the erroneous interpretation; Justine feels them keenly. 
However, Wharton seems to regard Amherst’s inaccurate new conception of Bessy as a 
mixed good because it is bound up with the emergence of something very positive in the 
workers’ pleasure house. Justine is Wharton’s representative here, bristling at the 
misappropriation of an author’s intentions but accepting the lack of control it witnesses as 
well as the unexpected good it generates.15 
                                                
15 Jennie Kassanoff’s interpretation of these two misreadings extends her argument that 
Wharton’s “deep-seated fears about political and cultural democratization” drive the text and that 
John’s and Justine’s reformist work in the mills constitutes a “class-based strategy of social 
control” (63, 69). For Kassanoff, these misreadings express a related anxiety about authorial 
agency that Wharton, unlike John and Justine, has no means of resolving, since she cannot fix 
interpretation. However, I interpret these misreadings in the context of Wharton’s increasing 
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 The Book of the Homeless extends and consummates the evolution I have 
described from Valley to Fruit. Constructed with the express purpose of raising money 
for her European refugee hostels and children’s homes, this collection of essays, fiction, 
and other artworks constitutes another development in Wharton’s changing conception of 
the poor and of sympathy and reading. The poor here possess solidity and depth, and not 
only because they are historical and not fictional figures. Wharton recognizes their three-
dimensionality and agency to a degree unprecedented even in Fruit. In her introduction to 
the book, she describes “these poor people” this way: “They are not all King Alberts and 
Queen Elisabeths, as some idealists apparently expected them to be. Some are hard to 
help, others unappreciative of what is done for them. But many, many more are grateful, 
appreciative, and eager to help us to help them” (xxi). Even in Valley, Wharton did not 
romanticize the poor as these “idealists” have, but she also never ascribed ingratitude to 
them. Here, she dignifies the poor by her lack of sentimentality, baldly admitting that 
some are grateful and some are not. This description hints at the most remarkable quality 
of Wharton’s portrayal of these poor: her recognition of their agency. Wharton’s 
testimony that the appreciative poor are “eager to help us to help them” is almost 
shocking. Her aristocratic heritage may well have fostered a noblesse oblige that 
presumed “mother knows best,” but this representation of the poor constitutes an 
admission of dependency, a very public confession that she and her colleagues require 
direction from the poor about what exactly they need. 
                                                                                                                                            
willingness to have her texts—and, as I will show presently, her identity—constituted in dialogue 
with others. Thus, the misreadings affirm the necessity and even goodness of subjecting one’s 
intentions and one’s self to the perceptions and answering intentions of others. 
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Here, we are miles away from the cancers and quasi-sentient animals that 
represented the poor in The Valley, and we have left not only the dolls and guinea pigs of 
Fruit but even the domestic creatures into whose lives Justine could so easily project 
herself imaginatively. Certainly, Justine’s tendency to slip into others’ skins, blurring the 
boundaries of self and other, exemplifies Whartonian sympathy. However, the image of 
Justine’s dolls reminds us of the hazard implicit in this imaginative projection, namely 
that the poor can disappear behind her overshadowing fantasies. If dolls have no 
consciousness apart from that projected on them by children, then Justine’s (admittedly 
lighthearted) metaphor of the poor diminishes their independent subjectivity and invites 
her flights of fancy, which may or may not correspond to their actual experience.16 In The 
Book of the Homeless, Wharton recognizes the solidity of the poor in a way that 
emphasizes difference over sameness—not a difference that impedes sympathy but one 
that resists simple identification, necessitates rigorous communication, and, most 
strikingly, elicits humility from those in conventional helping roles. 
Here again, as in Fruit, a change in Wharton’s thoughts on poverty and sympathy 
corresponds to a shift in her ideas about reading, for The Book of the Homeless 
unapologetically embraces the commodification of literature. Wharton clearly cares for 
the reading of this work, but most immediately she hopes for sales that will help fund her 
charities. She even sponsors a stateside auction of manuscripts and other “collectibles” 
connected to this project; here consumption is the point, not subtle interaction with a text. 
This is utilitarian reading defined. Indeed, Wharton has embraced a role as the director of 
                                                
16 Rebecca Garden, Jason Puskar, and Jennie Kassanoff all criticize The Fruit of the Tree on these 
grounds. What their arguments lack is not only a sense of Justine’s own questioning of her class 
prejudices, described above, but also a sense of evolution across Wharton’s oeuvre, which this 
chapter aims to provide. 
131 
these charities and the editor of this fund-raising book that makes her look for all the 
world like a philanthropist. With The Book of the Homeless it may appear that she has 
abandoned her distinctions between philanthropy and sympathy and set herself up as 
Lady Bountiful. However, it is important to remember that sympathy is, for Wharton, a 
broad structure of engagement and not only a means of interacting with the poor. As we 
have seen in Valley and Fruit, sympathy can be understood as the practice of compromise 
that Wharton considers fundamental to all of life. When we look at Wharton’s 
assimilation of her unwonted role in the World War I charities, we see that sympathy-as-
compromise is precisely what she was practicing. 
Alan Price, the preeminent scholar of Wharton’s wartime work, argues, “The 
convergence of historical forces that transformed Wharton from an ironic social satirist 
into a partisan war reporter provides one of the few periods in her life when she was not 
in control of what happened [. . .]” (qtd. in Hellman 103, 104). Price adds that for a 
woman like Wharton, “the loss of control was potentially devastating” (qtd. in Hellman 
104). Instead, the war constituted for Wharton a “borderland,” like one of those running 
through her fiction, which compromises the individual’s sense of identity but, in doing 
so, prepares her to engage people and things in a new way—in sympathy, that is. 
Wharton’s movement into a very public charitable work, sustained by the sale of a 
coffee-table book and other literary collectibles, may have taxed her powers of sympathy 
as heavily as the poor people whom her hostels and children’s homes served. In The Book 
of the Homeless, though, these people have become real enough to relativize her distaste 
for even the appearance of philanthropy and to separate her from any dogmatism about 
the nature of reading. As in Odo’s ecstasies in reading, Justine’s reflections on her 
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mystical union with Amherst, or Wharton’s own tastes of the Italian “garden magic,” the 
author has been “caught up” by the work in which she is engaged, and preexisting 
categories have grown less definite. The proof that she is no Lady Bountiful lies in her 
willingness to subject her preferences to the needs of these others displaced by the war. 
Paradoxically, then, Wharton is at her most sympathetic when she appears most 
traditionally philanthropic, and her literature is most committed to interpersonal 
engagement when it seems most utilitarian. 
 In John Steinbeck’s mid-career writing, his ecological vision, informed by his 
marine biologist friend Ed Ricketts, turns his attention also to liminal spaces, the 
transformative sites of sympathy in Wharton’s fiction. However, in Steinbeck’s work, 
these in-between spaces expand and so fully overwhelm the people and things they once 
separated that all distinctions between subject and object disappear. When liminality is 
everywhere, the self is nowhere, and there remain no structures in which sympathy could 
unfold, no grounds for generative cross-class relationships. 
  
 
Adrift at Sea: Steinbeck’s Posthumanist Ethics and Aesthetics 
In June of 1935, the summer of the original publication of Tortilla Flat, John 
Steinbeck wrote to his agent Elizabeth Otis, commenting that, “Hotel clerks here [in 
Monterey, California] are being instructed to tell guests that there is no Tortilla Flat. The 
Chamber of Commerce does not like my poor efforts, I guess. But there is one all right, 
they know it” (Life in Letters 111). Since Steinbeck based his novel on collected stories 
about a real community of paisanos in Monterey (Benson 277), he deemed it a “very 
funny thing” that the local chamber of commerce would deflect the interest of his readers, 
even “issu[ing] a statement that the book was a lie” (“My Short Novels” 16). Perhaps, 
Monterey businesspeople considered their interests threatened by the sympathetic 
portrayal of a poor community whose semi-socialist economy repeatedly upsets capitalist 
norms. If so, then Monterey’s leading citizens, like many Americans since then, 
overestimated the social challenge posed by Steinbeck’s fiction of the 1930s and 1940s. 
With novels like In Dubious Battle (1936), Of Mice and Men (1937), and The Grapes of 
Wrath (1939), Steinbeck established his reputation as one of the United States’s great 
political authors, who railed against the injustices of capitalism so miserably written on 
the faces of his fictional migrant workers. While he certainly championed a mode of 
representing the poor sympathetically, his moral philosophy and narrative practice 
enervated the affective thrust of his fiction. Of the authors in this project, he is the most 
heralded as a reformer and perhaps the least deserving of that label. 
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Preaching a reformist aesthetic in his 1962 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, 
Steinbeck asserted that the “ancient commission of the writer” lies in “exposing our many 
grievous faults and failures” and “dredging up to the light our dark and dangerous dreams 
for the purpose of improvement.” So central is the ideal of improvement that, to his mind, 
“a writer who does not passionately believe in the perfectibility of man, has no dedication 
nor any membership in literature.” These morally laden aesthetic maxims should not 
surprise readers familiar with Steinbeck’s late career. East of Eden (1952) thematizes a 
concept of human freedom and responsibility grounded in the Hebrew word timshol, 
which is roughly translated as “Thou mayest.” That novel and his later publications (e.g., 
The Winter of Our Discontent [1961], Travels with Charley [1962], America and 
Americans [1966]) express a profound concern with individuals and communities 
confronting moral dilemmas, free choices that seem to hold nothing less than America’s 
welfare in the balance. However, most Steinbeck scholars regard this treatment of moral 
responsibility, residing first in the individual and, by extension, in the community, as a 
significant development for the author. It departs from a critique of agency he advanced 
in his middle career between roughly 1935 and 1945. Oddly, though, Steinbeck’s 
reputation as a reformist writer depends largely on this earlier period, which on closer 
inspection shows him intensely ambivalent and apparently confused about the nature, 
capabilities, and responsibilities of the individual. In these years, although Steinbeck’s 
feeling for the poor ran deep, it was neutralized by a paradoxical blend of distrust toward 
charitable intervention in the lives of others and toward the very concept of a volitional 
human subject. 
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This chapter reads Tortilla Flat, The Sea of Cortez (1941), and Cannery Row 
(1945) as critical moments in Steinbeck’s mid-career development of an anti-reform 
position in ethics and aesthetics. Tortilla Flat critiques the discourse of reform by 
associating it with a broader institutional discourse (of government, commerce, and 
education, e.g.) that impinges on human freedom. However, to turn back an imagined 
reader’s reformist impulses toward the novel’s poor characters, Steinbeck practices a 
mode of storytelling that, in narrowly circumscribing the reader’s hermeneutic options, 
itself resembles the confining discourse of reform. Co-authored with his marine-biologist 
friend Edward Ricketts, The Sea of Cortez: A Leisurely Journal of Travel and Research 
(1941) sets forth in nonfiction a quasi-scientific philosophy that paradoxically critiques 
reform on the bases of its violence and its impossibility. That is to say, after an intense 
public response to The Grapes of Wrath that soured Steinbeck on political writing, The 
Sea of Cortez deepens Steinbeck’s earlier criticism of reform as oppression and 
simultaneously deconstructs human subjectivity and agency, thus eliminating the very 
possibility of reform. Cannery Row applies this non-teleological philosophy, as Steinbeck 
and Ricketts call it, in fiction: the results are a topsy-turvy moral landscape whose 
instability makes basic neighborly care a dubious project and a narrative structure that 
gives an illusion of significant readerly participation. Incidentally, Steinbeck reverses the 
account of reading with which this project began, the incarnational model set forth in 
Rebecca Harding Davis’s Life in the Iron-Mills (1861). He, too, describes audience 
participation through reference to Jesus, but he prescribes a response to texts that is 
abstractly reflective rather than fully embodied, observational rather than interventionist. 
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Tortilla Flat 
On its surface Tortilla Flat bears little resemblance to the texts in this project that 
are easily labeled “social novels,” like Life in the Iron-Mills, A Hazard of New Fortunes, 
or The Fruit of the Tree. Tortilla Flat presents no sweeping reform initiatives or even a 
narrator’s meditations on the plight of the poor. Steinbeck’s poor are happy in their 
insular community outside Monterey. In fact, the novel implies that they are happy 
because they belong to that marginal community. The dearth of charitable institutions 
and Lady Bountifuls operating in Tortilla Flat does not signal a lack of concern with 
social reform. Instead, the novel critiques reform by associating it with a particular kind 
of discourse, an institutional language that prevails within the culture of reform and 
makes it incompatible with and harmful to the cultures of the poor. 
The first page of Tortilla Flat begins a project, extending throughout the novel, of 
distinguishing between and assigning value to different types of discourse. The narrator 
lends his story a mythic aura by claiming that Danny’s house “was not unlike the Round 
Table, and Danny’s friends were not unlike the knights of it” (1). However, he does not 
mean for his narrative to be itself considered myth. In fact, he aims to foreclose the 
possibility that “sour scholars” of a future time, hearing oral accounts of Danny’s life, 
would conclude, “There was no Danny nor any group of Danny’s friends, nor any house. 
Danny was a nature god and his friends primitive symbols of the wind, the sky, the sun” 
(1). Therefore, the narrator calls his narrative “history,” prescribing that it be interpreted 
as an account of a real person named Danny and of his actual friends in a community 
near Monterey, California.1 
                                                
1 In his biography of Steinbeck, Jackson J. Benson, having traced the disparate sources of 
Steinbeck’s stories in Tortilla Flat, concludes that “[a]ll the major characters in the novel had 
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However, the basic formal commitments of Tortilla Flat appear to change over 
the course of the novel. The penultimate chapter of the novel suggests that the narrator’s 
conception of his work has shifted dramatically, for in his account of a riotous party held 
in Danny’s honor, the narrator no longer defends his narrative against “sour scholars” 
who would mythologize a history but instead disparages the “historian [who] may write a 
cold, dry, fungus-like history of The Party” (162). To such academic accounts, which 
would reductively explain Danny’s revelry as the characteristic behavior of a “dying 
organism” or a “living organism [that] is attacked,” the narrator responds dismissively: “I 
say, and the people of Tortilla Flat would say, ‘To hell with it. That Danny was a man for 
you!’” (163). Two things are significant in these lines: first, in a departure from the 
language of the Preface, the narrator positions himself against an “historian” rather than a 
mythologizing scholar. Secondly, he aligns himself with the paisano community’s 
interpretation of Danny’s exploits and emphasizes the mythological character of that 
interpretation: 
Where Danny went, a magnificent madness followed. It is 
passionately averred in Tortilla Flat that Danny alone drank three gallons 
of wine. It must be remembered, however, that Danny is now a god. In a 
few years it may be thirty gallons. In twenty it may be plainly remembered 
that the clouds flamed and spelled DANNY in tremendous letters; that the 
moon dripped blood; that the wolf of the world bayed prophetically from 
the mountains of the Milky Way. (163) 
 
This mythologizing operation is the very process that the narrator aimed in the Preface to 
exclude, the result of which was an interpretation of Danny as a “nature god” and of his 
friends as “primitive symbols of the wind, the sky, the sun” (1). What, then, accounts for 
                                                                                                                                            
their real-life counterparts, although they were not all part of one group, as indicated in the novel, 
nor did they live in Tortilla Flat” (278). Benson’s assertion, far from suggesting that Tortilla Flat 
can be read as a history in the academic sense, does lend a suggestive, extra-textual import to the 
narrator’s claims about his work. 
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the narrator’s shifting formal allegiances, from a preference for history over myth to the 
opposite position? I contend that the significance of this shift lies not so much in the 
narrator’s ultimate preference for myth but in his rejection of a single epistemological 
stance over against which he defines both history (in the Preface) and myth (in the 
penultimate chapter). In other words, the history and myth that the narrator approves both 
practice a form of storytelling unlike the forms that the novel’s fictional scholars prefer. 
 The narration of Danny’s party highlights four oppositions that distinguish these 
narrative forms from one another. The first of these oppositions involves the position of a 
storyteller relative to his subject matter. The academic figures condemned in the Preface 
and the penultimate chapter occupy one side of this opposition, as they interpret the life 
of Tortilla Flat from outside that community; they maintain a critical distance.2 Although 
Steinbeck’s narrator cannot claim full membership in the paisanos’ community, either, he 
at least stands in closer proximity to it, claiming solidarity with the paisanos throughout 
the text. 
The second opposition between the academics’ and narrator’s discourses involves 
their comparative self-reflexivity, or how candidly they acknowledge the work of 
interpretation implicit in the stories they tell. The novel’s academics, preserving a critical 
distance between themselves and the objects of their study, expose the interpretive work 
essential to mythology, but they imagine their own accounts of historical events as 
uncomplicated, unmediated presentations of the truth. The academics’ positivist 
epistemology elides their own situatedness, and their language betrays their 
overconfidence in the stories they tell. The mythologizer of the Preface finds no need to 
                                                
2 The novel’s academic figures participate in a broad discursive network encompassing many 
professions, the entirety of which I label “institutional.” 
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qualify his claims or acknowledge a margin of error, but he confidently asserts, “There 
was no Danny,” and, “Danny is a nature god” (1, emphasis mine). Similarly, the 
“historian” of the penultimate chapter writes down his purportedly objective conclusions 
“with unshaking hand” (163).3 
 The narrator of Danny’s party, however, embracing the paisanos’ mythic account 
of that event, celebrates the work of interpretation that storytelling necessarily entails. 
Likewise, Danny and his friends relish the dialogical quality of stories, as Pilon’s 
response to one narrative indicates: “The story was gradually taking shape. Pilon liked it 
this way. It ruined a story to have it all come out quickly. The good story lay in half-told 
things which must be filled in out of the hearer’s own experience” (38). According to the 
paisanos, the “good story” unfolds in a process requiring the audience’s creative 
engagement. “[R]uined” by immediate revelation and unfinished apart from the hearers’ 
contributions, the “good story” defers closure and emerges as a product of communal 
negotiation. Later in the text, when Pilon’s evaluation of an ambivalent narrative departs 
from these principles, Pablo reiterates the essence of good storytelling: 
Pilon complained, “It is not a good story. There are too many 
meanings and too many lessons in it. Some of those lessons are opposite. 
There is not a story to take into your head. It proves nothing.” 
“I like it,” said Pablo. “I like it because it hasn’t any meaning you 
can see, and still it does seem to mean something, I can’t tell what.” (139-
140) 
 
In this instance, Pilon wants to extract a moral lesson, intact, from the narrative (“to take 
into [his] head”), rather than negotiating a meaning with the storyteller and the rest of the 
audience. However, Pablo, faithful to the communal narrative form, embraces the 
                                                
3 The same mode of discourse operates in a “short and juryless trial” that sentences Big Joe to jail 
(65). The absence of a jury suggests an absence of deliberation, or interpretation, but this 
ostensible objectivity is no more convincing than that of Tortilla Flat’s fictional scholars. 
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hearer’s responsibility of interacting with a story to elicit its meaning/s. He invites the 
burden of interpretation and shares it with his friends. 
The third opposition separating Tortilla Flat’s narrative forms concerns the 
deference with which they approach their subject matter. Throughout the novel a 
multivalent institutional presence hovers officiously over Tortilla Flat, as in an episode 
where Pilon and Big Joe Portagee search for buried treasure on St. Andrew’s Eve. These 
subterranean treasures trace a violent history, for “Monterey had been invaded many 
times, and each time valuables had been hidden in the earth” (66). With this historical 
commentary in mind, the “treasure” that Pilon and Big Joe unearth, a “good-sized square 
of concrete” bearing the words “United States Geodetic Survey + 1915 + Elevation 600 
Feet,” seems an index of one such invasion of Monterey. If a geodetic marker seems too 
neutral an object to bear this symbolic load, Pilon explains that digging up such a marker 
earns the offender a “year in jail and two thousand dollar fine,” and this consequence 
points to an expansive institutional network assembled around this stone. Warren French 
correctly interprets the marker as “evidence of the ubiquity of an incomprehensibly 
systematic government” and of an “orderly methodical civilization that is closing in on 
the undisciplined paisanos” (55). Indeed, this surveying and codifying bureaucracy, 
prepared to inflict punishment on the person who resists it, manifests the encroaching 
tendency of institutional discourse in Tortilla Flat. 
Returning to the narration of Danny’s party and its aftermath, one notices the 
same invasive quality about the historian’s pronouncements on Tortilla Flat and, 
conversely, the retreating impulse in the narrator’s voice. The narrator treats Danny’s 
death in a way that distinguishes his perspective from the vivisecting gazes of the 
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scholars, as he refuses to represent the private scene at Danny’s bedside: “I shall not go 
into the bedroom with Father Ramon, for Pilon and Pablo and Jesus Maria and Big Joe 
and Johnny Pom-Pom and Tito Ralph and the Pirate and the dogs were there; and they 
were Danny’s family. The door was, and is, closed. For after all there is pride in men, and 
some things cannot decently be pried into” (166). The narrator grants neither the reader 
nor himself access to this most intimate scene. Thus he practices an ethics of narration 
unlike that of institutional discourse, for he sacrifices the work of representation out of 
respect for his subject matter, the paisanos. 
Despite the narrator’s deference in this scene, Tortilla Flat asserts that storytelling 
never leaves its subject matter unchanged; the narration reshapes the thing narrated. 
Danny’s party exemplifies this phenomenon that occurs repeatedly in the text, for he is 
“translated,” his body assuming gigantic proportions, precisely at a moment when the text 
changes its narrative style.4 The narrative of Danny’s party reports that throughout the 
night the guest of honor “had been rapidly changing his form,” and the narrator describes 
the effects of the “translation” this way: “He had grown huge and terrible. His eyes flared 
like the headlights of an automobile. There was something fearsome about him. There he 
stood, in the room of his own house. He held the pine table-leg in his right hand, and 
even it had grown. Danny challenged the world” (164). The significance of this passage 
lies in the coincidence of Danny’s change in physical form and the text’s change in 
                                                
4 In his essay, “Tortilla Flat: The Shape of John Steinbeck’s Career” (1970), Howard Levant 
finds Danny’s supernatural change at the party “completely arbitrary” and archly concludes that 
“in composing these final chapters, Steinbeck did not trouble greatly about a harmonious 
relationship between the structure and the materials within the complete novel” (1093). Levant 
misreads this scene because he interprets it backward; Levant unsuccessfully searches for 
something “in Danny’s previous, central characterization that justifies the transformation” (1093), 
instead of recognizing that a change in the narrative (or discursive) form imposes a change on 
Danny’s person. 
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narrative form, from history to myth. Just before this moment, the narrator describes and 
even aligns himself in principle with the mythologizing work of the paisanos, but when 
he narrates Danny’s “translation,” the narrator himself becomes the purveyor of myth. 
Ceasing merely to describe myth, the text at this point becomes myth. Hence, the change 
in Danny’s person occurs, necessarily, at the very moment of change in Tortilla Flat’s 
narrative form. Danny’s translation enacts the Foucauldian principle that discourse 
objectively inscribes subjective identity, even calling into existence new forms of 
subjectivity.5 Tortilla Flat distinguishes institutional and communal discourses according 
to the types of identity they foster. 
One such “translation” of personal identity occurs in the novel’s first scene, when, 
upon the announcement of America’s entrance into World War I, Danny and his friends 
Pilon and Big Joe march drunkenly into town and shout patriotic sentiments in front of an 
enlistment station, only to be “silence[d]” by the enlistment officer—and then enlisted 
into the military themselves (3). The same official silences them and enlists them, as if 
suppressing one element of the men’s identities (expressed in their drunken cheering) and 
replacing it with new identities. When the official says of Pilon, “I guess we need men 
like you in the infantry,” the text immediately follows this pronouncement with the 
suggestive footnote, “And Pilon was written so” (3). Thus, Pilon becomes, like his 
companions, a text—or, perhaps, a subject inscribed by a text. Either way, his identity is 
“written” by a bureaucratic official and the state institution he represents. Accordingly, it 
                                                
5 In his essay, “What Is an Author?” (1969), Foucault articulates this argument that would guide 
much of his later work: “[T]he subject,” he contends, “must be stripped of its creative role and 
analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse” (1636). Both Discipline and Punish 
(1975) and Volume 1 The History of Sexuality (1976), for example, represent historiographical 
applications of this principle whereby the subject, relinquishing its Cartesian prerogatives, takes 
the form assigned to it by prevailing discourses. 
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should come as little surprise that during Big Joe’s tenure in the military, the crimes for 
which he is court martialed involve his inadequate assimilation of his new identity; the 
charges against him are as follows: “Being drunk on duty. Striking a sergeant with a 
kerosene can. Denying his identity (he couldn’t remember it, so he denied everything). 
Stealing two gallons of cooked beans, and going A.W.O.L. on the Major’s horse” (65, 
emphasis mine). Fittingly, the most serious of these charges, “Denying his 
identity,”orients all the others from its position at the center of this list. The military, 
utterly dependent on its members’ conformity to their assigned roles, cannot tolerate such 
a denial as Big Joe’s. 
 Another episode situates the panoptic institutional discourse in a legal sphere. 
Confronting a Spanish-speaking immigrant who loiters on the street, a Monterey 
policeman says, “I don’t care if I can’t understand you. You can’t sit in the gutter all day. 
We’ll find out about you” (94, emphasis mine). Just as the block of concrete unearthed by 
Pilon and Big Joe marks a bureaucratic presence that surveys and demarcates government 
territories, so the policeman’s “we” designates an entire institution for which he speaks, 
an institution committed to collecting information on unclassified and unintelligible 
persons such as this immigrant—the aim, of course, being to move such persons from 
society’s “gutters” into authorized avenues of productivity. 
The same taxonomizing discourse makes itself known in the reform-oriented 
spheres of education and public health. In the course of telling a story about one paisano 
family, Steinbeck’s narrator introduces the bureaucratic presence this way: “At about this 
time in California it became the stylish thing for school nurses to visit the classes and to 
catechize the children on intimate details of their home life. In the first grade, Alfredo [a 
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son in the family] was called to the principal’s office, for it was thought that he looked 
thin” (121). The word “catechize,” implying both interrogation and instruction, befits the 
work of institutionalized discourses in Steinbeck, for these discourses first require 
subjects to give an account of themselves, and then they instruct those subjects in proper 
behavior. When Alfredo supplies an unsuitable account of himself, ingenuously reporting 
that he eats tortillas and beans at all three meals, the principal and a school nurse “trained 
in child psychology” authorize further investigation into this anomalous case; and a 
school doctor visits the child’s house, where “his scientific interest [is] piqued” by the 
family’s (admittedly strange) method of feeding the children (121, 122). When, after 
subjecting the children to “every test [he] know[s] of,” the doctor confesses that he has 
“never seen healthier children in [his] life,” he also upholds the legitimacy of his medical 
categories in the only way he can—that is, by situating these children outside the purview 
of his expertise and beyond the pale of humanity, calling them “little beasts” (122). Thus, 
the reader finds in this episode the same quality of institutional discourse that can be 
found in the paisano men’s encounters with the military and in the Mexican immigrant’s 
confrontation with the police, namely a surveying and classifying impulse that invariably 
reduces individual subjectivity to the space allotted by existing taxonomic categories. 
 In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech Steinbeck preaches the perfectibility of 
humankind, contending that any author who does not believe in that doctrine has no place 
in literature. However, his critique of reform challenges the doctrine, to the point of 
outright contradiction in his lampoon of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union. He 
describes a meeting of that body this way: 
In the neighboring and Methodist village of Pacific Grove the W.C.T.U. 
met for tea and discussion, listened while a little lady described the vice 
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and prostitution of Monterey with energy and color. She thought a 
committee should visit these resorts to see exactly how terrible conditions 
really were. They had been over the situation so often, and they needed 
new facts. (34) 
 
The committee is locked in a cycle of appalled observation and inaction. Its members 
find pleasure in the “energ[etic] and color[ful]” recitation of sins, which they have heard 
“so often”; and their aim is no longer to reform, if it ever was that, but “to see” and to 
gather “new facts”—to prolong the titillating litany of vices. The unintentional irony of 
the passage lies in the designation of Pacific Grove as a “Methodist village” because, of 
all the Protestant denominations, Methodism is most strongly associated with 
perfectionism. A Wesleyan doctrine of sanctification asserts that men and women can 
reach a state of perfection in the present life in which they no longer choose to sin. 
Hence, Steinbeck’s 1930s critique of the W.C.T.U. members runs counter to, even 
derides, his 1960s confidence in human perfectibility. 
In Tortilla Flat, communally negotiated narratives “translate” personal identity 
just as surely as institutional ones do, but they do so in exactly the opposite fashion, 
enlarging rather than diminishing the individuals on whom they operate. Danny’s party 
dramatically illustrates this function because as the narrative form of the text shifts from 
history to myth, so Danny’s very body, like his reputation in communal memory, grows 
larger to assume the properly “mythic” proportions. Similarly, the narrator, describing the 
familiar scene of Danny and his friends telling their stories on the front porch, adds a 
significant detail that elevates these men, indicating, “The flaming flies made halos about 
their heads” (130). The paisanos’ storytelling lifts them out of the realm of mere 
humanity: their narratives make them angels. Indeed, the frequency with which the 
paisanos’ stories impel them to acts of charity renders this sanctifying “translation” quite 
146 
fitting because often their narratives concern disadvantaged members of the community 
and strategies for alleviating their plight. Repeatedly, one of Danny’s friends tells a story 
of someone in need, and that narrative moves the whole house to action, as when Jesus 
Maria’s “passionate plea” on behalf of Señora Teresina’s hungry family “ignite[s] the 
hearts of his friends” and they overwhelm her house with pilfered food. Equally 
instructive is the scene in which Pilon’s plan to help the Pirate stirs the friends into “a 
philanthropic frenzy” and they welcome the lonely man into their home (124, 56). Such 
communal narratives run counter to the reductive work of institutional narratives in 
Tortilla Flat, affecting not only personal identity but also economic systems. 
 Oddly, Tortilla Flat does not invite its audience to participate in the communal 
culture of storytelling. It specifies its own interpretation in the Preface; its form is not up 
for negotiation. Morever, the text does not act like Jesus Maria’s “passionate plea” for 
charity or like Pilon’s appeal for the Pirate. The novel does not aim to generate a 
“philanthropic frenzy” among readers. Rather, at the moment of the central characters’ 
greatest need—that is, their grief at Danny’s bedside—the narrator explicitly bars the 
reader from entering the room. Whatever sympathetic feelings or intentions the reader 
may harbor toward Danny and his friends, the reader remains as much of an outsider to 
the paisanos’ community as all those scholars and reformers that repeatedly invade and 
aim to colonize Tortilla Flat. Steinbeck will not have his readers doing the same. There is 
a philanthropy that works, and it is performed entirely within the boundaries of a 
community, like the paisanos’ aid to their neighbors. 
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The Sea of Cortez 
 Tortilla Flat is not so frequently called a novel of reform as The Grapes of Wrath, 
but the latter novel decisively drove Steinbeck away from political writing.6 The 
firestorm of criticism engulfing his supposed Communist agenda took a heavy toll and 
fostered in Steinbeck “not only outrage and extended depression, but a growing 
repugnance for the whole [migrant labor] topic and everything connected with it” 
(Benson 423). Jackson Benson writes that, by and large, Steinbeck “adamantly refused to 
be connected to the migrant problem or to any of the hundreds of other liberal causes that 
asked for his endorsement” (423). Nearly giving up fiction writing altogether, he turned 
to science and the intellectual companionship of Ed Ricketts to reorient himself. In the 
tide pools, he thought, were “things [. . .] easier to understand than Stalinist, Hitlerite, 
Democrat, capitalist confusion, and voodoo,” so it was there that he went to “find a new 
basic picture” and to “make a new start” (Letters 193, 194). 
 The Sea of Cortez articulates much that Steinbeck learned on the collecting 
expedition that it chronicles and in months of prior collaboration with Ricketts. However, 
it does not so much narrate an intellectual revolution for Steinbeck as it crystallizes and 
consummates an existing intellectual trend. The philosophy that emerges in this book 
synthesizes previously unspoken intuitions, formulates new convictions, and lays a 
conceptual foundation for the stories, especially Cannery Row, through which Steinbeck 
would eventually resume his old vocation. Here I will focus on two innovations in The 
                                                
6 The reformist credentials of The Grapes of Wrath are actually somewhat dubious. Discussing 
Steinbeck’s extensive research for the novel, including experience “in the field,” Jackson Benson 
writes that the author “didn’t see the [socioeconomic] problem in political terms” but instead “as 
a matter of attitude” (345). In light of Steinbeck’s sentimental tendencies, this apolitical 
perspective on even the migrant workers’ plight is not entirely surprising. 
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Sea of Cortez that deeply influence Steinbeck’s ethics and, by extension, his relationship 
with readers of Cannery Row. But those innovations are best approached through the 
ethical posture they commend, an anti-reform position manifested in several of Steinbeck 
and Ricketts’ encounters with Mexican cultures during their expedition. 
The authors’ discussion of an offshore dredging project helpfully dramatizes their 
ethical stance. Initially they witness the dredging as a wasteful disruption of an ecosphere 
and call the project “a true crime against nature and against the immediate welfare of 
Mexico and the eventual welfare of the whole human species”—and, more simply, “a bad 
thing” (250, 249). Steinbeck and Ricketts propose two pragmatic initiatives to end this 
destruction and to manage the area’s natural resources more responsibly. However, when 
they return to this topic in a subsequent chapter, there are no more interventionist 
strategies on offer, and the writers seem to find any moral judgment untenable. Their 
earlier condemnation was not rash or reductive. They recognized the complex moral 
position of the workers, saying, “[The sailors] were good men, but they were caught in a 
large destructive machine” (249). Later, though, concerning the charge of wastefulness 
that Steinbeck and Ricketts first levied at the dredging project, the authors reflect 
somewhat abstrusely, “There is not, nor can there be, any actual waste, but simply 
varying forms of energy. [. . .] The great organism, Life, takes it all and uses it all” (263). 
Here they appeal to a wider perspective in which apparently bad events may prove to be 
like cells in an organism that “must be sickened before others can be well” or like 
“therapeutic fevers which cause a rush of curative blood to the sickened part” (263). This 
movement, from condemnation and proposed intervention to suspension of judgment, 
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marks a passage from what the authors call “teleological thinking” to “non-teleological 
thinking.” 
Steinbeck and Ricketts associate the former style, which they ultimately reject, 
with “the evaluating of causes and effects, the purposiveness of events”; teleological 
thinking “considers changes and cures—what ‘should be’” and “presumes the bettering 
of conditions, often, unfortunately, without achieving more than a most superficial 
understanding of those conditions” (134). On the other hand, the authors describe their 
preferred perspective this way: 
Non-teleological ideas derive through “is” thinking, associated 
with natural selection as Darwin seems to have understood it. They imply 
depth, fundamentalism, and clarity—seeing beyond traditional or personal 
projections. They consider events as outgrowths and expressions rather 
than as results; conscious acceptance as a desideratum, and certainly as an 
all-important prerequisite. Non-teleological thinking concerns itself 
primarily not with what should be, or could be, or might be, but rather 
with what actually “is”—attempting at most to answer the already 
sufficiently difficult questions what or how, instead of why. (135) 
 
One can readily detect the politics, or apoliticism, implicit in this epistemology that 
ignores questions of “what should be, could be, or might be.” As the authors finally 
retract their judgment on the Mexican dredging project, so they shrug at the American 
unemployment problem, naturalizing it as an expression of “the fact that animals produce 
more offspring than the world can support” (132). Steinbeck and Ricketts assign no 
blame to the unemployed, but, asserting that a percentage of people will always be 
without work, the authors do “rejoice that they [the unemployed], rather than we, 
represent the low extreme, since there must be one” (133). 
 Steinbeck and Ricketts repeatedly acknowledge that this perspective seems to 
many “detached, hard-hearted, or even cruel”; but the authors claim that “[n]on-
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teleological methods more than any other seem capable of great tenderness,” since those 
methods dispense with fault-finding and represent the world as a place where “no 
apologies are required” (146). The Sea of Cortez consistently describes this perspective as 
“wider” than its opposite: “It seems safe to assume that non-teleological is more 
‘ultimate’ than teleological reasoning” (141). But that assumption hardly seems “safe” to 
this reader—either in the sense of being logically justified or of being free from violence. 
(Safe for whom, one might ask.) It is far from clear how the authors decide from what 
distance and what angle it is appropriate to view events like the dredging project or the 
unemployment problem, for surely some vantage points would render these events more 
and not less insidious than they originally appeared. Ultimately, the writers find it 
“amusing that at any given point of time we haven’t the slightest idea of what is 
happening to us” (265).7 This lightheartedness about human ignorance may well have its 
place, but the writers give no rationale for thinking that beyond the edges of our 
knowledge lie only “amusing” boogiemen and not terrors greater than we had imagined. 
Moreover, Steinbeck and Ricketts’ humor seems to paper over the disturbing matter of 
their ethical withdrawal. 
 Having sketched The Sea of Cortez’s anti-reform position, I want to describe two 
conceptual innovations on which that position rests and which shape the reading 
experience in Cannery Row. The first of these is Steinbeck’s practice of minding the un-
                                                
7 Given the diminution of the human will in this section, it is not surprising that the prose abounds 
in syntactical structures that elide human actors. Like self-effacing scientists, the writers tell us 
that from a certain type of observation “a knowledge of the function of war and destruction might 
emerge”; that “little enough is known about the function of individual pain and suffering,” 
although “it is suspected of being necessary as a survival mechanism”; and finally that “nothing 
whatever is known of the group pains of the species” (265). One wonders how the elusive subject 
of these clauses came to know so much about his ignorance, to be so certain of his uncertainty. 
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minded, by which I mean attending to overlooked things and people (as he does in his 
poverty fiction) but also, in a more philosophical register, attributing consciousness 
(mindedness) to non-human life forms and inanimate matter. Like Edith Wharton before 
him, Steinbeck rejects the practice of philanthropy as a unilateral relation between 
affluent benefactor and bereft recipient. In novels like Tortilla Flat and Cannery Row he 
makes poor characters his protagonists; traditionally passive objects of charity, here they 
are the movers of the narrative and the dispensers of kindness and wisdom. Top-down 
charity is rebuffed by the fullness of Steinbeck’s poor. These novels posit a morally 
bankrupt affluent class whom only the poor can save. But this attention to the overlooked 
resources of the poor—rational, moral, and spiritual—also reflects the author’s 
philosophical habits. 
Steinbeck sees in the non-human natural world an array of forces comparable to 
that of the human mind and will. In The Sea of Cortez, for example, the erratic 
functioning of the crew’s outboard motor (the “Sea-Cow”) occasions a half-playful, half-
serious meditation on the force in machines: 
Recently, industrial civilization has reached its peak of reality and has 
lunged forward into something that approaches mysticism. In the Sea-Cow 
factory where steel fingers tighten screws, bend and mold, measure and 
divide, some curious mathematick has occurred. [. . .] Life has been 
created. The machine is at last stirred. A soul and a malignant mind have 
been born. Our Hansen Sea-Cow was not only a living thing but a mean, 
irritable, contemptible, vengeful, mischievous, hateful living thing. (20) 
 
Like Henry Adams writing about the dynamo, Steinbeck animates the inanimate and 
minds the un-minded. Jackson Benson argues that this outboard motor “almost becomes 
the leading character of Steinbeck’s narrative” (443). In this respect, The Sea of Cortez 
exemplifies a twentieth-century discursive trend that Robert Chodat describes as the 
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“gradual displacement of [agency] onto new and varied forms” (4).8 Chodat finds “a deep 
suspicion about agency thematized and formalized” in literature of the twentieth century 
but argues that while the purposive human subject has come under intense scrutiny, the 
notion of agency has not disappeared but been reapplied to unexpected entities. Though 
The Sea of Cortez and Cannery Row are full of skepticism toward the existence of human 
agency, they repeatedly ascribe willfulness to machines, words, non-human animals, 
human institutions, and so on. This conceptual move relativizes human agency. In much 
the same way that the gifts of Steinbeck’s poor to the affluent turn back the affluent’s 
offers of philanthropy, non-human agents like the “Sea-Cow” push back on the human 
will. Every agent is constrained by all the others. 
 The other basis of Steinbeck’s anti-reform position contradicts this one, but the 
confusion does not seem to trouble Steinbeck, and its pragmatic implications are the 
same.9 While at times The Sea of Cortez ascribes agency to new entities, at other times it 
outlines an ecology and philosophy that dissolves human agency by dissolving the 
boundaries between discrete species or objects, or subject-object relations as such. 
Steinbeck and Ricketts assert that “[t]he whole taxonomic method in biology is clumsy 
and unwieldy,” and in The Sea of Cortez “the whole idea of definite independent species 
begins to waver [. . .]” (207). Their critique of taxonomy bears quoting at length: 
Our own interest lay in relationships of animal to animal. [. . .] [A]ll life is 
relational to the point where an Einsteinian relativity seems to emerge. 
                                                
8 I recognize the looseness of the language about consciousness and agency here: having a mind 
may not mean having a will, too. However, I persist in treating “minded” things as agents because 
for Steinbeck the conditions of consciousness and agency do seem crucially paired. 
 
9 As he turned away from the controversy over The Grapes of Wrath and toward biological work 
with Ricketts, Steinbeck rejoiced that this new path offered him “freedom from the necessity of 
being consistent” (Letters 193). He exercises that freedom here. 
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And then not only the meaning but the feeling about species grows misty. 
One merges into another, groups melt into ecological groups until the time 
when what we know as life meets and enters what we think of as non-life: 
barnacle and rock, rock and earth, earth and tree, tree and rain and air. And 
the units nestle into the whole and are inseparable from it. Then one can 
come back to the microscope and the tide pool and the aquarium. But the 
little animals are found to be changed, no longer set apart and alone. (216) 
 
For Steinbeck and Ricketts, then, “species” are discursive inventions, as are “life” and 
“non-life”; there are no solid boundaries in nature that separate what we call a crayfish 
from what we call a shark—or either of them from what we call a rock. Neither do human 
beings have any privileged ontology in this system, and in The Sea of Cortez the 
dissolution of the human being coincides with a denial of human agency. The authors 
claim that “[c]onscious thought seems to have little effect on the action or direction of 
our species” (88), and, while their own terms perpetually shift underneath them, it is clear 
that they doubt taxonomic ontology and human agency and that these two doubts 
mutually support one another. 
The ethical consequences of these conceptual innovations are dramatic. 
Steinbeck’s first move, which populates the world with new agents, sanctions a retreat 
from reform on the basis that (1) the poor are not empty vessels but human beings with 
gifts liable to reverse the traditional benefactor-beneficiary relationship and (2) reformers 
are surrounded and constrained by other agents—human and otherwise—and are, 
therefore, less capable of meaningful intervention than they think. Steinbeck’s second 
innovation, which dissolves the human being and human agency, not only makes reform 
impossible—a mere word game—but it also confounds traditional moral philosophy. The 
Sea of Cortez suggests the same thing about good and evil that it does about species and 
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about life and non-life: they merge into one another and do not possess an independent 
existence. 
 Undoubtedly, Steinbeck and Ricketts give expression to important 
epistemological truths. Their sensitivity to the limitations of culturally situated 
knowledge provides a necessary corrective to naïve empiricism and ethnocentric 
moralism. Yet they claim for non-teleological thinking an almost Archimedian quality. 
They helpfully complicate subject-object relations, but their critique outruns their own 
important dependence on taxonomic language. If Cannery Row was criticized for its 
“disappointingly cheap philosophy” and “boozy metaphysics,” the critique can aptly be 
applied backward to The Sea of Cortez, from which the novel derives its philosophy.10 
This philosophy suffers from what one reviewer incisively diagnosed as Steinbeck’s 
“irresistible urge to exaggerate general statements,” a tendency that could be moderated 
by some “decent restraint and a good sense of proportion” (Longaker 283). Recognizing 
the limitations of his own vantage point, he aims to erect an intellectual system around 
that somewhat banal recognition, precipitously discarding notions of critical distance, 
morality, human agency, and the human per se. Cannery Row dramatizes the social 
consequences of these premature renunciations. 
Cannery Row 
 Jackson Benson reads Cannery Row as a “fictional poetic version” of The Sea of 
Cortez written largely out of a sense of “unfinished business” from the nonfictional work, 
which Steinbeck worried did not adequately represent the non-teleological philosophy he 
                                                
10 The commentary on Cannery Row’s “philosophy” appeared in the Times Literary Supplement 
in an anonymous review entitled “The Dickensian Flavour,” while George Mayberry published 
his critique of the novel’s “metaphysics” in his New Republic article entitled “Reading and 
Writing.” 
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had learned from Ricketts (556). Steinbeck’s own words corroborate and enlarge this 
reading, framing the novel not only as the complete expression of a lingering idea but 
also as a forward-looking manifesto: “when this work is done I will have finished a cycle 
of work that has been biting me for many years and it is simply the careful statement of 
the thesis of work to be done in the future” (Letters 230). In short, Cannery Row 
constitutes the philosophical and emotional center of Steinbeck’s pre-1960s career; it is, 
in Benson’s words, “a summation of all his conflicts and contradictions, and all that he 
had learned” (554). 
Accordingly, Cannery Row extends insights expressed in Tortilla Flat, but revises 
them so deeply as to make the later novel altogether new. Tortilla Flat dramatizes the 
violence of reformist discourse and, therefore, rebuffs a readerly impulse to intervene in 
the lives of the paisanos. Cannery Row recapitulates the argument about violence but 
radicalizes Tortilla Flat’s critique of readerly intervention by dismantling the idea of 
human agency. The later novel more fully expresses a non-teleological philosophy even 
in its deconstruction of traditional narrative form, and although Cannery Row’s 
unconventional structure makes work for a participatory reader, Steinbeck ultimately 
claims an authoritative role in the text that dramatically limits the role of the audience. 
Among Cannery Row’s multiple critiques of reform, the first is that it does violence 
to the communities it purports to help. This is poignantly suggested by the story of 
Frankie, who lingers at Doc’s laboratory because, as he tells Doc, “You don’t hit me or 
give me a nickel” (52). Frankie explains that at home, where his uncles are often present, 
“some of them hit me and tell me to get out and some of them give me a nickel and tell 
me to get out” (52). The syntactical parallelism indicates that his uncles’ philanthropy is 
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no less dismissive than their beatings, while also suggesting the operation of violence 
even in the giving of a nickel. The text makes the same insinuation while introducing 
Hazel’s character: “Reform schools are supposed to teach viciousness and criminality but 
Hazel didn’t pay enough attention. He came out as innocent of viciousness as he was of 
fractions and long division” (29). Far from rescuing children from delinquency, the 
narrator claims, reform schools drive them to it. 
Cannery Row expresses this critique, familiar from Tortilla Flat, in a manner 
consistent with Steinbeck’s evolving philosophy, for it more explicitly grounds its ideas 
about reformist violence in the argument that, contrary to many reformers’ assumption, 
there is no cultural vacuum among poor communities that needs filling with the gifts of 
the affluent. In an open, decentered ecology, the affluent reformer holds no privileged 
subject position. The poor are not the antithesis to his thesis or the negation of his 
positive. The text underscores this assertion when it questions the designation of the 
“vacant lot” abutting the so-called Palace Flophouse where Mack and his friends live: 
“why it is called vacant when it is piled high with boilers, with rusting pipes, with great 
square timbers, and stacks of five gallon cans, no one can say” (15). The lot next to the 
men’s house, like the lives of those men, is far from empty, even if these spaces are filled 
with objects, activities, and values that others consider worthless or distasteful. 
Another sort of critique is the text’s assertion that reform is simply impossible, 
that it does not lie within the power of human beings. The failure of Doc’s first party and 
Mack’s response to it support the text’s broad suggestion that human beings cannot fulfill 
their good intentions for one another or even for themselves. The closest thing to a central 
conflict in Cannery Row is the problem of how to “do something nice for Doc” (26). 
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Mack and the boys decide to throw Doc a party, but they fail miserably despite extensive 
preparations—six chapters worth, in fact. Doc does not make it to the surprise party in his 
honor, and those who do attend make a horrible mess of his lab. Punched by a furious 
Doc, Mack despairs of his good intentions that have always “turned sour” like this, 
saying that it does no good for him to apologize because he has “been sorry all [his] life” 
(120). Failures of goodwill like this one drove away his wife, who “only got hurt from 
[him]” (120). Defeated, he predicts that, despite hoping to take a lesson from the event, in 
the end he “won’t learn nothin’” (120). He considers himself incorrigible.11 
These shipwrecked plans and the resignation with which Mack—and eventually 
Doc—confront them lie at the heart of Steinbeck’s project in Cannery Row, spatially and 
philosophically. The second party for Doc is successful precisely because Mack and his 
friends renounce planning for it, realizing that the first time they “forced her” (145). 
Mack professes that with a good party, “You got to let her creep up on you,” and his 
statement constitutes a credo broadly applied throughout the novel (145). A 
contemporary reviewer considered it a “defect” in the novel that “Steinbeck endows [the 
characters] with no motive power of their own” and that “They do not move but are 
moved about” (Marshall 281). However, this absence of volition is not the result of an 
authorial lapse. The text consistently suggests that the deeply flawed characters of 
Cannery Row are not their own masters and can no more reform themselves or one 
another than they can throw a successful party. Moreover, the novel absolves them of 
                                                
11 Mack’s renunciation sounds much like Steinbeck’s own after his first wife Carol separated 
from him for the first time. Alone in their home, he wrote to his agent Elizabeth Otis, “I have no 
plans at all. Always before [in previous conflicts] I have tried to do something about it and that 
hasn’t worked and this time because I am tired and sad I am doing nothing about it. Perhaps this 
is wrong. I don’t know” (qtd. in Benson 412). 
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responsibility and finally exalts their resignation as a virtue. When Mack promises to pay 
Doc for the damage to his lab, Doc tells him not to bother because he knows Mack will 
do no such thing but will feel guilty because of that. Two chapters later, Doc praises the 
men of the Palace Flophouse for being “relaxed” in an age of “ambition and nervousness 
and covetousness” and for “do[ing] what they want” and “satisfy[ing] their appetites 
without calling them something else” (129). 
Despite Steinbeck’s affection for the “whores, pimps, gamblers, and sons of 
bitches” who inhabit Cannery Row, a robust strain of anti-humanism animates his 
critique of reform and its rational, willing agent. The text expresses distrust and even 
scorn toward the category of the human by repeatedly presenting human beings in 
symbolic frames that erase the dignity traditionally ascribed to their species. For example, 
the narrator provides a catalog of the wares in Doc’s laboratory, beginning with “the 
sponges, tunicates, anemones, the stars and buttlestars,” and so on for several lines (23). 
In the middle of this list, the narrator indicates dispassionately, “Then there are little 
unborn humans, some whole and others sliced thin and mounted on slides” (23). With no 
further comment, the narrator proceeds to the rest of the list, which includes sharks, cats, 
and frogs. The inconspicuous location of “little unborn humans” amid sea creatures, 
spiders, and rodents is anything but: the absence of hierarchical taxonomy draws 
attention to itself, as does the clinical dismemberment of these humans “sliced thin and 
mounted on slides.” 
Cannery Row pairs this image with one calculated for dark humor later in the text. 
The narrator tells the story of humorist Josh Billings’ death near Monterey, after which 
the embalmer disposes of the man’s internal organs in a gulch behind his house. Shortly 
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thereafter, a townsman sees a boy going to fish with a liver in his hand for bait and his 
dog “dragg[ing] yards of intestine at the end of which a stomach dangled” (65). When the 
man later makes the connection between these organs and Billings’ death, he and some 
fellow citizens track the boy down and retrieve the organs for burial with the rest of the 
body, since “Monterey was not a town to let dishonor come to a literary man” (66). 
Steinbeck surely intended the story as a jibe at Monterey’s disregard for literary men like 
himself, but the cumulative effect of this episode, the “unborn humans” in Doc’s 
laboratory, and no less than three suicides in the novel (two in the first twenty pages) is to 
strip the human of its traditional sanctity, to place it by way of humiliation on a plane 
with all the other creatures in its environment. 
In Cannery Row’s animation of the inanimate, it is not only animals, plants, rocks, 
and machines that acquire life but also formless, disembodied energies and, as I will 
show later, literary texts. To those amorphous energies first: on the novel’s second page 
the narrator calls Cannery Row “magical,” and the word effectively evokes the strange 
“flow and vitality” of the place that exceeds visible and tangible things. The text fairly 
revels in the play of formless forces on and among its characters, as hinted, for example, 
by the testimony that the employees of the local brothel are mostly Christian Scientists 
and by Mack’s invocation of astrology when planning a party for Doc, the depiction of 
Mary Talbot as a whimsical and benevolent witch, Doc’s lurking superstitions, and the 
harmonization of his bodily rhythms with the ocean tides. The second party for Doc 
seems to emerge as a product of such forces. Likewise, once the idea for the party has 
blossomed, the inhabitants of Cannery Row become ineffably aware of it: “People didn’t 
get news of the party—the knowledge of it just slowly grew up in them” (152).  
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In describing Hazel’s approach to dialogue, Steinbeck suggests the manner in 
which these metaphysical dynamics influence the form of his narrative: Hazel “loved to 
hear conversation but he didn’t listen to words—just to the tone of conversation. He 
asked questions, not to hear the answers but simply to continue the flow” (29). Hazel’s 
enjoyment of a verbal “flow” mirrors the text’s seeming delight in the disembodied 
forces that swirl about Cannery Row, affecting the action as surely as the characters do.12 
Like Hazel the novel subjugates the simple references of “words” to a more holistic 
concern with “tone,” much like Steinbeck emphasizes the relationships in an ecology 
over, and even to the denial of, the individual species that populate it.13 Likewise, 
Cannery Row seems to “ask questions” but “not [in order] to hear the answers,” not 
unlike Jesus Maria’s story in Tortilla Flat that resists didactic interpretation and “hasn’t 
any meaning you can see” but that “still [. . .] does seem to mean something” (139-40). 
The unconventional structure of the narrative illustrates these qualities of the text best. 
In Cannery Row Steinbeck deploys a narrative structure reminiscent of The 
Grapes of Wrath, a novel in which he periodically interrupts the main plot line with a 
chapter that initially seems unrelated to it. In The Grapes of Wrath such chapters often 
metaphorize the primary action of the story, as in the comparison of the turtle and the 
Okies. The same is sometimes true in Cannery Row (witness the comparison of the 
gopher and Doc), but the narrative structure of the later novel is more complex. While in 
                                                
12 The text hints that Hazel’s approach to conversation is owing to his escape from reform school, 
which should have taught him the importance of taxonomy, definition, and essences and, by 
extension, the importance of seeking “answers” in conversation. However, his primary interest in 
conversation’s movement and relations—its “flow”—demonstrates his unreformed condition. 
 
13 Steinbeck shared Hazel’s fascination with the sound of words, professing that his own written 
words “are more made to be spoken than to be read. I have the instincts of a minstrel rather than a 
scrivener” (Letters 19). 
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Grapes these chapters interrupt but ultimately serve the main plot line—the ineluctable 
movement and empowerment of the migrant workers—in Cannery Row these chapters 
cannot properly be called interruptions because there is hardly a main plot line to speak 
of, much less a secondary one to accent it.14 For several chapters in Grapes, the turtle 
chapters comprise a sort of antiphon, but in Cannery Row no such repeated image or 
character appears. The shifting narrative perspective falls sometimes on characters who 
appear only once and other times on minor but familiar characters. On other occasions 
the narrator spends a brief chapter philosophizing abstractly. However, no one of these 
foci dominates, and the shifts in narrative occur consistently throughout the text, so that 
here variety is the rule and not, as in Grapes, the exception. The upshot is a highly 
episodic novel that complicates traditional conceptions of narrative; lacking a simply 
discernible trajectory, it can rightly be called a non-teleological novel, giving literary 
form to Steinbeck’s ecological philosophy. 
More than a virtuosic demonstration of non-teleological form, geared to elicit 
admiration, the narrative structure of Cannery Row invites readers to participate in the 
text. To make any sense of the non-linear narrative, readers must supply the thematic 
linkages between seemingly unrelated episodes. The novel’s form also urges participation 
in Steinbeck’s philosophy. The text exerts pressure on the audience’s ideological 
commitments, for the hermeneutic work required of the reader approximates the non-
teleological observation modeled in The Sea of Cortez, where Steinbeck and Ricketts 
                                                
14 The absence of a clear narrative trajectory contributed to one New York Times reviewer’s 
judgment that the novel as a whole was insubstantial: “There just isn’t much here, no real 
characters, no ‘story,’ no purpose. Instead, with considerable pointless vulgarity and occasional 
mildly humorous scenes, a series of loosely connected incidents is thrown casually together” 
(Prescott 277). 
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write that “It is advisable to look from the tide pool to the stars and then back to the tide 
pool again” (217). This maxim implies the fundamental unity of all ecological spheres 
(i.e., tide pool and stars) while accentuating the different impressions yielded by different 
apertures on the whole. Cannery Row expresses the same insights in its first paragraph, 
when Steinbeck introduces his characters, saying that Cannery Row’s “inhabitants are, as 
the man once said, ‘whores, pimps, gamblers, and sons of bitches,’ by which he meant 
Everybody. Had the man looked through another peephole he might have said, ‘Saints 
and angels and martyrs and holy men,’ and he would have meant the same thing” (1). A 
primary function of the novel’s non-linear, episodic structure is to place the reader in 
front of several peepholes, to tilt her gaze toward the tide pool and then the stars and then 
again the tide pool. The novel’s unconventional, and otherwise inexplicable, shifts in 
perspective simulate Steinbeck’s own mode of observation, never stopping for long in 
one place but perpetually integrating his impressions into a holistic vision. Cannery Row 
impels its reader to engage in the same process. 
The concept of readerly participation is central to Steinbeck’s aesthetics. An 
unpublished introduction to the Viking Portable Steinbeck explicitly indicates this 
priority, as Steinbeck subjugates critical “appraisal and evaluation” to the more affective 
forms of textual engagement that draw readers back to a story repeatedly: 
The reader if he likes a story feels largely a participation. The stories we 
go back to are those in which we have taken part. [. . .] No one has ever 
read Treasure Island or Robinson Crusoe objectively. The chief characters 
in both cases are merely the skin and bones of the reader. The poetical 
satires of Gulliver have long been forgotten but the stories go on. The 
message or the teaching of a story almost invariably dies first while the 
participation persists. (qtd. in DeMott “The Place” 302) 
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The passage suggests a holistic investment in the text, which is contrasted with the 
primarily cognitive criticism of literary professionals. Metaphorizing characters as “the 
skin and bones of the reader” calls to mind Davis’s corporeal aesthetic, which, being 
grounded in the Incarnation, insists that full participation in Life in the Iron-Mills entails 
embodied service to and presence among the poor. Steinbeck also echoes Wharton’s 
account of sympathetic reading in asserting that “When a man hears great music, sees 
great pictures, reads great poetry, he loses his identity in that of the phalanx”—the larger 
social organism, constituting more than the sum of its parts, to which he belongs (qtd. in 
DeMott “The Place” 299). He even shares Wharton’s animus toward the impertinent 
reading that they both think book clubs encourage: when no such club would embrace 
East of Eden, Steinbeck wrote to his publisher, “Do you remember when I argued that the 
book clubs were bound to be burdened by the prejudices of so many readers? When the 
reader tells you what to write and publish, you can’t have very good books. Maybe that is 
our trouble now. Writing for readers instead of ourselves” (qtd. in Benson 716). 
Nonetheless, the participatory responses that Steinbeck expects from his readers differ in 
important ways from the commitments that Davis and Wharton solicit from theirs. 
Steinbeck’s participation is more passive than Wharton’s. While she imagines an 
active, tinkering reader whose every interaction with a text involves “additions and 
modifications” to it, even “distortions,” Steinbeck envisions the reader as less of an agent 
than the text. He remembers the great books of his formative years as “things that 
happened to me” (qtd. in DeMott Steinbeck’s Reading xx); he approves the representation 
of Cannery Row as “a poisoned cream puff” (Tedlock and Wicker 276); and he describes 
the reader of “The Chrysanthemums” as the unwitting object of the story’s designs: 
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Steinbeck says the text is intended “to strike without the reader’s knowledge. I mean he 
reads it casually and after it is finished feels that something profound has happened to 
him although he does not know what nor how” (Life in Letters 91). Steinbeck’s repeated 
suggestion that texts happen to readers, like a strychnine-laced dessert or a “strik[ing]” 
serpent, frames his notion of audience participation as a fairly ineffectual mode of 
activity. 
Although the mention of a reader’s “skin and bones” evokes the corporeal 
emphasis in Davis, his aesthetic is a perfect inversion of hers. Steinbeck references the 
body metaphorically to suggest the reader’s imaginative involvement in the narrative, his 
or her fictive place inside it. In Life in the Iron-Mills the narrator invokes the Incarnation 
to model the social action, literally embodied, to which she calls her reader upon putting 
the book down. Steinbeck also cites Jesus’s teaching as a model of audience 
participation: “Perhaps the best balance of message and participation in all literature is 
the story of Jesus—for there step by step the mind is opened by association with the man 
and his suffering to the things he said” (qtd. in DeMott “The Place” 302). For Steinbeck, 
affective participation leads to cognitive apprehension of a message, and the body is only 
the medium in which these two processes occur. For Davis, the inverse is true: the reader 
confronts the message as a call to embodied participation. Charity practiced in the flesh is 
paramount, while emotion and cognition support this practice. For Davis, Jesus calls an 
audience to action; for Steinbeck, he calls an audience to reflection. 
Next to Wharton’s and Davis’s accounts of readerly engagement, Steinbeck’s 
“participation” seems like a misnomer. In Cannery Row the audience’s main interpretive 
task consists in following the narrator’s continually shifting perspective and finding 
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relations between the objects of his observation, which amounts to trying on the non-
teleological epistemology that gives birth to Steinbeck’s moral quietism. Thus, the 
reader’s charge to “participate” is less like a rallying cry, more like an invitation to “Have 
a seat…make yourself comfortable.” Crucial for understanding Steinbeck’s aesthetic is 
Jackson Benson’s insight that “for all [Steinbeck’s] general suspicion of academics, he 
was really a scholar himself” (233). In Tortilla Flat Steinbeck repeatedly castigates 
professional scholars but sometimes borrows their institutional authority to fix 
interpretation. In The Sea of Cortez Steinbeck shares with Ricketts the mantle of scientist 
and philosopher. And Cannery Row, perhaps Steinbeck’s most modernist work in terms 
of form, illustrates Thomas Strychacz’s claim that although modernist writers explicitly 
positioned themselves against a technocratic culture of professionalism in the early 
twentieth-century, their development of esoteric literary forms reproduced the emergent 
professions’ means of establishing their authority, namely, constructing a language 
accessible only to the formally initiated.15  
Specifically, Cannery Row’s prefatory chapter presents the narrator and implied 
reader as scientists, thus inviting the audience to practice non-teleological observation. 
Attempting to explain how one can “set down alive” the many facets, activities, and 
                                                
15 Steinbeck’s relationship with science at mid-career mirrors his relationship to professionalism. 
Robert Chodat’s study of agency identifies a twentieth-century ambivalence toward science and, 
thus, helps explain Steinbeck’s love-hate relationship with the scientific bent of modern 
scholarship—love for the questioning impulse that gives birth to wonder but hatred toward the 
reductive materialism that spurns mystery. Chodat concedes the critical commonplace that early-
twentieth century and post-war literature reacted against “scientific rationalization and 
disenchantment,” but he argues nonetheless that “the same period that has seen repeated literary 
attacks on positivism and reductionism has also seen a deep fascination with scientific methods, 
concepts, and achievements” (17). 
 
166 
characters of Cannery Row, the narrator compares the work of telling his story to the 
biologist’s task of gathering specimens for observation: 
When you collect marine animals there are certain flat worms so delicate 
that they are almost impossible to capture whole, for they break and tatter 
under the touch. You must let them ooze and crawl of their own will onto 
a knife blade and then lift them gently into your bottle of sea water. And 
perhaps that might be the way to write this book—to open the page and to 
let the stories crawl in by themselves. (2-3) 
 
These metaphors of narrative as organism and of writing as science recapitulate the 
foundation of Steinbeck’s philosophy while setting forth a corresponding ethics of 
reading. First, they animate the inanimate text; stories become living things. Steinbeck’s 
representation of texts as agents that do things to readers, like poisoning or striking them, 
has prepared us for this more explicit animation. Next, applying to literature a scientific 
objective of increasing knowledge through empirical observation, these metaphors place 
a premium on preserving the “whole[ness]” of the story-specimen. Because the scientist’s 
(or narrator’s) “touch” is damaging, his task requires a passive approach that reduces his 
intervention to a minimum. This metaphor also makes a scientist of the reader: if the 
product of the narrator’s work is a book where stories have “crawl[ed] in by themselves,” 
then the implied role of the reader is to join the narrator in observing those stories with 
the same measure of delicacy. If anything, the reader’s “touch” is more strongly 
prohibited than the narrator’s.16 
                                                
16 There is an echo of this metaphor in the description of Doc’s laboratory. One paragraph 
provides a tour of the basement, beginning with the statement, “The basement is the storeroom 
with shelves, shelves clear to the ceiling loaded with jars of preserved animals” (24). Then the 
following paragraph describes the library in parallel terms: “The walls are bookcases to the 
ceiling, boxes of pamphlets and separates, books of all kinds, dictionaries, encyclopedias, poetry, 
plays” (25). The varied writings on the “bookcases to the ceiling” are framed much like the 
specimens on the “shelves clear to the ceiling” in the room below. 
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Steinbeck admires the orphic role. Cannery Row declaims on the power of 
language: “The Word is a symbol and a delight which sucks up men and scenes, trees, 
plants, factories, and Pekinese. Then the Thing becomes the Word and back to Thing 
again, but warped and woven into a fantastic pattern” (13). Steinbeck wants to be the 
speaker of that omnipotent Word. Witness again his resentment of readers “telling you 
what to write and publish” and his suggestion that “our trouble now” may be in “Writing 
for readers instead of ourselves.” Steinbeck does not so much crave a dialogue with the 
reader as an affirmation of his own perspective, nor a wide influence so much as a 
comprehending coterie. The writer writes, he says, in hopes of eliciting the response, 
“Yes, that’s the way it is” (qtd. in Benson 4). For audiences that cannot produce this 
response—like “delicate ladies” and others “insulted by normal events or language”—he 
has little use (Letters 175). “I’ve never wanted to be a popular writer,” he told his 
publisher, and at times he insisted on his way in a text “no matter what the audience 
thinks” (Letters 175). Steinbeck distanced himself rhetorically from the class of experts 
that by the 1940s had annexed so much cultural authority for themselves, but the cycle 
comprised of Tortilla Flat, The Sea of Cortez, and Cannery Row suggests that he 
desperately “wanted in” to that class—at least, that he wanted a similarly unquestioned 
authority for himself. He may have denigrated literary scholars as a “pale and 
emasculated critical priesthood,” but without a doubt he imagined authors as priests, and 
prophets, with whom a proper relationship was characterized not by negotiation but by 
deference.  
Steinbeck’s prohibition against intervention may constitute good science, but it 
makes for bad ethics, as the text demonstrates almost in spite of itself. In one of Cannery 
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Row’s encomiums on Doc, the narrator says of that “fountain of philosophy and science 
and art” that he “would listen to any kind of nonsense and change it for you to a kind of 
wisdom” (26). This is charitable work, indeed, when performed well. The best teachers 
do it habitually. Sadly, though, Doc’s conversion of nonsense to wisdom also hints at a 
fault of Steinbeck’s work, namely his penchant for wrapping flabby philosophical 
thoughts in the glow of revelation. Indeed, Cannery Row repeatedly revises biblical 
language to authorize Steinbeck’s non-teleological vision, as when the first line of the 
Lord’s Prayer becomes “Our Father who art in Nature,” trading transcendence for 
immanence (14). Likewise, in his Nobel acceptance speech, he rewrites the Gospel of 
John’s prologue, declaring, “In the end is the Word, and the Word is Man—and the Word 
is with Men.”17 Propped up by reappropriated scriptures, Steinbeck turns the world’s rich 
variety to an undifferentiated morass; supplants Christian theology with a vague, 
naturalistic mysticism; and replaces moral obligation with puerile sentimentalism.  
The failure of laissez-fair morality is especially apparent through Doc’s character, 
whose freewheeling approach to life earns him universal recognition as a “nice fella” but 
makes him prone to indifference, selfishness, and violence. Sadly, his relationship with 
Frankie is hardly less injurious than the boy’s relationships at home. Doc certainly 
exhibits more tolerance than Frankie’s uncles, permitting the boy to follow him about and 
help with various tasks. The text explains that Doc got rid of Frankie’s lice, bought him 
some new clothes, and made him his “slave,” and the narrator’s use of this last word is 
telling. It aims at light humor, but it suggests exploitation, too. Despite Doc’s occasional 
                                                
17 The prologue to John’s Gospel, which identifies Jesus with the divine logos, actually begins, 
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” (Jn. 1:1). 
Steinbeck’s revision expresses the conviction, referenced explicitly in his speech, that humankind 
has taken over a role in the cosmos traditionally attributed to God. 
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compassion toward Frankie and his overall good-guy reputation in the novel, he fails to 
care for the boy in two crucial instances.18 Frankie yearns to win’s Doc’s affection, and 
once when his attempt to help Doc at a party goes wrong, leaving him devastated, Doc 
follows him to his hiding place and finds him “whimpering” but leaves without a word or 
look or touch, having decided “There wasn’t a thing in the world he could do” (55). The 
narrator seems to regard Doc’s decision sympathetically, but the truth is that in such 
situations, even the clumsiest words, looks, and touches can be significant and 
restorative. Later in the novel when Frankie breaks a store window to get a gift for Doc 
and the police decide that, with a “mental report” and a “felony” now on Frankie’s 
record, he will need to be “put away,” Doc conspicuously fails to intervene again (160). 
When Frankie explains his behavior by telling Doc, “I love you,” Doc seems 
overwhelmed by the intimacy and the responsibility it entails: he “ran out and got in his 
car and went collecting” (161). Doc is not heartless; he appears to feel the boy’s tragedy 
keenly. His sensitivity, in fact, is why his inaction on Frankie’s behalf seems so strange. 
However, this tension in Doc’s character between sympathetic feeling and ethical 
withdrawal is not anomalous; it constitutes a foundational problem in Steinbeck’s 
approach to reform.19 
                                                
18 Edmund Wilson described a posture that characterized both Steinbeck in relation to his low-life 
characters and also Doc in relation to the inhabitants of Cannery Row. It seems an apt description 
of Doc’s response to Frankie: “A curious and perceptive mind is situated among simple human 
beings and scrutinizes their activities with the same kind of interest that it finds in the habits of 
baby octopi, sea anemones, and hermit crabs. It is capable of sentimentalizing about them but it 
has difficulty convincing itself or us that it accepts them on its own level. It may let them climb 
all over it, but it always brushes them off” (278). 
 
19 Citing several scenes like this one as evidence, a trenchant contemporary review in The Nation 
averred that “[i]f proof were needed that sentimentality and cruelty are the two sides of the same 
coin, it may be found in this book” (Marshall 281). 
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Doc’s carefully guarded independence sometimes comes at the price of others’ 
well-being. A scene concerning drunk driving illustrates this dynamic: having picked up 
a hitchhiker on a roadtrip, when Doc proposes to stop for some beer, the passenger offers 
the opinion that “it’s not a very good idea to drive under the influence of alcohol” (97). 
“It’s none of my business what you do with your own life,” the man says, echoing Doc’s 
own live-and-let-live philosophy, “but in this case you’ve got an automobile and that can 
be a murderous weapon in the hands of a drunken driver” (97). Doc promptly instructs 
the man to get out of the car, threatens to “punch [him] in the nose,” and brandishes a 
monkey wrench to underline the point (97). The text seems to take Doc’s side against the 
hitchhiker’s straight-laced moralizing, but many decades removed from the birth of the 
automobile, having witnessed the consequences of drunk driving over several 
generations, the contemporary reader can heartily endorse the hitchhiker’s message and 
shudder at Doc’s don’t-tread-on-me response. 
The story of Henri the painter neatly demonstrates the sinister element in 
Steinbeck’s laissez-faire morality. The text characterizes Henri through association with 
the boat he lives in, perpetually under (re)construction and eternally confined to land. In 
ten years of living in the boat, Henri “had been married twice and had promoted a 
number of semi-permanent liaisons” (123). When each woman left him, “he mourned 
formally for a while”: he got drunk and “Sometimes he cried a little all by himself” and 
read “Rimbaud aloud with a very bad accent” (123). All these gestures, though, were 
“luxurious stuff and he usually had a wonderful feeling of well-being from it” because 
Henri “actually felt a sense of relief” in being able once more to “stretch out,” “eat what 
he wanted,” and “be free of the endless female biologic functions for a while” (123). 
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During one such besotted episode he sees a macabre vision in which a “dark handsome 
young man” cuts the throat of a “golden haired little boy, hardly more than a baby,” the 
man and baby all the while smiling and laughing (124). Horrified, Henri consults Doc 
about the meaning of the vision and in that conversation provides a gloss on the moral 
universe of Cannery Row: “You see [the man] doesn’t look like a murderer. He looks 
nice and the kid looks nice and neither of them give a damn. But he cut that baby’s throat. 
I saw it” (125). 
Henri could just as well be speaking of Doc and Mack and all the characters who 
live by their non-teleological philosophy—“look[ing] nice” and not “giv[ing] a damn” 
but haplessly inflicting harm on one another. Actually, that neither the man nor the baby 
“give a damn” seems to me an explanation of their violence, not, as Henri assumes, a fact 
that makes it less probable. To Henri, their careless disposition mirrors his own and 
seems a virtue, but it actually harbors violence. Henri’s perpetual tinkering on his boat 
and deferral of its maiden voyage may be endearing on one level, but it points toward his 
unwillingness to commit himself in more significant ways. His marriages and romances 
fail because he does not care enough about his wives and girlfriends, whose “endless [. . 
.] biologic functions” annoy him, to sustain a relationship with them. The legacy of his 
cavalier bohemianism is a series of broken relationships, dramatically reimagined in his 
gruesome dream. Doc’s legacy in Frankie’s life includes critical instances of 
abandonment. One thinks, finally, of the novel’s three suicides and wonders if anyone 
“[gave] a damn” about them. 
Steinbeck’s middle career reveals an extreme tension, between reformist zeal and 
modern skepticism, devolving into a situation where individuals retain deeply humanist 
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moral inclinations but dare not act on them. This moment, as I suggest in the afterword 
below, parallels the current one in cultural theory and literary studies, where the Left 
deploy earnest campaigns against human rights violations in America and abroad even as 
they seek to articulate a posthumanist ethics and aesthetics. The field is tenuously 
balanced between those who perceive the arts as resources for political and ethical 
interventions and those for whom the radical indeterminacy of texts steers them away 
from intervention. Whether this fragile equilibrium will persist remains to be seen, but 
the fiction considered here demonstrates modes of surviving, and sometimes thriving, 
within the tension. 
Davis and Wharton in particular develop activist practices that depend in part on 
countercultural constructions of human subjectivity—its corporeality in Davis and its 
permeability in Wharton—and also of literary experience—its embodied character in 
Davis and its dialogical character in Wharton. Perhaps the defining feature of Davis’s and 
Wharton’s activism is a tolerance for risk, exercised not only in making oneself 
physically available to the needy (Davis) or mingling one’s identity with another’s 
(Wharton) but also in constructing fiction whose final form depends on the work of 
diverse readers. This practice of vulnerability contrasts Steinbeck’s modus operandi, 
encapsulated in Steinbeck’s expressed hope that his writing would “do some good and no 
harm” (qtd. in Benson 347).20 This almost creedal phrase betrays Steinbeck’s lingering 
romance of individual sovereignty, the notion that one could foresee all possible 
consequences of an action and adjust his behavior to effect only the desired ends, while 
                                                
20 The quote comes from a letter Steinbeck sent to Tom Collins, a manager of a camp of migrant 
workers who permitted the author to research and report on the conditions there in 1936. 
Steinbeck and Collins became friends, and the author dedicated The Grapes of Wrath, in part, to 
Collins (“to Tom—who lived it”). 
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avoiding the hazards. Davis and Wharton assume they have real choices to make as 
artists and neighbors. That is, they assume that those choices are conditioned by their 
own constitutions and environments and also that they will be mis/interpreted and 
answered by their readers and neighbors. Nevertheless, they risk charity as neighbors and 
artists, opening themselves to abuse and the hazards of unintended consequences but 
hoping to effect more good than harm.
  
 
Literary Agency Then and Now 
 On November 15, 2011, New York City police officers evicted Occupy Wall 
Street protesters from Zucotti Park and, in the process, threw away more than five 
thousand books from the movement’s on-site People’s Library. While some books were 
later returned or made available for pickup at a local sanitation facility, the majority were 
lost or damaged, and journalists and bloggers instantly drew comparisons to the activities 
of Ray Bradbury’s book-destroying firemen in Fahrenheit 451 (1953), a copy of which 
was disposed of in the Zucotti Park eviction.1 This event manifests in the current 
American moment many of the ideas and energies that framed and pervaded poverty 
fiction in the Long Progressive Era. To begin with, the Occupy Wall Street movement, 
like its right-wing counterpart the Tea Party movement, illustrates that the anxious 
pursuit of agency, especially in relation to objectionable social conditions, defines the 
United States in the twenty-first century much as it did in the period this project studies. 
These movements mobilize Americans grasping for agency in a landscape where they 
feel themselves politically and socially disempowered. Furthermore, the outcry over the 
destruction of the People’s Library situates literature once again, as in the Long 
Progressive Era, at the center of a struggle for agency, while the journalistic invocation of 
Fahrenheit 451 offers us a textual bridge between that earlier period and the present 
moment. 
                                                
1 One blogger, referring to Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s responsibility for the event, called it 
“Bloomberg’s Fahrenheit 451 Moment,” while Mathias Christopher at The Huffington Post 
singled out Bradbury’s novel for special mention among the library books that were thrown away. 
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 Before building the bridge, though, I note an important difference between these 
periods: a strain of paranoia runs through the Occupy and Tea Party movements, 
distinguishing them from the earlier reform campaigns. For Occupiers and Tea Partiers, 
Wall Street and Big Government, respectively, represent vast networks of power that 
exert enormous influence over the lives of individuals and communities without their 
consent. In the paranoid imagination, these inaccessible, tyrannical institutions are hosts 
to all manner of conspiracies against the freedom and general welfare of the public. The 
authors in Reforming Readers also worried about an emergent class of experts’ arrogation 
of authority over poverty relief and fiction reading, but none of these authors interpreted 
that redistribution of power in the shrill tones and apocalyptic terms that have become 
familiar today. It is telling that Rebecca Harding Davis’s polemics reached their 
emotional pinnacle in an essay innocuously entitled “A Grumble” and that Edith Wharton 
feared the consolidation of power by experts less than she did the violent democratization 
of power by socialized labor. William Dean Howells inhabited a love-hate relationship 
with the Progressive reforms that established an American technocracy, and John 
Steinbeck, whose writing occasionally approached the post-war paranoid style, countered 
his fears of what would soon be termed the “military-industrial complex” with non-
teleological philosophy and fictions of Pacific Coast bonhomie. 
 However, if conspiratorial thinking suffuses parts of the Occupy and Tea Party 
movements, the movements’ very existence testifies to a robust sense of agency among 
their constituents, who have indeed found ways of making their concerns heard and their 
influence felt on a national and even global level. In their against-the-odds advocacy, if 
not their particular aims or their rhetorical tones, these contemporary apostles of agency 
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resemble Davis and Wharton before them. The linkage between these periods is still more 
concrete, though. Fahrenheit 451, which commentators referenced in criticizing the raid 
on Zucotti Park, is one of thirty-one books selected by The Big Read, a program of the 
National Endowment for the Arts that, launched in 2006 to stimulate America’s flagging 
reading habits, improvises on the literary-ethical legacy of the Long Progressive Era. 
 In 2009, when the NEA’s then-chairman Dana Goia publicized new survey data 
connected to the Big Read initiative, he sounded a note that would have been familiar to 
Americans in that earlier period: “At a time of immense cultural pessimism,” he began, 
“the NEA is pleased to announce some important good news. Literary reading has risen 
in the U.S. for the first time in a quarter century” (“More American Adults”). Goia’s 
prefatory phrase (“At a time of immense cultural pessimism”) resonates with the 
narrative of modern decline that Reforming Readers has aimed to destabilize and that 
post-war Americans have radicalized, while his identification of literary reading as a 
hopeful and constructive practice echoes the sentiments of the four authors I have studied 
here—especially Davis and Wharton, who imagined reading as a gateway to positive 
social action. However, as much as Davis, Howells, Wharton, and Steinbeck believed 
that literature improved its audiences, nowhere in the Long Progressive Era was there a 
campaign to encourage reading that could rival the scope and organization of the NEA’s 
Big Read project. Goia’s confidence that increased reading rates constitute “important 
good news” in a dark cultural moment begs for some explanation, as does the substantive 
governmental investment in literary reading practices. With what social goods does 
reading correlate, such that the prospect of more reading would command federal monies 
and temper the “cultural pessimism” that frames Goia’s announcement? Or, put 
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otherwise, why would bloggers care more about the loss of Occupiers’ books than that of 
their tents and computers? 
 Two earlier reports by the NEA during Goia’s administration lamented the 
decline of literary reading among all sectors of the American population and especially 
among children, a trend that The Big Read aimed to reverse. As indicated by the title of 
the latter report, To Read or Not to Read: A Question of National Consequence (2007), 
the authors of these reports considered reading not only a privatized, recreational practice 
but also an exercise with “demonstrable social, economic, cultural, and civic 
implications” (To Read 3) in fields like education, employment, cultural engagement, 
and—especially pertinent to Reforming Readers—political activity and volunteerism. In 
the 2000 presidential election, 84% of “Proficient” readers voted, while only 53% of 
“Below-Basic” readers did (To Read 17). In 2002, 43% of literary readers volunteered, 
while only 16% of non-readers did; and in 2003, 57% of “Proficient” readers 
volunteered, while only 18% of “Below-Basic” readers did (To Read 16). The NEA’s 
reports presented similar statistical data about a variety of reader behaviors, but if voting 
and volunteering were the only positive practices so strongly correlated with reading, one 
would understand not only Dana Goia’s claim that the abandonment of reading “would 
constitute a vast cultural impoverishment” but also his assumption in 2009 that increased 
reading rates were “important good news” (Reading at Risk vii). 
 Statistics like the ones above prompt Goia to say that “Regular reading [. . .] 
seems to awaken a person’s social and civic sense” (To Read 4). Certainly, his claim 
corresponds with my sense that poverty fiction of the Long Progressive Era presents a 
strong linkage between reading and individual agency. I have argued that the fictions of 
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Rebecca Harding Davis and Edith Wharton exercise readers’ volition, priming them for 
social action. However, the NEA reports make no distinction between types or forms of 
fiction, as I do, for example, in claiming that William Dean Howells’ and John 
Steinbeck’s works operate on readers differently than Davis’s and Wharton’s works do, 
even “relaxing [. . .] the moral fibre” in the same way that New York society does in A 
Hazard of New Fortunes (296). Perhaps, there are elements of any literary reading 
experience that do “awaken a person’s social and civic sense.” Still more likely, there are 
commonalities among literary readers, voters, and volunteers (e.g., education, class, 
personality) that help account for correlations among their respective defining activities. 
Regardless, it remains important to differentiate the manifold ways in which the forms of 
individual fictional texts act on and respond to readers in the act of reading. Representing 
the poor as pitiful animals (The Valley of Decision) does not urge the same social posture 
upon readers as does representing the poor as ignorant sages (Cannery Row). Neither do 
readers negotiate a text presented as a biographical outline (Life in the Iron-Mills) by the 
same means that they negotiate one represented as a conversation (A Hazard of New 
Fortunes). These idiosyncrasies of content and form matter for the sorts of attitudes and 
actions that emerge from various encounters with fiction. 
 Furthermore, if different texts engender different responses, theoretical 
commitments about the nature of reading do the same, as indicated, for example, by 
contemporary and historical disagreement among literary scholars about the relationship 
between literature and politics. The conflicts between proponents of politically “engaged” 
literature and advocates of “art for art’s sake” derive in no small part from those scholars’ 
different notions of what it means to read well. The former assume a fairly 
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straightforward linkage between the world of the literary text and the world of a reader’s 
daily experience: readers apply in their lives the ideas, emotions, and attitudes cultivated 
in their act of reading. Thus, literature becomes a means of catalyzing particular forms of 
social action. An author constructs a text that fosters specific ideas, emotions, and 
attitudes about specific institutions, practices, or events, and then she watches as the 
intended readerly responses find expression in real-world social forums. Of course, there 
are resistant and aberrant readings, but an author hopes that reading her text generates a 
particular type of social behavior. Rebecca Harding Davis would have very little 
objection to this account of reading. Edith Wharton would protest this account quite 
loudly, but her literature-as-architecture metaphor assumes its basic structure. When an 
author builds a literary environment, a reader makes choices within it under certain 
formal constraints, constraints that the author imposes to promote a particular sort of 
readerly experience. 
 On the other hand, literary scholars in a Howells-Steinbeck lineage take a 
deconstructionist perspective on social injustice, textuality, and human subjectivity that 
prompts them to eschew political readings. In The Ethics of Deconstruction, Simon 
Critchley calls deconstruction a “philosophy of hesitation” that cannot move “from 
undecidability to the decision, from responsibility to questioning, from deconstruction to 
critique, from ethics to politics” (236). Indeed, the increasing animation of the poor and 
of literary texts, combined with the deconstruction of the autonomous self, inclined 
Howells and Steinbeck to settle deeper in their armchairs, despairing of both their own 
agency and the prospects for social reform. The same is true of their descendants in 
literary studies, whose attention to the dignity of the subaltern, the overdetermination of 
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texts, and the contingency of “the human” nurtures three tendencies, one or two of which 
may predominate but all of which cooperate in turning back reformist readings: (1) to 
doubt the very possibility of choosing a response to a text, (2) to engage with reformist 
texts only on an intellectual level (and not to be interpellated in any more holistic way), 
and (3) to relegate any other levels of response (e.g., affective, corporeal, ethical) to the 
private sphere. This aloofness is sensible for one who doubts his own agency, and it is 
consistent for one who deems cultural forms and practices utterly contingent. Reformist 
readings assume a power of personal choice and a superior cultural vision. Steinbeck, for 
one, depicts the violence that well-intentioned reform can do to the communities it aims 
to help. To be uncritically incorporated by a text promoting change in someone else’s life 
makes one a potential agent of oppression. 
 Is it possible, then, to embrace Dana Goia’s enthusiasm for literary reading as a 
socially constructive practice? Differences among literary texts and differences among 
theories of reading problematize any broad judgments on reading as such. Which text are 
we reading? And how are we reading it? In the face of these questions, I argue that one 
can celebrate the NEA’s evidence that more Americans are reading literature. While 
Reforming Readers favors interventionist readings over purely observational ones, I 
maintain that the types of literature conducing to one or the other response both have a 
constructive social function, which I will describe at greater length presently. First, 
though, I want to critique the socially aloof mode of literary scholarship descending from 
Howells and Steinbeck that threatens Goia’s linkage of reading and social engagement. 
 Readings of reformist fiction that prioritize cold analysis, while privatizing any 
emotional, corporeal, and ethical responses, often proceed from a healthy skepticism of 
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cultural imperialism, of the seductive notion that because someone else’s life looks 
unfulfilled from my vantage point, her life must want reforming. However, Davis and 
Wharton, whose fiction invites interventionist readings, also recognize the risk of 
violence in reform, and they embrace it. On what grounds do they do so? I argue that they 
embrace the risk of violence because they have internalized critiques of social reform, 
activist reading, and the Cartesian self more deeply than Howells and Steinbeck have. In 
their withdrawal from ethics, Howells and Steinbeck indulge an Enlightenment fantasy of 
self-determination, maintaining an illusion of ethical control and innocence by refusing to 
participate in reformist behaviors whose outcomes are uncertain. This stance depends on 
something like a toddler’s sense that if she covers her eyes, the world she can no longer 
see ceases to exist. Davis and Wharton recognize the inescapability of social injustice and 
their own involvement in it. There is no moral neutrality, even in withdrawal. Therefore, 
Davis’s and Wharton’s texts invite action on behalf of the poor; they encourage the 
exercise of agency, which does not presume autonomy and a conquering will but affirms 
the potential for constructive work under the limiting conditions of biology, environment, 
and, perhaps, metaphysical forces. 
 Another risk that Davis and Wharton embrace as reformers is the possibility—
really, the inevitability—of becoming themselves the reformed. Just as the title of this 
study casts “Readers” in the acts of reforming and being reformed, so Davis’s and 
Wharton’s activism causes them to oscillate between the positions of subject and object, 
the changer and the changed. In this respect, too, they reject the fantasy of self-
determination. To them, living means changing, and not only according to one’s own 
intentions. Drawing on the Incarnation, Davis conceives meaningful action as the sort 
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that makes one vulnerable, like Christ, to violence at the hands of others. Theorizing 
sympathy, Wharton imagines life’s most defining moments as those in which interacting 
with an Other blurs one’s own sense of self and reveals a social interdependence. For 
both authors, the self emerges in relationship, and its shape bears the impressions of other 
wills acting on it. The scrupulous detachment that Howells’s and Steinbeck’s fictions 
commend seems to result, after all, from too shallow an appropriation of what I have 
anachronistically called deconstructionist insights. Howells and Steinbeck advertise these 
insights, but their faith in withdrawal and the possibility of doing no harm indicates that 
their illusions of individual sovereignty remain intact. 
 A post-war novel concerned with reclaiming agency from a totalitarian state that 
outlaws books, Fahrenheit 451 seems a natural selection for The Big Read project. It 
thematizes the sort of risk that Davis and Wharton commend to “reforming readers.” 
Having decided to subvert the state from his position within the repressive government, 
Guy Montag leans on his friend Faber’s counsel, piped to him through an earpiece. When 
Montag hesitates to confront Beatty, the fire chief, Faber advises him, “I know. I know. 
You’re afraid of making mistakes. Don’t be. Mistakes can be profited by” (104). 
Bradbury returns to the theme after Montag stumbles upon a community of literate exiles 
from the state, who memorize books verbatim in hopes of helping to rebuild civilization 
after the repressive state collapses under its own weight. Looking at these men’s faces, 
however, he anticipates “a brightness, a resolve, a triumph over tomorrow that hardly 
seemed to be there” (154). Though Montag “expected their faces to burn and glitter with 
the knowledge they carried,” these men “weren’t at all certain that the things they carried 
in their heads might make every future dawn glow with a purer light [. . .]” (154). Indeed, 
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“they were sure of nothing save that the books were on file behind their quiet eyes, the 
books were waiting, with their pages uncut, for the customers who might come by in later 
years [. . .]” (155). This humble confidence in the books, however, sustains the men, who 
want nothing more. “Ask no guarantees,” the leader counsels Montag, and continues, 
“ask for no security, there never was such an animal. And if there were, it would be 
related to the great sloth which hangs upside down in a tree all day every day, sleeping its 
life away” (157). The message resonates with Davis’s and Wharton’s theories of agency, 
which preach commitment in the absence of certainty. 
 Having located a more authentically deconstructionist ethic in intervention than in 
withdrawal, let us return to the problem of literature that itself promotes withdrawal. Why 
would the NEA celebrate the reading of such work? The Big Read initiative did not 
scruple over such literature, and neither does Reforming Readers, ultimately, because 
both projects promote a kind of reading that circumscribes self-indulgent passivity; to be 
more precise, they encourage reading that is holistic and communal. The Big Read’s 
website offers the following statement about the work that literature performs on readers: 
“A great book combines enlightenment with enchantment. It awakens our imagination 
and enlarges our humanity” (“Fahrenheit 451 Preface”).2 These sentences describe a 
holistic engagement of the reader. If “enchantment” denotes the sort of full-bodied 
experience by which readers of Davis and Wharton are drawn out of themselves and into 
the lives of others, then “enlightenment” denotes the sort of cognitive discoveries that 
Howells and Steinbeck offer their readers concerning the limitations of the human will. 
“A great book” offers both of these readerly experiences, and, if the two seem 
                                                
2 These sentences appear as part of the Big Read’s preface to each of its selected books. 
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incompatible, literature also “awakens our imagination” to effect a reconciliation and 
“enlarges our humanity” beyond the necessity of choosing one or the other.3 Holistic 
reading shuttles continuously between enlightenment and enchantment, mind and body, 
observation and intervention. The poles in these binaries are not strictly opposed but 
mutually constitutive. In the case of novels like A Hazard of New Fortunes and Cannery 
Row, which draw the reader mostly toward the first term in each of these polarities, 
holistic reading becomes resistant reading, pulling in the opposite direction to keep mind 
in conversation with body and to keep observation the partner of intervention. 
 Reading that finds expression in constructive social action must be communal as 
well as holistic. The Big Read promotes such collective reading in that the project’s 
primary work consists in sponsoring one-month events in selected communities across 
the country, each of which reads a single book together. Communities apply to participate 
in these programs that include “a kick-off event to launch the program locally, ideally 
attended by the mayor and other local luminaries; major events devoted specifically to 
the [chosen] book (panel discussions, author reading, and the like); events using the book 
as a point of departure (film screenings, theatrical readings, and so forth); and book 
discussions in diverse locations and aimed at a wide range of audiences” (“About the Big 
Read”). Reading in such a context not only encourages the holism described above, by 
bringing many individual reading experiences into conversation, but it also militates 
against passive reading. A participating community has already invested substantial 
energy in applying to The Big Read and planning events for the month-long program, and 
                                                
3 With humanism on the academic chopping block for the last forty years, the notion of 
“enlarging our humanity” seems dubious. But Davis’s and Wharton’s poverty fiction suggests 
that humanism and the idea of the human are richer, subtler conceptual resources than recent 
academics have acknowledged and ought not to be abandoned. 
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this investment encourages a real commitment to the work of reading that follows. 
Moreover, the events themselves require readers to expend the energy of traveling 
somewhere to talk, think, feel, and act in response to the text. Finally, the sharing of 
one’s private reading experiences in public discussions emphasizes the processual and 
social character of reading; one becomes more acutely attuned to the temporal evolution 
of a reading experience and more obviously accountable to others for her readerly 
responses. Such a process entails a honing and an intensification of individual readings 
and, perhaps, new forms of social interaction emerging in and through the exchange of 
those readings. 
 Fahrenheit 451 offers a striking image of this holistic and communal relation to 
books in the band of exiles that Montag joins at the novel’s end. Having committed many 
books to memory, but lacking the physical artifacts, these men represent themselves as 
the books. The leader of the men, Granger, tells Montag, “I am Plato’s Republic” (151); 
and since only Montag and a man named Harris know Ecclesiastes, Granger tells the 
protagonist, “If anything should happen to Harris, you are the Book of Ecclesiastes” 
(151). The text proceeds to identify other exiles as the embodiments of particular authors’ 
works—Swift, Darwin, Einstein, Gandhi, and so on. Thus, Fahrenheit constructs an 
image of radically holistic reading, where the whole person is not only incorporated in 
the reading experience but even merges with the text. The men have become “dust 
jackets for books”; they are “bums on the outside, libraries inside” (153). Moreover, this 
situation makes the men’s continuing relation to books a thoroughly social one, as 
engaging a book not only involves but is engaging another person. They also locate their 
personal salvation and that of civilization in literary community. Granger attests that 
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“When we were separate individuals, all we had was rage,” but formed into a strategic 
“network,” the men have purpose and a gift to offer a post-apocalyptic world. Indeed, 
Fahrenheit ultimately turns even its apocalypticism to purposes of global restoration, as 
the narrative’s last page has Montag contemplating the book of Revelation’s depiction of 
the New Jerusalem: “And on either side of the river was there a tree of life, which bare 
twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month; And the leaves of the tree 
were for the healing of the nations” (165). Seeming to play on the association of “leaves” 
and pages, Bradbury invokes a sacred text to pronounce hope—even for subjects of 
hyper-modern, totalitarian regimes—in holistic, communal reading. 
 Fahrenheit 451’s deep entanglement of books with bodies and communities 
makes the destruction of the Occupy Wall Street People’s Library seem all the more 
desolating and goes some distance toward explaining the public fixation on that feature of 
the November 15th eviction. But that this novel found a place in the movement’s library is 
no more surprising than its selection to The Big Read project. Its dramatization of human 
agency under the most constraining conditions, exercised through reading, makes it a 
potentially liberating text even for the paranoid and a gateway to an even earlier historical 
moment—the subject of Reforming Readers—when social and aesthetic constraints could 
as well be invitations as impediments to action.
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